Ackerman on Af/Pak COIN and Somalia CT

By Steve Hynd

Spencer Ackerman picked up on my recent post about the strike that took out militant leader Saleh Ali Nabhan in Somalia, a seeming execution of a perfect counterterrorism operation that might give a model for what to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan that doesn't involve decades-long nation building attempts. The same thought occured to John Kerry at the hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Afghanistan. Kerry quizzed Stephen Biddle about the possible lessons from the raid and Spencer was on the case.

�Safe havens do not [offer al-Qaeda] real estate for construction of tent farms for training seminars,� [Biddle] said, but instead they protect al-Qaeda from �human-intelligence penetration on the ground,� upon which such targeted counterterrorism strikes depend. With regard to the drone strikes in Pakistan against al-Qaeda � which the CIA claims has seriously eroded al-Qaeda�s freedom of movement in the tribal areas and which some counterinsurgents fear will ultimately alienate Pakistanis � �control of the government underneath the drones� was an additional prerequisite for success, Biddle said. Take away human intelligence and host-government complicity through an offshoring strategy, and counterterrorism would be a non-starter.

Spencer notes that Biddle was a bit evasive.

Biddle could have grappled more with the implications that we really did manage to kill Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in Somalia, without an onshore presence; despite his safe haven; and evidently acquiring the requisite intelligence. Now, perhaps conditions in the Pak tribal areas just aren't like conditions in Somalia in terms of permissibility. (That would be a good answer to the "why are we invading Afghanistan and not Yemen/Somalia" question, btw.) But there needed to be more engagement with the example than Biddle provided. 

Then, always the consumate journalist, Spencer asked Col. Daniel Roper, the head of the Army-Marine Corps COIN Center, about the possibility that the Somalia strike could provide part of a template for CT operations in Af/Pak and got another evasive answer.

In Roper�s view, counterterrorism is a prophylactic measure, a treatment of the symptom after the patient has fallen ill, while counterinsurgency addresses root-cause economic, social, legal and political failures that contribute to insurgency. Counterinsurgency is about �addressing political dynamics at the local level, through existing or adapting governance structures,� Roper said. �If we focus on the symptoms we�ll never solve the causes.�

It was impossible to divorce Afghanistan from its regional context, Roper continued, citing �profoundly transnational dynamics.� To discuss extremism in Afghanistan without discussing �the dynamics in Pakistan� was folly, and you �can�t have a coherent talk about the dynamics with Pakistan without [discussing] India� and other regional players. At the same time, Roper praised �increasingly successful attacks of drones that are killing militants, not civilians.�

So all of that regional talk is well-taken. But the fact remains that the Somalia strike succeeded. I asked Roper if there was some specific condition in Somalia that allowed Special Forces to acquire sufficient intelligence to execute the strike that doesn�t exist in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Roper was justifiably hesitant to speak to the Somalia raid before all the facts were in. �Within the borders of Afghanistan,� he continued, �there are places where [insurgents] are inaccessible, for whatever reason, collectively, either getting the intelligence we need to have sufficient confidence to conduct an operation or we may not have the resource to take advantage� of that intelligence.

Spencer writes:

This explanation... isn't an explanation. It remains obscure (perhaps rightly so) how it was we were to acquire sufficient intelligence in an impermissible environment like Somalia to kill Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan but can't in the more-permissive environs of Afghanistan. Roper's concession on the efficacy of the drone strikes makes the Somalia-but-not-Afghanistan case harder as well. If we can do it in Waziristan...

There's a discussion between Spencer and myself about those "transnational dynamics" of Col. Roper's too.

But this series of posts is why I respect the hell out of Spencer Ackerman even when I disagree with him, sometimes vociferously. (And remember, I'm not a subtle man and sometimes ruffle people the wrong way thereby - something I apologise to all and sundry for in advance but will never change.)  I know Spencer has leaned fairly heavily towards a COIN answer for Af/Pak, but his integrity and intellectual curiosity led him to pursue this question and in doing so he strengthened the argument for a Rory Stewart style drawdown to a more counter-terrorism based strategy which will focus on hunting Al Qaeda, not nation building. That's something that Obama told us back in March we would get but which rapidly changed without announcement or real debate. Thanks for the follow-up, Spencer.