Poodle No More?

By Steve Hynd

The head of the UK's Royal Air Force has questioned the military's focus on Afghanistan, just as the  public debate over the forthcoming Strategic Defense Review kicks in to high gear. (Bold is mine - SH.)

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton told the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) that reinforcing the armed forces' "low-tech warfare" capabilities, as is required in Afghanistan at present, risked missing the bigger picture.

...I've explained the implications of this choice - we drastically reduce our options, increase risk, and commit ourselves to a future of low-tech warfare that may be neither desirable, nor politically or publicly acceptable."

Instead he called for an armed forces which combines all capabilities, balancing the needs of the Army in Afghanistan with consideration of mid- and long-term needs.

"We need to think very carefully about whether our 'Afghanistan' era force structure is a model for the future," he warned.

"Do we want � and need � to put all our eggs into this particular basket? Where would we fight a major, low-tech counter-insurgency again?"

The obvious, cynical and glib answer to that last question is - wherever the U.S. wants us to.

Both Gordon Brown and his opponent David Cameron have been keen to emphasise their intention to "stay the course" alongside the United States in Afghanistan - and pretty much anywhere else. That's unlikely to be the result of deep conviction from either of them - they're British political leaders - but may stem from a long-held British political myth that the UK has a "special relationship" of influence over the U.S. and the conclusion that any British leader who destroyed that relationship would be political dead meat. Both Brown and Cameron should look to Blair's singular lack of influence over Bush, or to Brown's inability to influence the U.S. on climate change, financial regulation and a whole lot else and realise that the "special relationship" is a fiction or at best a one-way street.

But Blair's poodle-like devotion to America's foreign policy adventurism has finally spoiled the relationship in the British public's eyes - and UK political leaders' unceasing commitment to that foreign policy in Afghanistan while public support for staying the course craters leaves an opportunity for someone, even if it's not going to be Brown or Cameron. The Financial Times today has an op-ed by Philip Stephens which calls for Britain to finally attend to its own national interests instead of America's. (Again, bold is mine.)

Operation Moshtarak carries the risk that tactical gains will be mistaken for strategic success. This is not the time to go deeper into Afghanistan. Rather it is the moment to think harder about withdrawal.

Britain�s armed forces have special cause for satisfaction. They have been under virtual siege in Helmand province, suffering heavy casualties. Public support, in Britain, for the war has drained even as admiration has grown for the valour of those fighting it. The influx of US forces has taken off some of the pressure.

Gordon Brown now talks about a new phase. You can see why. The UK prime minister faces an election in May. He has been criticised for sending troops into battle with sub-standard equipment. Yet the bill for the war has soared even as recession has wrought havoc with government finances. The cost for 2011 is put at �6bn ($9.4bn, �6.9bn), nearly a fifth of the peacetime defence budget. Mr Brown badly needs good news from the front.

Yet military advances should not obscure the underlying realities of the conflict. The present operation will prove a turning point only if the west draws the right lessons.

Military victory for Nato in Afghanistan is as far away now as it was a week, a month or a year ago. Territorial gains are no substitute for the political consent upon which long-term stability depends. Now is the time for the west to intensify the pressure on Afghan president Hamid Karzai to talk to his enemies. The surge will be of lasting worth only if it encourages the emergence of an Afghan coalition that includes those Taliban willing to reach a reasonable accommodation with Kabul.

For its part, Britain should start thinking about a timetable for withdrawal. Ideally, the return of British troops should be part of the wider US plan to transfer security to the Afghans. But, if needs be, Britain�s politicians should make up their own minds. Their first duty is to the national interest; and it is hard to see how an open-ended commitment to keep British troops in Afghanistan serves that interest.

Undoubtably true. But the depth to which Britain's political leadership plays poodle to American foreign policy is made obvious by discussion papers paving the way for the Strategic Defense Review. As Alex Harrowell ably points out, there's no discussion whatsoever about the changing role of the U.S. - including its commission and coverup of war crimes - or its declining superpower influence. Alex writes that a major aim of British policy should be to maximise Britain's ability to say "no", to not be America's poodle. Unfortunately, there's absolutely no sign that either Brown or Cameron are willing to do that. An opportunity for the national third party, the Liberal Democrats, perhaps? It'll certainly be seen as one by the SNP.