By Cernig
SecDef Bob Gates among others have been vocal recently in calling for America to "fight the wars it has" rather than chase big-ticket procurement of massive shiny toys which keep arms manufacturers in a cozy government welfare program but will only be useful if America fights a war it isn't in yet. Meanwhile, we're already seeing interventionist hawks attack Obama for "appeasement" in wanting to use negotiation to solve problems and raising the old chestnut of progressives never waging even an undeniably just war for fear of breaking eggs (collateral damage and civilian deaths) while making an omelet.
Back in 2006, I got to thinking about these issues in the light of the counter-insurgency principles that "less is more" and that "hearts and minds" always end up more important than body counts of bad guys. What follows is mostly copied from a post back then - but I keep revisiting that post and I still think it's largely correct. However, Newshoggers has a rather larger readership than it did in 2006 - this idea is being put forward again for criticism. If you think you can shoot it full of holes, please do so.
Although as a democratic socialist I believe that whenever possible conflict should be settled by diplomacy and negotiation I am also a realist enough to understand that is not always possible. In particular, fundamentalist extremists willing to turn to terror and violence - often backed by states with a vested interest in keeping such groups on some kind of leash - have historically presented a major problem to peaceable conflict resolution. Given that force must occasionally be used as a last resort, where diplomacy will not suffice, it makes sense to me to say that we want to use that force in the best way - that is, the most successful for conflict resolution.
It is an article of faith among many that overwhelming military force is just as valid and valuable a response in fighting terror as it indubitably is in fighting another State's regular armed forces - is that actually the case?
The short answer to that is undoubtedly "No". To see this we only have to look at the situations in which America and some of its major allies around the world find themselves. Even where 3rd generation warfare was incredibly successful in the state-on-state phase of a conflict, the occupations or hunting down and eradicating of terrorist and insurgent groups has been an universal failure when using the same equipment and tactics.
In Lebanon and Palestine, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, bombing even with "precision" weapons seems to kill and radicalize more of the civilian population than it kills terrorists. Heavy troop presence becomes an incitement to radicalization when the populace sees it's land as "occupied" rather than seeing "liberators". Tanks and heavy artillery simply add to the disproportionate civilian carnage of the fighter-bombers while being easier for an insurgency to gain PR points by counter-attacking. Surely only the dumbest of the dumb would expect a different outcome from exactly the same set of failed tactics.
For those who seem to be exactly that dumb, here's a short refresher course in Guerrilla War 101, courtesy of the guy who literally wrote the book (and who thinks the neocons are morons) William S. Lind:
Air power works against you, not for you. It kills lots of people who weren�t your enemy, recruiting their relatives, friends and fellow tribesmen to become your enemies. In this kind of war, bombers are as useful as 42 cm. siege mortars.
Big, noisy, offensives, launched with lots of warning, achieve nothing. The enemy just goes to ground while you pass on through, and he�s still there when you leave. Big Pushes are the opposite of the �ink blot� strategy, which is the only thing that works, when anything can.
Putting the Big Push together with lots of bombing in Afghanistan�s Pashtun country means we end up fighting most if not all of the Pashtun. In Afghan wars, the Pashtun always win in the end. [Apply this to the ethnic/religious group with a generations-long warrior tradition of your choice for other regions. It still works. - C]
Quisling governments fail because they cannot achieve legitimacy.
You need closure, but your guerrilla enemy doesn�t. He not only can fight until Doomsday, he intends to do just that-if not you, then someone else.
The bigger the operations you have to undertake, the more surely your enemy is winning.
And more - as Lind quotes from expert Chet Richards in his forthcoming book "Neither Shall The Sword":
war is terrorism, so a �war on terrorism� is a war on war. We are not in a war on �terrorism� or engaged in a �struggle against violent extremism.� Instead, we are faced with an evolutionary development in armed conflict, a �fourth generation� of warfare that is different from and much more serious than �terrorism��
to see the difference between 4GW and �terrorism,� run this simple thought experiment: suppose bin Laden and al-Qaida were able to enforce their program on the Middle East, but they succeeded without the deliberate killing of one more American civilian. The entire Middle East turns hostile, Israel is destroyed, and gas goes up to $15 per gallon when it is available. Bin Laden�s 4GW campaign succeeds, but without terrorism. Do you feel better?
This applies to situations like Iraq and Afghanistan:
It�s not a war followed by a blown peace. That is conventional war thinking, even if the war is waged and quickly won by 3GW. Instead, it will be an occupation against some degree of resistance, followed by the real, fourth generation war.
I've a notion that the correct strategy lies in going exactly the other way in applying asymmetric force. Less is more. Assassinate known and self-admitted terrorist leaders and those who noisily support them from positions of state or popular power. Those individuals who lead, support and advocate terror only and no others. Do not create civilian casualties to fuel the next round of hate. One of the very first effects will be to concentrate the minds of both sides' leadership - often the very people who are safest from the destruction they create, towards ceasefires, conflict resolution and peace.
Let the terrorists be the only ones to ever mass-kill innocents and even many who support them will change their minds about that support, gradually removing their power base of generational hatred. Back that up with a genuinely universal foreign policy of ethical intervention and aid (hearts and minds) and the effect will be multiplied. Between the two, it would even dampen down, through both positive and negative reinforcement, the process of replacing the terrorist leaders and the leaders who enable them.
The West has the tools - highly trained special forces and intelligence units. No person is safe from a trained and motivated assassin backed by the kind of support technology modern democracies can provide. But don't use bombs and artillery - they just aren't accurate enough, even when "precision" is prefixed to their names by the advertising blurb.
Should this mean threats of reciprocity - killing of the West's leaders and and its own versions of advocates of genocide - then let those threatened people declare "bring it on". Let them too have the courage to face the bullet from afar. (Isn't the dream of the common man to have the two leaders in a conflict fight it out as champions without a multitude of peasants' deaths? This would be as close to it as we are likely to get.)
Should any nation descend into chaos because too much of its leadership class has been removed then - as the neocons never cease to remind us - not all medicine tastes nice. Which is preferable, a chaotic nation where inimical strongmen are still around to help guide the chaos along to their own ends or one where a true "hearts and minds" policy can soften the blow, shorten the interregnum and help the blameless innocent - all of whom will blissfully still be alive - choose a decent path for their nation free of the machinations of terrorist leaders and their enablers?
Let me make myself clear - I'm not advocating secret wars of political assassination here. I'm talking about a new approach to waging declared wars - one that minimizes killing of innocents, maximizes killing the bad guys that count and can drive change in a destructive group or a rogue regime, either by allowing those who are amenable to rational negotiation to rise to power or by decapitating leadership in a way that allows massive reconstruction forces of the kind envisioned by Gates and others - "wingtips on the ground" in current COIN-speak - a far easier time in stepping into the consequent breach.
But it would mean the U.S. spearheading a move to have the prohibition against direct targeting of political leaders struck from international law - a prohibition nowadays which is effectively ignored by massively penetrating ordinance anyway and which was originally set up by political leaders who wanted to guard their own elite asses while sending peons into the meat-grinder. There would be a political price to pay for that if it wasn't handled delicately and with full explanation of the whys and wherefores. Even so, I think it would make sense from a progressive point of view and from the view of those COIN specialists contemplating the kinds of wars America and the world look to be engaging in for now and the considerable future.
So go on - shoot it down, build on it, whatever.
There's only one effective counterinsurgency method: understanding what's going on and acting justly.
ReplyDeleteThe Battle of Algiers used face-to-face tactics... and failed. The latter years of Vietnam was purely an air war... and it failed. The reason both failed is that they were trying to accomplish objectives that their societies did not support.
The first step is always to understand what is going on. For example, Pakistan is a case of a civil war: Pashtuns and Balochis who never wanted to be part of Pakistan joining forces with the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaida to resist what they regard as a foreign occupation.
Taking it purely from the standpoint of Big Power domination, the key strategy in Pakistan is to align against the military and with the majority in Pakistan who want an end to corruption and more democracy. Where there are injustices against the Balochis and the Pashtuns, they should be corrected. A settlement possibly including a separate state for people who feel injured by the imposition of the Durand Line should be considered. And then blow the h--- out of anyone who won't accept yes for an answer. At least you'll have the support of the society.
IMHO.
Hi Charles,
ReplyDeleteI agree totally on what you write. Negotiation, deplomacy, soft power - these are the real answers. But what I'm trying to set out is a targeted way to "blow the h--- out of anyone who won't accept yes for an answer" which leaves those who will say "yes" in charge even of the worst groups.
Arguably, it's what the British govt. followed as a long-term strategy in N. Ireland. What they were left with was the folk like McGuiness who didn't want to spnd years in jail only to end up being a target for an SAS marksman and so did some really serious thinking about the best way forward...and it ended up not involving bombs.
Regards, C
Hi BJ, good stuff. But I'd like to point to a nuance of my outline I think you've maybe missed - I'm not advocating assassination of all leaders, just the ones unamenable to peace. The true goal of a "War on Terror" isn't to kill or capture terrorists. It is to prevent terror attacks. And in N.I. the Brits discovered that one of the best ways to accomplish that was to artificially select a leadership for the terrorists who were more likely to negotiate an end to attacks.
ReplyDeleteRegards, C
Cernig, if the dominant power's goals are aligned with the smaller power's goals, there's no ambiguity about how to fight the war. The smaller power will supply the manpower, the guidelines and the methods. The dominant power will provide the weapons and the training, plus maybe a little high-tech.
ReplyDeleteTactically, counterinsurgency differs according to circumstances and terrain. In Sudan, one probably could do an air war. Just give the villagers basic weapons for self-defense and a hotline to bring in close air support. In Pakistan, where terrain and ethnic complexity make it difficult to know who is friend and who is enemy, Special Forces from the besieged areas are the only really effective way to kill the right people.
I don't think that there is one best way to do counterinsurgency. There is just the pre-condition that if you are viewed as doing what most people in the country want, they'll help you. If you are viewed as an occupier and a parasite, they'll help the insurgency. Great powers are not very good at letting smaller powers lead, but that's the nub of the issue.
If the strategy you propose of assassinating leaders you disapprove of was posted by Al Quada you and the press would be all over it, using their post as a further rationale for branding them the bad guys and you the good guys.
ReplyDeleteHow about we pressure the countries in the region to involve their political enemies in the process of govt through fair elections, how about we provide food and shelter to those made homeless by these wars? How about responsible foreign policy and respect for international law as an alternative to slaughter?
Stop seeing war as some neat latest version of Nintendo and realize you are sanctioning and supporting murder as a solution to political unrest.
Recognize the wars we are in are the direct result of our support of corrupt regimes and address the problem instead of deploying a idiotic solution of I know, let's kill the bad guys!
Hi Cernig,
ReplyDeleteI'm not advocating assassination of all leaders, just the ones unamenable to peace. . . . the Brits discovered that one of the best ways to accomplish that was to artificially select a leadership for the terrorists who were more likely to negotiate an end to attacks.
I didn�t miss the nuance, (well, I don�t think I did), I just don�t agree with the focus on the hierarchy. I�m not saying you won�t be forced to remove some people, (though here too, �less is more� regarding the method used. �Remove� here isn�t exactly a euphemism.), my argument is that doing so doesn�t inevitably lead to more conciliatory leadership.
Israel has been trying to �artificially select� Palestinian leadership for quite some time now. How do you think that�s working out? Decapitation strikes are sometimes a tactical necessity, but they only become strategic successes as they did in Northern Ireland when the overall situation makes the ascension of a more amenable leader more likely. Otherwise you go down the road the Occupied Territories have, where even if one groups' leadership becomes more willing to negotiate, other more radical groups spring up and take over the fighting, leading to even further radicalization of the population at large.
This and my previous comment are all my long-winded way of saying, deal with the base people issues and the leadership problem will ultimately rectify itself. I�ll bow before your undoubtedly superior knowledge of the NI campaign, but I�m willing to bet that McGuiness didn�t start out his career a strong believer in negotiation, and that had the British been far more heavy-handed, the rejectionist splinter groups would be a whole lot bigger and more active.
"But it would mean the U.S. spearheading a move to have the prohibition against direct targeting of political leaders struck from international law "
ReplyDeleteThat's only illegal in peacetime. In a "state of armed conflict" under international law, the entire chain of command up to the Head of State, is a legitimate military target.
Previously, in State vs. State warfare, it was customary, but not required, to exempt the senior leadership ( such as Hirohito)from being targeted so that there would be a recognized, legitimate, authority who could turn off the war machine and facilitate a surrender.
Now this applies reasonably well to rigidly hierarchical Maoist insurgencies like FARC or the Nepalese Communists who have tight internal discipline and chains of command that ape conventional military structures (ascending Giap's stages). It does not apply to true, highly decentralized 4GW insurgencies composed of heterogeneous networks. You might as well take out the key "nodes" because while these figures can lead, inspire or organize the larger insurgency, they don't really "command" it like Patton commanded the 3rd Army. You lose nothing by killing them because they can't surrender or negotiate concessions for more than their own immediate followers.