The NPT, Article Four And Iran

By Cernig

Here's a very interesting post (and comments discussion) from Dr. James Acton of King's College, London, writing at The Arms Control Wonk. The post centers around what is accepted under the NPT as constituting the �manufacture� of nuclear weapons - which would be a compliance breach with serious consequences - and what would constitute part of an NPT signatory nation's right �to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy�.

There was considerable debate during NPT negotiations over the meaning of manufacture. Agreement was eventually reached in a set of purpose criteria, sometimes known as the �Foster Criteria� (after ACDA Director William Foster). According to Josef Goldblat (in Arms Control: A New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements) these criteria have not been challenged.

Most of the time the Foster criteria are simply given as: �Facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance.� But, occasionally, they are quoted in a longer form:

Facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of an experimental prototype nuclear explosive device would be covered by the term �manufacture� as would be the production of components which would only have relevance to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a particular activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, settle the question of whether that activity was in compliance with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any suspicion of non-compliance.

A month or two ago, I was given a copy of Mohamed Shaker�s epic but almost impossible-to-find The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Foster Criteria appear to be based on Foster�s testimony to the Senate. In this testimony there is a second, very interesting paragraph that I have never seen before. It goes like this:

It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several activities which the United States would not consider per se to be violations of the prohibitions in Article II. Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful nuclear program would violate Article II so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also clearly permitted would be the development, under safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards.

Foster could hardly be clearer...    [Emphasis Mine - C]

Now, the point in all this is that the Foster Criteria were explicitly accepted by the U.S. at the time the NPT was signed and no administration has ever officially repudiated them. Which leaves the Bush administration grasping at straws for its belligerence over Iran's nuclear program. No-one has yet provided any evidence that Iran's nuclear program has as one of its aims the manufacture of a weapon and the alleged "Laptop of Doom" evidence given to the IAEA recently is on a very shaky foundation - it was handed to the US by the MeK terror group which has a long history of making lurid anti-Iranian accusations, all of which have turned out to be false when investigated. Indeed, the Bush administration's own intelligence community says Iran doesn't have a weapons program - something Bush and his "non-proliferation" officials have ignored whenever possible.

"Deja vu all over again" indeed. 

The administration's pushing of the US/India nuke deal only serves to point up its hypocrisy in demonizing what America has long held was the right of any NPT member. India developed nukes outwith the NPT but rather than sanctions it is to get a deal which would allow it access to US technology and nuclear material. Israel and Pakistan also developed actual weapons in secret and outwith the NPT but remain US allies who receive billions in military aid. According to Bush's former UN ambassador John Bolton, those countries did it "legitimately" by not joining the NPT first while Iran should be bombed. That's what passes for logic in neocon circles. However, many of the member nations of the important Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) appear to disagree - they've moved to block Bush's deal with India unless comprehensive conditions to prevent india using the deal to further its weapons program are applied.

Outrageous double standards of this kind are a big part of why America no longer has the international standing it once has. Castigating Russia for invading and occupying Georgia on a pretext, while still being in Iraq five years after Bush used his own even more ginned-up pretext for war, comprises yet another double standard the world isn't blind to.  Bush and the neocons, driven by a vision of American exceptionalism, have made America exceptionally mistrusted and John McCain's own statements show that he is more than ready to perpetuate that slide off the moral high ground.