By Steve Hynd
The Center for a New American Security is without a doubt the most influential foreign policy think-tank during these early days of the Obama administration. Just as the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute were the neocon motherships in Bush's time, this liberal interventionist grouping has provided key staff and key policy prescriptions for Obama. The facts that General David Petraeus seems to be its unofficial leader and that all the big COINdinista names are fellows don't hurt at all.
Michael Cohen, in an excellent post over at Democracy Arsenal today, takes a long hard look at the latest CNAS policy paper "Triage". The paper's main purpose is to look at the next 12 months of counter-insurgency occupation in the Af/Pak region and provide the "metrics" or benchmarks that were so obviously AWOL from the official Obama administration's announced plan. But Michael spotted a very telling passage in the paper (all emphasis mine):
Because population-centric counterinsurgency operations demand a high concentration of troops, there will still be a sizable gap between the coalition�s stated objectives and its available resources, even with these significant new commitments of forces. The United States and its allies may have enough military power to clear Taliban fighters from large areas of Afghanistan, but they do not have enough troops to hold and then build across equivalently large areas.This constraint will require commanders to triage ruthlessly, allocating their forces to areas where the smallest number of coalition troops can protect the greatest number of Afghans.
Cohen writes:
Now wait a minute, if there is a "sizable" gap between objectives and resources isn't that a pretty serious problem and doesn't it suggest that either the effort is doomed or we are on the cusp of a much longer and robust engagement? I'd love to get a respectful answer from the authors of the report on this question, but how do they believe that gap will be filled? Will it involve more troops and a longer US commitment to ensure that initial gains are solidified? Do they truly believe that the United States is prepared for and interested in such a long-standing commitment?
The authors of the report are admirably honest about the fact that their vision of success in Afghanistan will take several years to achieve. If the Obama Administration intends to echo their conclusions then they need to say so as explicitly as possible. The American people have a right to know what a population-centric counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan will entail. My guess is that, like Iraq, if they know what such an effort truly entails, they won't be too interested.
My worry, as it has always been, that the argument for a population centric counter insurgency approach in Afghanistan is a recipe for justifying a longer and more engaged mission there. Nothing I've read in this report dissuades me from this view. And having attended the CNAS conference today in Washington I am convinced more than ever that if the COIN advocates have their way we will be in Afghanistan for a very, very long time.
Spot on. But the authors of the CNAS paper aren't being all that honest. "Several years" is none too precise. Back in March, co-author David Kilcullen was far more specific, saying "ten to fifteen years, including at least two years of significant combat up front".
A back of the envelope calculation gives a cost for the longer timeframe of $1.3 trillion over and above what has already been spent, that figure including VA benefits and debt servicing. But that assumes only the current troop levels. If those increase - and I agree they look likely to - then the sky's the limit. Casualty figures will presumably be proportionate - and are already climbing.
During the course of 10 to 15 years, it's unlikely there won't be a military emergency that will require the U.S. to re-deploy its troops from Afghanistan. Heck, with the money our operations there are sucking out of our economy, the troops might be needed in the U.S. to quash an uprising by America's poor.
ReplyDeleteIf the cases for various wars and occupations were made honestly and public opinion mattered, they'd be far fewer wars and occupations.
ReplyDeleteThe gap between stated objectives and available resources necessarily "dooms" the enterprise from the start only if one presumes that agency rests solely with coalition forces.
ReplyDeleteJPD, the Afghans can't afford their own security forces now, never mind at the level the US intends to build them to. Would you like to be specific on what other agencies you mean?
ReplyDeleteRegards, Steve
Agency in this context means that the Afghans are free actors, able to affect their own situation. The vast majority of the time--as above--when folks are arguing either for or against continued involvement (or pretty much anything else about western policy in Afghanistan, for that matter) the Afghans are either not mentioned at all or are painted with broad brushstrokes in a crude caricature to support whatever best supports the author's position (e.g., they're bitterly opposed to everyone and everything from outside Afghanistan the eternal "graveyard of empires"; they're nascent Jeffersons in flat caps; they're noble tribesmen; they're oppressive wife abusers etc., etc.). Brush, rinse, spit, repeat as the western news cycle runs and one's fancy strikes one.
ReplyDeleteThe most important determining factor is the Afghans and they are about the only people that can doom something from the start. Gain a clear understanding of where they're at in all their myriad and varied forms and factor them into the mix--then one might be speaking of generating policy based on analysis rather than personal belief and political conviction.
As to Afghan security forces, they're key to any scenario in terms of both numbers and competence. Get more good ones they help, get more bad ones and one is pretty much done. Similarly governance: get better governance that's actually effective and accountable, it helps - continue the warlordism and one is going to end up being done. The list goes on at some length, but notably it turns on the character of the list elements, as determined by the Afghans.
In terms of budget, the economy of Afghanistan cannot pay the scale of security forces required in the near to medium term on its own, but we [i.e., the West] can and we could go on paying that cost indefinitely - it's the other costs that are difficult to sustain. We're paying through the nose right now to maintain little western bubbles around pretty much every aspect of our involvement - those bubbles are what absorbs about 80% to 90% of the cost (factoring civil and military sides) and they diminish effectiveness greatly to boot. Make substantive progress so that the bubbles come down, indigenous Afghan capabilities increase, requirements decrease, and the cost equation of involvement for us (and for Afghanistan's coffers) can change pretty dramatically, such that it may actually be possible to reach an internally sustainable end state financially. Long timeframe and needing no small amount of cash, but that's the nature of the issue and no amount of wishing changes that - walk away and it cuts against you in other ways that can end up being a lot less predictable and a lot less easily mitigated by underwriting the cost of Afghan security forces in the near to medium term.
That's the dilemma: Precipitously walk away and it can go bad enough that the costs of underwriting that security are going to seem like they were awfully cheap; stay and fuck it up and it can go bad enough that the cheaper estimates of costs are insanely inaccurate; stay and do okay and it can go bad enough that it's still going to seem expensive. It's always going to look bad and seem expensive, that's the nature of the issue--and more than anything it's the nature of the observers (pear shaped westerners looking through soda straws at cultures we do not understand).
Hi JPD, I agree with much of what you right as theory - but then it hits reality.
ReplyDelete"Gain a clear understanding of where they're at in all their myriad and varied forms"
The US military and politicians are, if anything, even less likely to do this than the rest of us pear-shaped Westerners. Which leaves
"substantive progress so that the bubbles come down, indigenous Afghan capabilities increase, requirements decrease"
pretty much a pony plan, imho.
Joshua Froust's been posting some very readable stuff on this subject, though. And I'm hoping to have Connor O'Steen's take in a guest post sometime soon after he returns from his latest trip to Afghanistan.
Regards, Steve
The thing that you're not taking into account is that we've not yet seen a major int push into Afghanistan - though I think one is coming online. The int effort (for US forces at least) has in large part not uniformly been staffed by the best. Based on what I've seen, that's changing, but it's going to take time. Similarly, nearly 8 years in and we've seen neither an actual "best practices" [God, I hate that phrase] COIN implementation nor a grand strategy that's at all well articulated with the operational aspect. My take - just because the past's been unbelievably fucked up it does not necessarily mean that it has to stay that way - it very well might, but it ain't written by the fates.
ReplyDelete