By Fester:
Strategic aims dominate tactical aims. If tactical aims do not aid in the achievement of a strategic goal, than tactical success is irrelevant at best if not seductively counter-productive. This is basic policy analysis that will be reworded in various domains including the field of Clauswitzian analysis of military policy. This is just a simple reminder that political outcomes (not defined as day to day partisan advantage and insta-polling) dominate street level outcomes, and by that metric, there is no such thing as success in Iraq against any plausible pre-war US war aims and political objectives; at best, there is a decent outcome. More likely, it is a decent interval of non-chaos to allow for a significant US withdrawal.
Tom Ricks at Foreign Policy reiterates this basic point --- the surge failed strategically:
My worry is that I don't see the political situation as being much different than it has in the past. Nothing much has changed from the previous rush to failures. As readers of this blog have seen me say before: the surge succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, as planned, it created a breathing space in which a political breakthrough might occur. But Iraqi leaders, for whatever reason, didn't take advantage of that space, and no breakthrough occurred. All the basic issues that faced Iraq before the surge are still hanging out there: How to share oil revenue? What is the power relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurd? Who holds power inside the Shiite community? What is the role of Iran, the biggest winner in this war so far? And will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what happens when all the refugees outside the country and those displaced inside it, who I think are majority Sunni, try to go back to their old houses, now largely occupied by Shiites and protected by Shiite militias?
If the political questions are either not resolved or resolved by a slightly softer dictatorship backed by the occassional use of US airpower to beat down on domestic foes, then tactical success is irrelevant.
Actually, isn't this kind of an outcome a strategic success for the neo-cons? The Iraki government might be reluctant to really press for a US exit in 2011 if it were to conclude that it will have a need for 'the occasional use of US airpower to beat down domestic foes'.
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