By Guy T. Saperstein
Recently, Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation had an op-ed published by the Washington Monthly entitled "Winning The Good War". It has been widely and approvingly linked by Democrat interventionists as a bolster to their support for Obama's staying Bush's course in Afghanistan.However I know for a fact that not everyone at N.A.F. agrees with Bergen. Nor do many other liberal observers and one of those, famous civil rights lawyer, former Sierra Club Foundation president and Co-Founder, National Security/Foreign Policy New Ideas Fund, Guy Saperstein, has kindly allowed us permission to republish his own letter in response to Bergen's column. We're very greatful for the opprtunity to do so. Regards, Steve Hynd.
Liberal Hawks like Peter Bergen are not merely ascendant, they have become dominant, so it is important to look at their arguments and see if they make any sense.
While I am impressed with Bergen's knowledge of Afghanistan, in a long article he fails to address the core questions about Afghanistan: Why are we fighting the Taliban? There are crucial differences between the goals of al Qaeda and the Taliban, so why are we treating them the same? Why do we have 70,000 combat troops, plus private mercenaries there? How many more will be needed? What are the metrics of success or failure? How long will we be there? What will it ultimately cost? What is the exit strategy? Are there alternatives to the military model? And what are the real strategic threats to America and is spending hundreds of millions more in Afghanistan getting in the way of dealing with more important national security issues?
Bergen calls Afghanistan the "Good War," and it might have been that when it was harboring al Qaeda, but everyone, including General Patraeus acknowledges al Qaeda left Afghanistan long ago---pushed out by our military intervention. In the absence of al Qaeda, we have simply substituted the Taliban as our enemy, without Bergen, or apparently anyone, asking whether this makes any sense. And should we consider it a success that al Qaeda has been pushed from a country with little or no strategic significance into nuclear-armed Pakistan, one of the potentially most dangerous countries on earth? Is it a success that now we are beholden to Pakistan to control al Qaeda, a task they have undertaken with mixed motives and weak results?
Al Qaeda has an international agenda, sees America as a long-term obstacle to its goals, and, of course, attacked the American homeland. But the Taliban never attacked America and no one claims the Taliban has any interest or capacity in attacking the United States homeland. It wants to take power in Afghanistan and it is fighting U.S. soldiers because these soldiers present an impediment to that goal. While the Taliban are not nice people, should America spend another trillion dollars, or more, on top of the $3 trillion cost of the War in Iraq [which Bergen also supported] to prevent the Taliban from taking power in Afghanistan? And while Bergen suggests the U.S. must reform not only the Afghanistan army and government, but also provide long-term "stability and prosperity" so that it "will never again be a launching pad" for terrorism, does this apply as well to the many weak and failed nations around the world which potentially could be launching pads for terrorism? Do we invade and rebuild them all? And with the American economy faltering and falling deeper into debt to its most important strategic rival, China, can we afford the luxury of fighting expensive wars wherever terrorism might arise?
Is negotiation and accommodation possible with the Taliban, or even part of it? Is there a deal to be made with the Taliban which allowed it to pursue its goal of retaking power in Afghanistan, provided that no terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda be allowed to operate in the country? Should we pursue such a deal?
And while I don't wish to argue tactics with Bergen, the Army's operation manual on counter-insurgency recommends one combat soldier for every twenty of population for success: With Afghanistan being a country of 13 million people, the 20:1 ratio would mean 650,000 combat troops. Is that where Bergen thinks we are trending, or should trend? If so, then Afghanistan will start looking like Vietnam.
The problem with Bergen's analysis is the same problem as the Administration's war effort: They both are full of talk of tactics and logistics, founded on unarticulated assumptions and lacking a long- term strategic vision or even consideration of less intensive, and perhaps more effective, alternatives. President Obama promised metrics and an exit strategy, but, to date, none have been forthcoming, either from the President or cheerleaders like Peter Bergen.
Not exactly. From FM 3-24:
ReplyDeleteDuring previous conflicts, planners assumed that combatants required a 10 or 15 to 1 advantage over insurgents to win. However, no predetermined, fixed ratio of friendly troops to enemy combatants ensures success in COIN. The conditions of the operational environment and the approaches insurgents use vary too widely. A better force requirement gauge is troop density, the ratio of security forces (including the host nation�s military and police forces as well as foreign counterinsurgents) to inhabitants. Most density recommendations fall within a range of 20 to 25 counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in an AO. Twenty counter-insurgents per 1000 residents is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective COIN operations; however as with any fixed ratio, such calculations remain very dependent upon the situation.
[emphases added]
FMI 3-07.22 [the interim manual] did make mention of a 1:20 ratio, but they've pretty clearly moved on in the final.
Talking the tactics but definitely not talking the logistics for the simple reason that the logistics of Afghanistan is, was, and will be impossible.
ReplyDeleteYeah JPD: about those host nation forces...
ReplyDeleteAFGHANISTAN: Child Rapist Police Return Behind U.S., UK Troops
Regards, Steve
How could I tell, before even reading the piece, that it would be a Porter story behind the hed. ;)
ReplyDeleteThe more interesting [and somewhat more important, frankly] story, centres around the short- and long-term effects of the fixing of ANA formations on particular chunks of geography. Bruce had some thoughts on it that are worth reading.
Dave, be careful. Gareth Porter is a friend of mine.
ReplyDeleteBut it's not as if he's the only source for reports on the corruption and criminality of the Afghan police.
There's this. And this.
And specifically on policemen and child rape there's this. And this.
To cheerlead a colonial occupation which makes no sense is one thing - to turn deliberately away from the enabling of such crimes so that you can do so is quite another, Dave. Shame.
"Cheerlead a colonial occupation"? Yeah, clearly when I identify Doronsorro's strategy of reducing military force levels as the most sensible and identify the challenge of producing an environment where development agencies can work in the context of a much reduced military presence as a crux strategic issue, I'm cheerleading for occupation. Kinda an odd way of cheering for occupation, in my view.
ReplyDeleteTo the extent that I'm "cheerleading" for anything I'm for not precipitously walking away from the Afghans as we have done in the past and for not adopting a policy of pure self interest where the focus is exclusively on disrupting al-Qa`eda in the region via collateral inducing Predator strikes. That this entails realization that there are currently more pressing issues than the sexual predilictions of some ANP members (and baldly stated we're talking about the sexual predilictions of members of all factions, Taliban founding myths aside), is a "shame" I'll happily bear when the alternative is the shame that goes with walking away from our obligations to the Afghans and snuffing what hopes they still have left in the face of our incomprehensible stupidity. We've fucked up pretty comprehensively up to this point, and I don't see any way of redeeming ourselves that doesn't involve significant commitments, particularly over the short-term [<5-8 years].
We walk away, child rape and myriad other unpleasantries continue - guaranteed - we stay, we may even now still just be able to help set the conditions where the Afghans can eventually change things, monumental generational task though both elements of that couplet are. From my perspective on your beliefs [correct or not], you appear to believe that it is not worth the butcher's bill to stay and help the Afghans generate that chance [and/or that staying can not possibly serve to produce that chance], and I disagree. I don't think the odds are at all good, but I'm willing to try.
My point about Porter is that he fills in the gaps in his reporting (and/or arranges the sub-components when things are unclear) - as do all journalists - in ways that fit his outlook and worldview. His outlook and worldview are pretty consistently anti-"official line of the USG" - in lots of cases this is healthy, but in my view sometimes it makes getting to the bottom of a story more difficult. I also am friends with a number of journalists [in a number of cases friends of 20 years or more standing], but that doesn't mean that I should ever, ever overlook how their outlooks and worldviews affect their reporting. Just because my friends are great people and good reporters or because some even hold largely similar worldviews to myself [shocking, I know ;)], it doesn't make them correct. This is particularly the case when they do the type of stories that Porter tends to specialize in, where it's all about putting a bunch of disparate pieces together to produce a synthetic interpretation - this is when one is most "working without a net". It is also when we as news consumers have to be most cautious about what's fact and what's worldview in the reporting, friends though they may be.