Remember: They stand up, we stand down....

By Fester:

The Washington Post has a short and informative article about the Iraqi government actually wanting to act like a government.  A US company commander received a credible tip about a potential mortar attack that could be launched from an Iraqi Army controlled neighborhood:

Over the next few days, Capt. Dustin Navarro and his Iraqi army counterpart wrangled over the appropriate response. They met, argued, sparred and compromised. In the end, two things became evident: First, Iraqi and American commanders have markedly different notions of what U.S. troops in Baghdad are entitled to do to protect themselves under a security agreement that went into effect July 1 and that sharply limits U.S. activity in Iraqi cities.

Also clear was that the balance of power, at least in the capital, has tipped, fulfilling a principle Americans have long paid lip service to, and now appear deeply worried about: Iraqis are taking the lead.

Earlier today Steve quoted Prof. Snow on the problems of counterinsurgency conducted by outsiders:

Foreign forces, no matter how well intentioned are, after all, foreigners,and their presence is not going to be universally appreciated, either by those who are suspicious of foreigners (which includes most Afghans) and those whose causes are harmed by their presence. Moreover, the need to invite foreigners in to defeat the insurgents says something basically negative about the HN (host nation) government being helped (e.g. if the government was doing its job, why would it need foreign assistance?). Moreover, those who collaborate with the outsiders are going to be viewed by some as, well, collaborators...

One of the key dynamics of Maliki's consolidation of Shi'ite power has been his ability to play good-cop/bad-cop with the Sadrists.  The Sadrists were always the hardline anti-occupation group while Maliki has been able to co-opt basic anti-Americanism that is very popular among almost all groups excluding some Kurdish elements without the thuggery of the Mahdi Army.  He has argued, reasonably successfully that the talk and politics route would get the US out of Iraq at a lower cost than the shoot and mortar tactics of the Mahdi Army. 

If he is seen as accomodating the US and not mandating a strict interpretation of the SOFA that dramatically limits US activity in urban areas, he weakens his political position.  This is the "soft-line" position that is the de-minimas for anyone who wants to be politically viable.  The hardline position has always been to wage long term guerrilla warfare. 

Foreign occupiers are not popular and by their very nature, delegitimate the government set up under the occupation.  Basic incentives are for everyone to be anti-occupation if there is any general selectorate and viability concern.  Limitations will get even tighter over the next few months.