The Case For COIN Has Not Been Made

By Steve Hynd

Over at James Joyner's New Atlanticist website, Prof. Donald M. Snow looks at the US counter-insurgency manual and argues that Afghanistan is NOT ripe for COIN success. 

 I think the manual argues implicitly that it is not, for three reasons. First, Afghanistan is too big for this kind of operation. The manual clearly states thateffective COIN requires one counterinsurgent for every 1,000 members of the population being protected. In Afghanistan, that means a COIN force of 660,000, a number so wildly in excess to what will ever be available to be disqualifying in and of itself. Second, the doctrine argues the heart of success is the political conversion of the population, but it fails to discuss who is going to do the converting. If it leaves this to U.S. counterinsurgents, the battle is lost. As the manual itself argues, an additional criterion for success is a good government the population can be loyal to. It is not at all clear Afghanistan has or is in any danger of acquiring such a government. Finally, the doctrine entreats that COIN is slow work and that its success will require considerable perseverance. A decade�s commitment or more is often suggested for Afghanistan: is there any danger the American public will support an Afghanistan war still going on in 2018 or 2019? I doubt it.

The US government likes to draw the analogy between Iraq and Afghanistan: COIN �worked in Iraq� and can be transferred to Afghanistan. Two rejoinders: the war in Iraq is not over, and will not be concluded until after the US leaves and the Iraqis sort things out,possibly violently. It�s not clear we �won.� Second, Afghanistan and Iraq are alike only in the sense of being in the same area of the world. One experience does not imply another.

Will COIN lead to victory in Afghanistan? The case has not been made.

Snow also notes the yawning gap in US COIN thinking:

it fails to recognize that the outsider COINs are probably part of the problem as well as the solution. Foreign forces, no matter how well intentioned are, after all, foreigners,and their presence is not going to be universally appreciated, either by those who are suspicious of foreigners (which includes most Afghans) and those whose causes are harmed by their presence. Moreover, the need to invite foreigners in to defeat the insurgents says something basically negative about the HN (host nation) government being helped (e.g. if the government was doing its job, why would it need foreign assistance?). Moreover, those who collaborate with the outsiders are going to be viewed by some as, well, collaborators, and the presence of those troops will in turn help insurgent recruitment.

Nice to know we're committed to an occupation lasting at least a decade and costing over $1 trillion - one that's now at least as dangerous as Iraq ever was - by a simple expedient of gradually moving the goalposts but without any kind of real public debate. Isn't it?