It's Not COIN, It's "Pacification"

By Steve Hynd

Special Forces officer Col. David Maxwell had a post at Small Wars Journal over the weekend that's definitely worth a read. (H/t Bernard Finel.) In it he argues that the COIN theory currently used by the U.S. military is fundamentally flawed "because it presupposes US forces being in charge whenever COIN is conducted":

Though FM 3-24 discusses the importance of host nation legitimacy and even our Security Forces Assistance and Irregular Warfare definitions discuss the importance of legitimacy and the �relevant population� we continue to employ US military forces as battlespace owners which drives the mindset among US military commanders that we are in charge of operations because we �own� the battlespace (despite being in a sovereign country!) De facto we make ourselves the occupying force. Even GEN McChrystal�s assessment calls for integrating Afghans into the command and control structure � those very words imply that we are in charge and not the Afghans.

...However, the perception of the US military being in charge has led to sometimes counter-productive activities or actions by military forces and causes further conflict.

When US forces take the lead role using today�s COIN theory and doctrine in actuality they are not conducting COIN since the insurgency is �not theirs to counter� because the responsibility to counter it should belong to the sovereign nation that is faced with insurgency. While the US can and must support the activities by correctly applying applicable COIN theory (adapted and adjusted for the unique culture and traditions and the conditions that exist in the conflict area) to support that sovereign nation, when the US takes the lead and pushes the host nation to a secondary role in its own country then the US takes on the role of occupier. They are conducting �pacification operations� [Emphasis mine - Steve]

I'd say Col. Maxwell is spot on about the problem but isn't quite correct about where to allocate the blame. He neglects to mention the think-tankers who came into the administration's civilian leadership through the revolving door from CNAS and penned the U.S. government's Counterinsurgency Guide for lawmakers. Despite their public protestations otherwise, that guide gave the clear impression that COIN was a multi-tool which enabled the question "Can we invade it?" to be answered "Yes, we can!". But endlessly reaching for COIN-based, decades-long occupation and pacification operations as the best answer to problems is the very definition of creating an accidental Empire. COIN as currently understood by the powers-that-be in America is inevitably a colonial adventure. 

There hasn't been nearly enough debate about the long-scale ramifications of adopting COIN, which is popular because it seemed to be the short-term "fix" for two stalled occupations. Indeed, that it even provides such a "fix" when the U.S. is an occupying power still isn't clear from events. The jury should still be out, but it isn't.