The Qom Facility - Another Scary Story About Iran (Updated)

By Steve Hynd

My collegue B.J. has already written about the newly-revealed Iranian facility at Qom, apparently a small enrichment facility in construction. He did a fine job of pointing out that, while something we should all be cautious about, its no smoking gun to give the "Real Men Go To Tehran" set their long-awaited causus belli.

I've a couple of links and a couple of thoughts I wanted to add, though.

First up, Spencer Ackerman addresses the meme that Iran has again broken its international obligations:

notice that neither Obama, French President Nicholas Sarkozy nor British Prime Minister Gordon Brown accused Iran of a specific violation of its international nuclear responsibilities, and pivoted their case instead on Iran�s concealment. That�s because it�s not actually clear whether Iran has committed a specific violation of either the Nuclear Nonprofileration Treaty or its follow-on agreements negotiated separately with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Under the NPT, each state negotiates a safeguards agreement to the IAEA so the atomic watchdog can work out where and how to establish monitoring devices like cameras at declared facilities. �Iran�s specific safeguards agreement doesn�t say anything about the time limits for the provision of design information,� says Ivanka Barzashka, an analyst with the Federation of American Scientists� Strategic Security Program. Specific time-frames for site or design disclosure typically occur in additional �subsidiary arrangements,� and usually provide for disclosure around 180 days before the introduction of nuclear material into a given facility. But Iran�s subsidiary arrangement with the IAEA �has not been made public as far as I know,� Barzashka says.

That said, in its Aug. 28 report, the IAEA criticizes Iran for not adopt implementing a section of its subsidiary arrangement that dealt with design notificiation. �The absence of such information results in late notification to the Agency of the construction of new facilities and changes to the design of existing facilities,� the IAEA warned. Barzashka translates that such adoption would require Iran to notify the IAEA �of the construction of a new plant, any kind of new facilities, as soon as a decision has been authorized by the government.�

Iran is hanging its hat on the ambivalant legality of its non-notification: as one friend in the arms control community put it, it's been caught with its hand in the cookie jar but with no actual cookie in hand. I wouldn't put it that strongly. I honestly understand, given how the neocons and likudniks have used every other facility as an excuse for singing "Bomb, bomb, bomb Iran", why the Iranians might want to be secretive until a site is near operation.

Next up, Patrick Barry at Democracy Arsenal, who writes:

Something else to note on timing is that the U.S. has reportedly known about this facility for "years," a period which coincides with the development and release of the the 2007 NIE on Iran's nuclear program, a report which found that the Iranians were not actively seeking a nuclear weapon.  If that timing is right, then while its troubling that this facility was kept secret, its existence does not actually prove that Iran is moving past the break-out capability they are suspected to be pursuing. From the public's perspective, Iran is no closer to a nuclear weapon now than they were before this intelligence was released.

That's something I'd noted myself in comments to B.J.'s post. Patrick is in broad agreement with Marc Lynch - the revelation of this site by the West is more to do with pressuring Russia and China on sanctions than with any actual Iranian nuclear threat.

Meanwhile, I've seen private suggestions that the new site may be for medium enrichment (i.e. 18-20%) enrichment for fuel for the Tehran research reactor which was launched with U.S. help in 1968. Its used for medical and research purposes and is under full IAEA inspections and safeguards.

And I've a thought on the location of the new site: it may be intended to deter an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities simply by being where it is. According to reports, it's outside a mountain at Qom, one of the most important sites in Islam. A stray missile, or a crashing plane, would inflame the whole Muslim world against any attackers.

Update: Here's the full transcript of the press briefing by two anonymous "Senior Administration Officials". After admitting that the US and its allies have known about this site for years, that "this construction began before they [Iran] attempted to withdraw [from their additional protocol in 2007], comes this:

Q Can you sort of square the revelation of this facility with the special National Intelligence Estimate that recently said that Iran was still many years away from a nuclear weapon?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I don't think we'll add anything more to the record here than what we've said already.

That's called being evasive in support of a scary story.

Update 2: Jeffrey Lewis writes that the NIE covered this possibility:

We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities�rather than its declared nuclear sites�for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.

There it was clear as a bell: The IC wasn�t worried about what they see at Natanz; they are worried at what they can�t see elsewhere. (I wonder what gave them �moderate confidence.�)

And the IC still concluded, and DNI Blair is on record as recently as concurring, that Iran isn't actively seeking a nuke, but rather the capacity to build them at short notice.

Lewis believes that the second site should convince policymakers to go for broad, deep monitoring rather than continuing to try to get Iran to halt activity. That makes sense, as does internationalization of the fuel cycle process and the setting up of "fuel banks".

Update 3: James Acton gives a very convincing argument that Iran has violated its safeguards agreement.