by Eric Martin
Despite President Bush's post-9/11, manichean-tinged attempt to categorize other nations as either "with us or against us" with respect to those terrorist groups that the US government considers problematic, and despite an understandable impulse on the part of the US government to put US interests ahead of those of other states (a tendency that spans administrations from both parties), governments in foreign capitals haven't necessarily been all that cooperative or obedient. This should come as no surprise, and yet our policies are often crafted with the expectation that our dictates will meet little resistance because we, the indispensable nation, have issued them.
Along these lines, much of our strategic class suffers from a persistent form of solipsism with respect to international affairs, a myopia that obscures the obvious truth that, just as we must pursue our interests first and foremost, other governments are, likewise, compelled to put their own respective interests first. Often times, this overriding motivation means that they will refuse to line-up along demarcations established, somewhat arbitrarily in their eyes, by the United States. It's nothing personal.
The most pertinent recent example of this incongruity between US expectations and demands, and a foreign nation's uncooperative and hesitant response, centers around our dealings with Pakistan and our policy agenda in Afghanistan.
After the attacks of 9/11, from the US perspective, the Taliban was an extremist religious faction that had seized power in Afghanistan, hosted a terrorist organization that had repeatedly attacked the US and US interests, and thus, a group that had to be deposed and shut out from power. That policy agenda is certainly reasonable enough, especially for an American, but there is another side to the story.
Whereas the United States is, quite understandably, concerned with the threat posed by al-Qaeda, and thus views the Taliban as a hostile element given its past support (and current cooperation) with al-Qaeda, Pakistan is not similarly disposed. For Pakistan, the foreign policy universe revolves around its regional adversary, frequent military opponent, and former co-inhabitant of a vast territory that each, in common, once called home: India. Everything from relations with China and Russia, to relations with the United States, are ordered on the principle of how to best counter India. In fact, this pervasive paranoia and monomaniacal focus has even warped Pakistan's domestic political life, exacerbating a militarized culture, complete with a powerful and semi-autonomous intelligence apparatus (the ISI), with frequent military coups and a general disregard for civilian rule.
While Pakistan views its alliance with the US as valuable, it is not because it necessarily sees eye to eye with the US on most matters. Quite the contrary: Pakistani elites, as well as the general population, have long had a suspicious view of the United States and its motives, opposing key aspects of its international policies (these attitudes have worsened dramatically in recent years). This alliance, like most others for Pakistan, passes through the India-lens; Pakistan values the military and economic aid it can obtain via cordial relations with the US in order to counter India, and it has an interest in preventing too close an alliance forming between the US and India (which could tilt the balance of power too heavily in India's direction). But the US alliance is - at best - of a second order importance, and subsumed by the India imperatives.
With respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan has long sought to cultivate a proxy and ally in that territory in order to achieve several objectives: expand its regional reach, influence and alliances in order to better balance India's larger territorial space and population, and create a strategic redoubt in case of conflict. In fact, the US facilitated this process somewhat with the funneling of massive amounts of financial and military aid destined for anti-Soviet Afghan mujaheddin through Peshawar and other Pakistani hubs, leaving it to the Pakistanis (mostly the ISI) to determine the recipients of this largess (a valuable perch from which to cultivate influence, as well as enrich itself). Peshawar, it turns out, was also where Osama bin Laden set up his operations, and the point from which he coordinated aid from Gulf donors to his favored groups of foreign fighters.
After the withdrawal of the Soviets, and the eventual fall of the regime that it had backed, the US withdrew its presence from Afghanistan. But Pakistan, obviously, continued its involvement with its neighbor. As the dust settled after years of post-Soviet conflict, Pakistan made sure that the eventual victor - the Taliban - was the horse that it had backed with money, arms and other forms of support. Pakistan, at last, had what it deemed vital in terms of countering India, its most serious threat.
Fast forward to the events of 9/11 and George Bush's invasion of Afghanistan. The leader of Pakistan at the time, by dint of a prior military coup in 1999, was Pervez Musharraf and he was faced with a significant strategic setback for Pakistan: it's proxy and ally had been replaced by a government that was establishing friendly ties (and accepting millions in aid from)...India. While the US was focused on neutralizing al-Qaeda and the Taliban (notwithstanding the massive diversion of resources away from this effort and to the unrelated theater in Iraq), Pakistan was trying to contain the fallout from the loss of its valuable regional ally.
Musharraf did his best, as any Pakistani leader would, to juggle the various imperatives: placate the United States by saying what they wanted to hear and making a show of cooperation, extract massive amounts of aid under the pretense of fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban (aid that was converted into conventional arms better suited for conflict with India, and rushed to that front), surreptitiously support (or, at least, keep alive) its Taliban allies, and destabilize the India-friendly Karzai regime. All in preparation for the day when the United States, again, withdraws and Pakistan can, again, fill the void.
But the tightrope walking has had its perils. In the process of, at least partially, complying with the war on terror as envisioned by the United States, the Pakistani government has had to support the anti-Taliban mission in Afghanistan which has, at times, involved cross border incursions and air strikes on Pakistani territory along the border regions. This support and acquiescence to infringements on its sovereign territory has, in turn, greatly stoked anti-Americanism as well as anti-government sentiment within Pakistan.
Pakistani Taliban elements have been radicalized, choosing in recent months to launch attacks against government forces. During the years that the Afghan Taliban were in power, the Pakistani government had little problem with its indigenous Taliban elements. The heightened tensions are a recent phenomenon, and are directly related to the Pakistani government's complicity in the US war on terror, and they are a symptom of a pernicious underlying unrest.
By pushing Pakistan even further, by forcing US prerogatives on the Pakistani government (interests that run counter to Pakistan's in many respects), the US is actually destabilizing Pakistan and forcing disparate groups of religious zealots and secular elites, extremists and moderates together in common cause in opposition to the current government and its pro-US tilt - ironic, considering that one of the arguments for ongoing US military operations in the region is the supposed stabilizing effect those military operations will have on Pakistan, crucial to safeguarding that country from potential hostile coup. From a McClatchy article (via Kevin Drum):
For weeks now, the Pakistani media have portrayed America, its military and defense contractors in the darkest of lights, all part of an apparent campaign of anti-American vilification that is sweeping the country and, according to some, is putting American lives at risk.
Pakistanis are reacting to what many here see as an "imperial" American presence, echoing Iraq and Afghanistan, with Washington dictating to the Pakistani military and the government. Polls show that Pakistanis regard the U.S., formally a close ally and the country's biggest donor, as a hostile power. [...]
The lively Pakistani media has been filled with stories of under-cover American agents operating in the country, tales of a huge contingent of U.S. Marines planned to be stationed at the embassy, and reports of Blackwater private security personnel running amuck. Armed Americans have supposedly harassed and terrified residents and police officers in Islamabad and Peshawar, according to local press reports.
Much of the hysteria was based on a near $1 billion plan, revealed by McClatchy in May and confirmed by U.S. officials, to massively increase the size of the American embassy in Islamabad, which brought home to Pakistanis that the United States plans an extensive and long-term presence in the country. [...]
A survey last month for international broadcaster al Jazeera by Gallup Pakistan found that 59 percent of Pakistanis felt the greatest threat to the country was the United States. A separate survey in August by the Pew Research Center, an independent pollster based in Washington, recorded that 64 percent of the Pakistani public regards the U.S. "as an enemy" and only 9 percent believe it to be a partner.
"The Ugly American of the sixties is back in Pakistan and this time with a vengeance," said Mazari, the defense analyst whose newspaper column was the subject of the American complaint. "It's an alliance (U.S.-Pakistan) that's been forced on the country by its corrupt leadership. It's delivering chaos. We should distance ourselves. You can't just hand over the country."
While the anti-US sentiment appears genuine, it is uncertain whether the current storm, and the particular stories that it thrived on, was orchestrated by a pressure group or even an arm of the state. In the past, Pakistan's notorious Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency, part of the military, has very effectively used the press to push its agenda. [...]
A widely believed conspiracy contends that America is deliberately destabilizing Pakistan, to bring down a "strong Muslim country", and ultimately seize its nuclear weapons. Pakistanis, especially its military establishment, also are distrustful of U.S. motives in Afghanistan, seeing it as part of a strategy for regional domination. Further Pakistanis are appalled that the regime of Hamid Karzai in Kabul is close to archenemy India. [...]
Many also blame the U.S. for "imposing" a president on the country, Zardari, who is deeply disliked and who last year succeeded an unpopular U.S.-backed military dictator. So democrats resent American interference in Pakistani politics, while conservatives distrust American aims in Afghanistan.
"You used to find this anti-Americanism among supporters of religious groups and Right-wing groups," said Ahmed Quraishi, a newspaper columnist and the leading anti-American blogger. "But over the past two to three years, young, educated Pakistanis, people you'd normally expect to be pro-American modernists, and middle class people, are increasingly inclined to anti-Americanism. That's the new phenomenon."
There are two main takeaways from this McClatchy piece, and the background laid out above: First, Pakistan will, ultimately, look out for Pakistan's interests and address threats to Pakistan which involve, above all else, India. Our efforts in Afghanistan run directly counter to Pakistan's regional/India-related concerns. Thus, Pakistan will only provide half-hearted cooperation, while key elements of its security establishment work at cross-purposes. The recent anti-American media blitz is either the result of grass roots sentiment, or an ISI funded campaign, but neither alternative should prove comforting.
With a population so suspicious of our motives, and with a military/elite/intelligence apparatus in vehement opposition to an agenda that is weakening Pakistan vis-a-vis India, forcing our mandate on Pakistan will serve to destabilize a country that is far more important to the US than Afghanistan. In that sense, it should be possible to line-up US interests and Pakistani interests: ultimately, destabilizing a nuclear armed nation such as Pakistan is riskier than withdrawing from Afghanistan and disrupting al-Qaeda from afar. And by doing the latter, we reduce the risk of the former. Perhaps if the Obama administration took full measure of Pakistan's position and interests, it could further seek to craft a compromise acceptable for all.
No comments:
Post a Comment