Making peace with enemies...

By Dave Anderson:

Unless one is engaged in a war of extermination, most wars end with some sort of agreement.  That agreement will be balanced by the relative power positions at the end, but the agreement has to be superior to both sides than continuing to fight.

For example, the end of the American Civil War saw such an agreement where the top political and military layer of the Confederacy were excluded from future political life, but most of the Confederate elite was able to re-integrate into American political life after time, loyalty oaths and the needs of the Republicans to win the 1876 election.  This is just one of thousands of examples where the defeated side still has some political stakes after the settling of a civil war.  Another good example is the flipping of the Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgency by buying them out and acceding to some of their political goals of non-inteference from Baghdad in 2006/2007/2008.  The Sunni Arabs did not achieve their maximal goals, a restoration of the status quo pre-bellum but their core interests were respected.

So when the AP reports that Obama is willing to countenance some type of settlement with some elements of the Taliban, that should be a no-brainer that to make peace one must make it with an enemy; and for two sides to agree, core interests will not be violated (given relative power differentials of course to define "core".)

This is especially true, as Steve noted earlier this morning, that most of the "Taliban" are actually local Pashtun militias fighting for local objectives and local causes.  The United States really does not care which clan or sub-clan controls the timber exports and smuggling from the Korengal Valley, as long as whomever is making that money is not funnelling resources to deep strike terrorist groups.  

Nearly all of the insurgents battling US and NATO troops in Afghanistan
are not religiously motivated Taliban and Al Qaeda warriors, but a new
generation of tribal fighters vying for control of territory, mineral
wealth, and smuggling routes...�Ninety percent is a tribal, localized
insurgency,�� said one US intelligence official in Washington who
helped draft the assessments. �Ten percent are hardcore ideologues
fighting for the Taliban.��

So of course, we get a right wing flip-out on the idea of a non-maximalist victory, however that is to be defined.  Despite the fact that meeting local goals and not giving a flying fuck on who controlled which smuggling route allowed the right wingers to do a victory dance for the Surge in Iraq despite the fact that it failed in its strategic intent of creating national political reconciliation. 

To make peace, you must either commit genocide or meet and talk with your enemies to find a mutually agreeable arrangment that often has your enemy gaining something for not fighting.