They Used To Love The Drones

By Steve Hynd

I've been meaning for a while to write a post about the neocon-led meme that reducing the massive U.S. footprint in Afghanistan, or turning away from COIN operations there, would massively reduce the ability of U.S. forces to carry out counter-terrorism operations in the region. I just never quite found the time - but luckily, Michael Cohen has.

Michael cites stories about the effectiveness of CT strikes in reducing Al Qaeda's effectiveness from the WSJ and NY Times and writes:

I'm surprised that the increased effectiveness of the drone war in Pakistan hasn't received more attention; because it does appear that since the ratcheting up of that war last year it has demonstrated extraordinary effectiveness and wreaked havoc with al Qaeda's already existing safe haven in Pakistan. Now I realize that what works in Pakistan may not work as effectively in Afghanistan; and that intelligence sharing may not be as robust . . .  but the increased effectiveness of the drone war must be considered as the possibility of a CT approach is weighed.

In addition, if the WSJ is to be believed the effectiveness of the US war against al Qaeda has been bolstered by improved HUMINT:

At the same time, U.S. intelligence collection in Pakistan has vastly improved, officials say. Western intelligence services have had more success penetrating al Qaeda groups lately, according to Richard Barrett, the United Nations' coordinator for monitoring al Qaeda and the Taliban. "There's many more human sources being run into the groups," Mr. Barrett, a former official with Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, told an audience at a Washington think tank last week.

Critics of the off-shoring approach like to argue that this strategy didn't work before 9/11, but back then the US was relying largely on cruise missile fired from the Indian Ocean. Pilotless drones have increased the effectiveness of these attacks and the very presence of a military base on Afghanistan's territory - one that would likely continue no matter what decision President Obama makes on future policy - suggests that the a comparison to pre-9/11 counterterrorism strategy just isn't even that relevant. And over the past 8 years in Afghanistan it sure does seem as though attacks from the air - first in supporting the Northern Alliance and later in harassing al Qaeda - have been a heck of a lot more effective than a sustained and prolonged military occupation.

Off-shore attacks are not by any means panacea and without a sustained US presence on the ground it might blunt their effectiveness - although even that conclusion is a bit unclear - but it sure seems a lot more efficient than a counter-insurgency campaign that has a dubious chance at success.

In his comments, I've cited another recent article from Foreign Policy which bolsters Michael's argument. When we look at where the AQ and Taliban safe havens are in Pakistan, we find that U.S. intelligence collection has improved where no-one has ever done any COIN - Waziristan and Baluchistan. In fact, Pakistan says that "Waziristan is like a black hole for intelligence" in respect of its own collection abilities. Yet still the US continues to launch effective strikes: "the erosion of the Pakistani military's intelligence capacity has also meant an increasing reliance on the CIA-guided drone attacks"

Which confirms what I've suspected for some weeks now: the neoliberal COINdinistas and especially the neocons who used to love drones made up the meme of strike intelligence collection suffering without a COIN presence out of whole cloth when they realised that the choice might become drones or their beloved troop escalation.

Update: Spencer Ackerman - "if the argument really is that counterinsurgency is a prerequisite for intelligence gathering, the Pakistani case needs to be further explored, because it really does look like a counterexample."