By Dave Anderson:
The Carnegie Endowment's Gilles Dorronsoro has an interesting take on the emerging conventional wisdom of COIN and its futility in Afghanistan:
The so-called ink spot strategy�subduing a large hostile region with
a relatively small military force by establishing a number of small
safe areas and then pushing out from each one and extending control
until only a few pockets of resistance remain�is not working because of
the social and ethnic fragmentation: Stability in one district does not
necessarily benefit neighboring ones, since groups and villages are
often antagonists and compete for the spoils of a war economy. In this
context, securing an area means staying there indefinitely, under
constant threat from the insurgency....The policy of clearing is plainly not working. The insurgents are
woven into the population, and there is no way to distinguish them from
ordinary villagers. As a consequence, the area targeted by the
Coalition forces remains unsafe, and because the Afghan National Army
is too weak to substitute, the troops can�t withdraw without allowing
the Taliban to regain control...
Minimalist goals where the US and the rest of ISAF cuts deals with the local issue only fighters (whom the US estimates make-up the overwhelming bulk of the people shooting at the irritiating foreigners backing an unpopular government) looks like an attractive option here. Anything else is a good way to commit to another generation or two of pushing rocks up the Hindu Kush.
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