New Afghan Compact Is A Clunker

By Steve Hynd

The Obama administration has a new so-called Afghan Compact which is designed to increase good governance in Afghanistan and reduce corruption. The main problem, though, is that any compact needs two sides agreeing to implement it.

The success of the so-called "Afghanistan Compact" will hinge on Karzai's willingness to take bold actions such as cracking down on official corruption, replacing ineffective ministers and surrendering some power to local authorities, which in the past he's resisted or failed to undertake.

"As long as the population views its government as weak or predatory, the Taliban's 'alternative' style of delivering security and some form of justice will continue to have traction," says a U.S. government document that outlines part of the proposed Compact and was obtained by McClatchy.

"We would have to see some really concrete actions on the part of Karzai to be able to take this seriously," said Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department intelligence analyst, now at the Middle East Institute. "It looks great on paper."

Yeah, the military's counter-insurgency theory and the infamous COIN Guide for Policymakers look great on paper too. But when the rubber hits the road...

The new-deal Compact, in the manner of the new softly-softly colonialism that COIN has popularized, is entirely a U.S. creation but is supposed to look like it's Karzai's idea:

The Obama administration has been developing the Compact for months in coordination with U.S. allies and Karzai's government. It's tried to keep the effort quiet so it could be presented as an Afghan initiative, according to several U.S. and European officials and the U.S. government document. "Afghans must lead," the document says.

The document outlines proposals for ceding greater power to authorities who run Afghanistan's 34 provinces and nearly 400 districts, including providing them with more development funds and the ability to direct them to projects that they think are most needed.

U.S. officials said Karzai also would be expected to implement new efforts to crack down on rampant corruption fueled by the country's production of opium, which is used to produce heroin, and to replace ineffective ministers with technocrats. Ministries that fail to improve could see international funds cut, they said.

Like any of the ministers care if their ministries funds get cut. It'll reduce their graft money inflow somewhat, but most are making far more from the corruption or drug trafficking they're supposed to stop. The people that get hurt, therefore, are common Afghans at the bottom of the heap. Meanwhile, plans to decentralize just mean more opportunities for provincial warlords and grafters to make some of the moolah their Kabul superiors have been keeping to themselves. That's if they ever happen, which I wouldn't suggest Obama holds his breath for. Puce wouldn't suit him.

Cynical, moi?

A U.S. intelligence official also said he was skeptical because the compact would require Karzai to break deals he made with warlords and power barons who oversaw ballot box-stuffing on his behalf.

"Karzai won't do the things it says he'll do � in fact, he can't do some of them without getting killed � and we have no way to enforce it. Do we threaten to cut off aid if he doesn't give Parliament or the provincial governors a bigger role? Threaten to withdraw troops? Arrest his brother down in Kandahar for drug-trafficking?" said the U.S. intelligence official.

Gareth Porter in his latest piece (subscription only, sorry) agrees with that anonymous U.S. intelligence official. He writes:

the sudden intensification of administration pressure on the issue of corruption is aimed less at far-reaching reform of the system than at avoiding a significant worsening of the problem in the wake of Karzai's fraudulent re-election.

In return for their pledges to guarantee huge majorities for Karzai in the Aug. 20 election, the Afghan president had to make promises to a number of power brokers or warlords in the provinces. Some of those were promised key ministries in the next government, according to Gilles Dorronsoro, a specialist on Afghanistan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The main concern in Kabul and Washington in the wake of Karzai's reelection is how many of the warlords to whom Karzai is indebted will be rewarded with ministries when the new cabinet is announced,

"Everybody who supported Karzai now expects their payback," said Dorronsoro, who spent the entire month of August in Afghanistan.

...Dorronsoro believes the administration's influence on Karzai's new government is going to be constrained by Karzai's dependence on provincial and sub-provincial warlords who control the actual levers of power outside Kabul. The U.S. pressure on Karzai "can only work on a few ministries and a few issues", he told IPS.

Gareth quotes David Kilcullen as saying last August that "There is no Afghan government in the way there is an American government. There are only a series of fiefdoms." In the majority of those fiefdoms, it will be business as usual.

Meanwhile, across the pond, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is sending what his opposition rightly says are conflicting signals.

Gordon Brown has told Afghan President Hamid Karzai he will not put UK troops "in harm's way for a government that does not stand up against corruption".

In a speech, Mr Brown said the UK "cannot, must not and will not walk away" from its mission in Afghanistan.

But he said continued coalition support would depend on the delivery of reform.

"International support depends on the scale of his ambition and the degree of his achievement in five key areas: security, governance, reconciliation, economic development and engagement with its neighbours," said Mr Brown.

"If, with our help, the new government of Afghanistan meets these five tests, it will have fulfilled an essential contract with its own people. And it will have earned the continuing support of the international community, despite the continuing sacrifice.

"If the government fails to meet these five tests, it will have not only failed its own people, it will have forfeited its right to international support."

Brown cannot have it both ways. Either the UK will withdraw its support - and that means including withdrawing its troops - if Karzai doesn't play nice or it "will not walk away". Yet Brown is in the same cleft stick Obama is in; he's only being a little more honest about it. A timetable for withdrawal - and the prospect of Karzai and his warlords having no Western backing in their ongoing thirty year civil war with the Taliban - is the only leverage the West realistically has left. We've seen this situation before, in Iraq in 2006/08. However, for the moment, the U.S. and U.K. governments are too afraid of the political blowback domestically to properly wield the only political stick they have.

Which means the new Afghan Compact is a clunker that should be traded in before it costs us even more blood and treasure.