Hyping A New Iran "Smoking Gun"

By Steve Hynd

You may have noticed mainstream media reports echoing a new story from the London Times which alleges to have gotten its hands on a "smoking gun" document that "proves" Iran is working on nuclear weapons. As usual, however, the hype isn't sustainable. The document the London Times has translated, even if it is genuine, doesn't prove anything of the sort.

The main Times article says:

The notes, from Iran�s most sensitive military nuclear project, describe a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, the component of a nuclear bomb that triggers an explosion. Foreign intelligence agencies date them to early 2007, four years after Iran was thought to have suspended its weapons programme.

An Asian intelligence source last week confirmed to The Times that his country also believed that weapons work was being carried out as recently as 2007 � specifically, work on a neutron initiator.

The technical document describes the use of a neutron source, uranium deuteride, which independent experts confirm has no possible civilian or military use other than in a nuclear weapon. Uranium deuteride is the material used in Pakistan�s bomb, from where Iran obtained its blueprint.

�Although Iran might claim that this work is for civil purposes, there is no civil application,� said David Albright, a physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, which has analysed hundreds of pages of documents related to the Iranian programme. �This is a very strong indicator of weapons work.�

Well, no. What it is is a very strong indication of work towards having a nuclear capacity - the ability to surge towards a nuclear weapon in a short timescale if an attack should make that necessary. What is known as a "virtual deterrent" capacity and exactly what all the other indications about Iran's nuclear program suggests they are aiming for.

The translated document makes that clearer, in that it talks about assembling a UD3 source so that Iran can do experiments to see if it can reliably detect neutrons from such a source - an important first step in building the capacity to create a nuclear trigger that would work reliably but a far cry from assembling such a trigger and the weapon to go with it.

So while the Times' document is a "smoking gun" if it is a genuine document - a big if, as my friend nuclear expert Cheryl Rofer tells me - it's important to be discriminate about what kind of smoking gun it is. It still doesn't prove Iran wishes to assemble an actual weapon. Even so, as Cheryl also points out, "Non nuclear weapon signatories to the NPT aren't supposed to be doing weapons studies. Part of what they signed up to."

As to the document's authenticity - Cheryl's right, the timing is highly suspicious given that Iran had just made a major official concession by approving the idea of a uranium swap if not the details. It makes me wonder why the Times' roving war correspondent Catherine Philp had to journey to Washington D.C. to file her story. It would suggest the leaker is from D.C., which brings up possibilities like AIPAC or the Clinton faction at the White House. Clinton has always said she thought negotiations with Iran would go nowhere and is now saying her self-fulfilling prophecy has been realised.

Speaking to reporters at the State Department, Clinton noted Monday that the administration has offered Iran a chance to participate in meaningful discussions about its nuclear activities and intentions. And she added that it is clear the effort has "produced very little" in terms of gaining a positive response.

Clinton said that additional pressure will have to be applied to Tehran in order to persuade its leaders that the international community is committed to stopping Iran from gaining a nuclear weapons capability.

That "additional pressure" is unlikely to be further UNSC sanctions. A meeting of the five UN veto holders and Germany scheduled for today, on Iran's nuclear program, has been canceled on China's request. So we're back to a "colation of the willing", which won't include all of Iran's main trading partners. And when that coalition fails, as it is certain to do, we'll be back to calls for bombs. That's problemmatic, to say the least. It's not as if Iran can't retaliate effectively.