Allies and common goals

By Dave Anderson:

In World War II, the major allies all had a single over-arching goal; decisively defeat Germany.  The US, the British Empire and the USSR each had conflicting secondary goals as well (defeat Japan and secure Pacific hegemony, preserve the Empire, build up as much of a western border buffer as possible) but the overarching goal subordinated the conflicting goals to a workable degree. 

The US's local allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan do not share the single over-arching goal of creating modern, democratic states that are capable to stamping out local extremists of both the near and far enemy persuasions.  This is a problem. 

Zenpundit links to an excellent piece byDr. Steve Metz of the Army's Strategic Studies Institute on the problem of allies with discordant goal and value sets:

The absence of serious threats on its borders has always pointed American strategy in a specific direction, one of relying on allies as a bulwark against threats, empowering them with assistance, and using direct power only when absolutely necessary. This commonsense approach has been largely successful...we might have policy disagreements with these allies, our relationships with them have been built on shared objectives, priorities, and values...

 authoritarian governments that received U.S. backing saw things differently. Their objective was retaining power and maintaining access to congressional aid packages... Reform was a threat, not a goal. The partners might, under pressure, make limited or token changes to keep Washington sweet...

Potential partners had to decide which was the greater threat: losing American material support or being tied to the United States. Most tried to split the difference, sustaining enough of a relationship to Washington to keep the money flowing while publicly distancing themselves as much as possible. From its onset, then, American strategy for the �global war on terrorism� was built on shotgun marriages.

There is no sign that the Obama administration intends to abandon the strategic assumption...

 

Americans could soldier on, hoping for miracles and redefining expectations at each inevitable failure. Washington�s flawed allies will continue superficial reform, at least until they conclude that the political and personal costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. But husbanding of power rather than the decisive defeat of the extremists or the building of a stable, liberal system will always remain their goal.

So what is the ten year desired end state and the probable end-state of relying on actors with severely different incentives and goal-sets?

It might just be time to redefine goal sets and embrace minimalist goals that are achievable.