By John Ballard
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RFK, Jr, May 5, 2010
The absence of an acoustical regulator -- a remotely triggered dead man's switch that might have closed off BP's gushing pipe at its sea floor wellhead when the manual switch failed (the fire and explosion on the drilling platform may have prevented the dying workers from pushing the button) -- was directly attributable to industry pandering by the Bush team. Acoustic switches are required by law for all offshore rigs off Brazil and in Norway's North Sea operations. BP uses the device voluntarily in Britain's North Sea and elsewhere in the world as do other big players like Holland's Shell and France's Total. In 2000, the Minerals Management Service while weighing a comprehensive rulemaking for drilling safety, deemed the acoustic mechanism "essential" and proposed to mandate the mechanism on all gulf rigs.
Then, between January and March of 2001, incoming Vice President Dick Cheney conducted secret meetings with over 100 oil industry officials allowing them to draft a wish list of industry demands to be implemented by the oil friendly administration. Cheney also used that time to re-staff the Minerals Management Service with oil industry toadies including a cabal of his Wyoming carbon cronies. In 2003, newly reconstituted Minerals Management Service genuflected to the oil cartel by recommending the removal of the proposed requirement for acoustic switches. The Minerals Management Service's 2003 study concluded that "acoustic systems are not recommended because they tend to be very costly."
It's not clear than an acoustic trigger would have made any difference in the Macondo blowout.
ReplyDeleteThe Macondo well BOP was unable to seal the leak even when commanded to close by an ROV. If a BOP can't respond to ROV intervention--due to damage or equipment failure--it is highly unlikely that it would be able to respond to an acoustic trigger.
It's much more productive to look at why BP didn't test their cement job before withdrawing drilling mud from the riser. If this had been done right, the BOP wouldn't have been needed to control the well.
See:
http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6493
From what little I know of engineering I'm sure you are probably correct. I am familiar with the term hydraulic ram from reading how they are used to pump water to higher elevations by using kinetic energy of the water flow instead of electricity. Similarly, in the case of a BOP I presume the pressure of oil drives a gate valve to shut off the flow.
ReplyDeleteFrom what you say the entire assembly was likely not ready for action because the cement was not yet cured. Kinda like when the dentist tells you not to bite down on a new crown for a few days. Is that about right?
In any case, it is clear that the accident resulted from a criminally negligent cost-benefit analysis that pushed safety to an extreme, and in this case fatal, limit. Whether driving a car, drilling for oil, building a bridge or planting dental crowns the temptation to go too fast is a dangerous impulse.
This comprehensive timeline from Jotman should be on everyone's reading list.
ReplyDeleteIt includes this...
NOV. 3: West Atlas, a burning and leaking oil rig in East Timor Sea owned by Bangkok-based PTTEP Australasia repaired 10 weeks after the original explosion.
- "The culprit: a problem during cementing, which is supposed to keep gases and oil from shooting skyward and exploding into fire. That accident and the blast on the Deepwater Horizon had at least one circumstance in common. Both happened in a transition period when the offshore oil wells were being capped off and the gaps around drilling casings were being cemented shut to prevent pressurized gases and oil from escaping. Much more is known about the Timor Sea incident; a commission appointed by the Australian government has turned up solid evidence it was caused by a mistake during careless cementing operations. (chronicle)
- "Halliburton, a major oil services company based in Houston, was involved in the concrete work as a contractor in both the Montara and Gulf of Mexico spills." (NY Times)
NOV. 18. "Deepwater Cementing Consideration to prevent hydrates destabilization," a presentation by Haliburton scientists at the AADA Chapter Meeting, Huston, on the risks of destabilized deepwater cement. Paper notes that "Destabilization of hydrates during cementing and production in deepwater environments is a challenge to the safety and economics."
NOV. 19. November 19, 2009, BP America�s vice president of Gulf of Mexico exploration, David Rainey, opposed the proposed MMS rules and defended the existing regulatory system. (thinkprogress)