Blowout Trivia

By John Ballard

Found this video showing what a blowout preventer looks like.

Then there's this.

Five Worst Blowouts

1. 
   
   Sedco 135F and
   the IXTOC-1 Well
   In 1979, the IXTOC-1 blowout flowed
   uncontrollably in the Bahia de Campeche, Mexico until it was capped 9
   months later.


2. Ekofisk Bravo
   Platform
   Phillips Petroleum's Ekofisk B platform
   experienced an 8-day oil and gas blowout in 1977 during a production
   well workover.


3. Funiwa No. 5 Well
   Oil from the 1980 Funiwa 5
   blowout polluted the Niger Delta for 2 weeks, followed by fire and the
   eventual bridging of the well.


4. Hasbah Platform Well 6
   Drilled in 1980 by
   the Ron Tappmeyer jack-up, exploratory well No. 6 blew out in the
   Persian Gulf for 8 days and cost the lives of 19 men.


5. Union Oil Platform Alpha Well A-21
   The 1969
   Union Oil Platform A blowout lasted 11 days but continued leaking oil
   into the Santa Barbara Channel for months afterwards.

In 1979, the Sedco 135F was drilling the IXTOC I well for PEMEX, the state-owned Mexican petroleum company when the well suffered a blowout. The well had been drilled to 3657m with the 9-5/8" casing set at 3627m. Reports then state that mud circulation was lost (mud is, in essence, a densely weighted drilling fluid used to lubricate the drill bit, clean the drilled rock from the hole and provide a column of hydrostatic pressure to prevent influxes) so the decision was made to pull the drill string and plug the well. Without the hydrostatic pressure of the mud column, oil and gas were able to flow unrestricted to the surface, which is what happened as the crew were working on the lower part of the drillstring. The BOP was closed on the pipe but could not cut the thicker drill collars, allowing oil and gas to flow to surface where it ignited and engulfed the Sedco 135F in flames. The rig collapsed and sank onto the wellhead area on the seabed, littering the seabed with large debris such as the rig's derrick and 3000m of pipe.

The well was initially flowing at a rate of 30,000 barrels per day (1 barrel = 42 US gallons = 159 litres), which was reduced to around 10,000 bpd by attempts to plug the well. Two relief wells were drilled to relieve pressure and the well was eventually killed nine months later on 23 March 1980. Due to the massive contamination caused by the spill from the blowout (by 12 June, the oil slick measured 180km by 80km), nearly 500 aerial missions were flown, spraying dispersants over the water. Prevailing winds caused extensive damage along the US coast with the Texas coast suffering the greatest. The IXTOC I accident was the biggest single spill ever, with an estimated 3.5 million barrels of oil released. LINK

I suppose I feel better that it's twenty years later, but from what I read today's wells are deeper. Whether that means the pressure is greater, I have no idea.

BP to Try Pipe Injection, More Equipment to Stem Gushing Well

May 2 (Bloomberg) -- BP Plc, the owner of the Gulf of Mexico Macondo well that has been leaking crude 5,000 feet below the water�s surface for 11 days, will try a battery of methods in the next two weeks to stem the flow, which remains unmetered.

Plans include chemical injections, containment domes and new pressure equipment, Bob Fryar, senior vice president BP�s operations in Angola, said today at a press conference in Houston. The company said there is no way of knowing the spill�s volume because of a lack of pressure data.

BP, based in London, said it hasn�t been able to use the so-called blowout preventer, which may have become corroded with sand. Pressure is being applied to the apparatus to seal the leak, Fryar said. BP may also try to �snap on� a second blowout-preventer stack, he said.

The first of two domes to contain the crude at the sea floor will be put on one of three leaks in six to eight days, BP said. The second dome will take eight to 12 days. A valve, which the company said may be in place in 24 hours, will be tried on the most significant leak.

Interesting observations from a comment thread.

?Comparing the attitude in the West Virginia, Massey mine accident that killed 29 people and this BP rig accident that has apparently killed 11 people, the attitudes are almost bipolar. In the mine accident the overall acceptance attitude: accidents will happen and miners will die. While in this rig accident the inquiring attitude: accidents can be prevented � what happened? what went wrong? They are both hazardous jobs but I would much prefer to work on a BP oil rig than in a Massey mine.

?Hit the nail on the head. Anyone who has been on a deep water rig knows a good portion of the day is consumed with safety and planning meetings, because it is known that a rig is inherently a risky environment, and those risks have to be minmized. With those steps taken, you have a greater chance of being killed on the drive to the heliport, or during the chopper ride out, than actually being on the rig itself. Whatever comes of the investigation, the lesson learned is written in these men's blood, and will be applied across the oil field instantly to prevent another tragedy.

�

As a disinterested observer I'm struck by what seems to be a relatively benign response to both these disasters on the part of people closest to them. In the same way that those living in the shadow of volcanoes or straddling known earthquake fault lines, those who earn their living from both of these enterprises somehow come to terms with the losses better, it seems, than those of us watching in horror from a distance.

In the video posted earlier the boat captain remarked at one point that offshore rigs are actually not a bad development for fishing, noting that they were a predictable place where bait fish could gather and bigger fish coming to eat them could be found for catching. With fishing and the oil business being the economic foundation of coastal communities and mining being the only game in town for those in West Virginia, it's not surprising that local people are quick to forgive and forget.

Journalists may call it grace or bravery or character. And we truly do admire their courage and determination overcoming what has happened. But something about these two disasters evokes comparisons with codependency, that pathological bond which holds abused children or spouses in unhealthy family relationships. In the same way that responsible adults are called to treat their children and spouses with nothing but the most caring protection, these corporations should be taking better care of those on whom they depend to keep their revenue flowing. Something is wrong with both pictures. I have no remedy but the observation is worth noting.

There are nearly four thousand offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.