I�ll Tell Them Anything at All, I Know I�ll Give Them More and More

by Eric Martin

David Shorr (whose byline always inspires me to read on), on the most recent developments in the Iran nuclear program saga:

[The cold-water-in-face award]...goes to Les Gelb, for pointing out how US nonproliferation priorities have little resonance with the rest of the world. According to his reading of Brazil and Turkey's recent mediation initiative, "the good old days of most nations automatically supporting U.S. non-proliferation efforts is over." Gelb notes that other countries don't understand why all the fuss about Iran and not about de facto nuclear weapons states like India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. As this kind of skepticism grows, it's bound to erode America's influence as the nonproliferation agenda-setter.

If this is a clash of worldviews, it could lead to much deeper differences of approach to nuclear proliferation. Gelb didn't look into that abyss, saying a sense of common interests can be bolstered by welcoming a role for new powers like Brazil and Turkey and placing the emphasis on intrusive inspections (clearly central to the ultimate resolution of the issue). The United States is already fighting a diplomatic battle with other nations' belief that an agreement with Iran can be reached without applying any pressure. But what if they really don't care whether Iran obtains a virtual weapons capability?

As Gelb points out, the root issue is the irrationality and inequity of not having a single standard. From the US perspective, I count eight different standards in dealing with the official weapons states, "de factos," and Iran.

Hence, the United States has had to push and pull, and give and threaten to take, in order to get some baseline of support for a new round of sanctions from China and Russia - all while Brazil and Turkey were (independently) pursuing alternative routes to a workable deal with Iran (to Obama's credit, cooperation from Russia was likely one of the byproducts of the New START treaty, which itself was a big victory - although I would have preferred a more valuable quo for the quid).

To put it bluntly, American foreign policy is distorted by an over-identification with Israeli interests in the Middle East.  The rest of the world is less influenced by Israel's core interests, and thus is not as convinced that Iran represents such a special non-proliferation case as opposed to states like India, Pakistan or...Israel itself.  The disconnect, and imbalance, results in inordinately high costs paid by the United States for dubious benefits.   

Not to mention the obvious fact that Israel does not reciprocate in terms of sacrificing for the benefit of U.S. interests.  One recent revelation, reported by Ryan Powers, highlights the disparity:

A new book on the history of the relationship between Israel and South Africa appears to have confirmed the long-standing suspicion that Israel offered to sell nuclear arms to South Africa in the 1970s. While the sale didn�t pan out, Israel did provide South Africa with Tritium � the material they needed to kickstart their now-abandoned nuclear weapons program � in return for easing restrictions on how South African yellowcake Uranium could be used:

[A]fter the 1973 Yom Kippur war, African governments increasingly came to look on the Jewish state as another colonialist power. The government in Jerusalem cast around for new allies and found one in Pretoria. For a start, South Africa was already providing the yellowcake essential for building a nuclear weapon. �

�South Africa�s leaders yearned for a nuclear deterrent � which they believed would force the west to intervene on their behalf if Pretoria were ever seriously threatened � and the Israeli proposition put that goal within reach,� Polakow-Suransky says in the book. �

Polakow-Suransky establishes that the relationship was so intimate that in the mid-1970s, South Africa lifted the safeguards supposed to govern how the yellowcake was used to prevent nuclear proliferation.

In return, Israel sent South Africa 30 grams of tritium, which gives thermonuclear weapons the boost to their explosive power. The delivery was enough to build several atomic bombs, which South Africa did in the coming years. [emphasis from RP]

...Regardless, I think we should take this revelation as a reminder that Israel � as they have every right to do � will nearly always do what is best for Israel and, as such, U.S. foreign policy towards Israel needs to be calibrated accordingly. As Walt and Mearsheimer put it:

A final reason to question Israel�s strategic value is that it sometimes does not act like a loyal ally. Like most states, Israel looks first and foremost to its own interests, and is has been willing to do things contrary to American interests when it believed (rightly or wrongly) that doing so would advance its own national goals. � Such behavior is neither surprising nor particularly reprehensible, because international politics is a rough business and states often do unscrupulous things in their efforts to gain an edge over other countries.

In the coming years, two things need to happen to bring American foreign policy in the region into its proper balance: First, America needs to become a better friend to Israel by setting limits and conditions on support, thus pushing Israel to adopt a course more beneficial to itself in the long run.  Real friends criticize when a friend is going astray.  Enablers of self-destructive behavior are not real friends - especially when the self-destructive behavior harms the enabler as well. 

Second, Israel needs to become a better friend to America by making some sacrifices in recognition of the large price paid by the U.S. for years of unconditional support, which support - while not unconditional - will and should continue.  By, say, ceasing new settlement construction, dismantling others and working in an honest, good faith manner toward a real two-state solution.