Afghanistan: Last Act Or Song That Never Ends?

By Steve Hynd

In the wake of General Stanley McChrystal's departure and after a string of bad news stories from Afghanistan, those who say that we've spent more than enough time, money and blood on what is a marginal strategic concern have gained ground. But in reply, it is argued that a "long war" there can not only be some kind of success, however defined, but can also have wider strategic benefits for the West's security interests. The debate has polarized between the argument that Petraeus' appointment should signal the beginning of the end of the Afghan adventure and the argument that the West should "stay the course". Unfortunately, the end result is likely to be a messy and unsatisfactory political cludge - both too long and too short to satisfy entirely the two competing strategic narratives.

The Independent on Sunday yesterday reported on a briefing McChrystal gave to NATO defense ministers shortly before his departure. The story has been roundly ignored in the U.S. so far. McChrystal gave a glum summation of the current situation.

Using confidential military documents, copies of which have been seen by the IoS, the "runaway general" briefed defence ministers from Nato and the International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) earlier this month, and warned them not to expect any progress in the next six months. During his presentation, he raised serious concerns over levels of security, violence, and corruption within the Afghan administration.

...the "campaign overview" left behind by General McChrystal after he was sacked by President Barack Obama last week warned that only a fraction of the areas key to long-term success are "secure", governed with "full authority", or enjoying "sustainable growth". He warned of a critical shortage of "essential" military trainers needed to build up Afghan forces � of which only a fraction is classed as "effective".

He pinpointed an "ineffective or discredited" Afghan government and a failure by Pakistan "to curb insurgent support" as "critical risks" to success. "Waning" political support and a "divergence of coalition expectations and campaign timelines" are among the key challenges faced, according to the general.

The IoS believes that "It was this briefing...as much as the Rolling Stone article, which convinced Mr Obama to move" against McChrystal, for being off-message "because it undermined the White House political team's aim of pulling some troops out of Afghanistan in time for the US elections in 2012." Given that is the case, then it seems obvious that Obama is still senistive to the wishes of the Beltway "very important person" set and to the COINdinistas led by alumni of the CNAS think-tank both outwith and inside the administration. Their reaction to such reports has always been to ask for more time and more patience, to allow COIN the decades and trillions they say it will need to work in Afghanistan. The White House obviously feels it needs this faction at least partially onside, blinded by propaganda if needs be, if there's to be happy-talk of a "tipping point" in 2011 which can be followed by some manner of drawdown. The bipartisan political consensus is that, without such happy-talk, the Democrats in general and Obama in particular will be made to suffer by a largely anti-war base.

But it's not just the Democrat's base which is getting sick of endless war with no end in sight.

A recent Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of likely voters finds that just 41 percent �now believe it is possible for the United States to win the nearly nine-year-old war in Afghanistan.� More to the point, a plurality of 48 percent now say ending the war in Afghanistan is a more important goal than winning it.

Meanwhile, 53 percent of those polled by Newsweek disapprove of how Obama is managing the war � a sharp reversal since February when 55 percent supported Obama on Afghanistan and just 27 percent did not. (Put another way, the percentage of Americans who disapprove of Obama�s Afghan policy has nearly doubled in four months.)

The same Newsweek poll finds that �46 percent of respondents think America is losing the war in Afghanistan (26 percent say the military is winning). A similar plurality think the US is losing the broader war on terrorism (43 percent vs. 29 percent)��

Part of this has to do with the nature of a counterinsurgency (COIN) effort � a phrase and acronym which has been around at least since the early days of Vietnam. Even when it works, counterinsurgency can take years. And the two most recent major examples � France in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam � hardly worked.

Those poll numbers shouldn't just worry incumbent Dems, they should worry the Beltway Boys. With the G8 saying this week that 2015 - not 2011 - is the earliest Afghan troops might be expected to take responsibility for their own nation's security and European allies signalling that 2015 is the latest date they'll consider for withdrawal, we can expect U.S. opinion to swiftly head in the direction of UK opinion, where a massive 77% want British troops out. Beltway pundits are in danger of being left behind by their readership - although some are so arrogant they might not notice.

The only way to square the circle, to allow both "long war" COIN-backers and those who advocate for withdrawal to be right, is for there to be a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and enough insurgent elements that a major reduction in violence can be achieved. At that point, victory can be declared and everyone can ignore whatever happens next in Afghanistan with their careers and reputations joyfully intact. Some have even suggested that this is in fact General Petraeus' true remit, delivered behind closed doors by Obama, although that suggestion ignores Petraeus and his faction's long advocacy for ignoring timetables in Iraq, their playing down of Obama's 2011 date as being anything more than a wishful guideline and their eternal "long war" advocacy.

Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai, has to be the point man for a negotiated settlement. He pushed hard for such at the London Conference back in January and he is the head of what is theoretically the sovereign nation of Afghanistan. Luckily, Karzai, no matter that his government lacks legitimacy and competence and is riddled with corruption, seems to genuinely want peace and to see the end to the West's occupation of his nation. Tentative talks have already begun and Karzai seems to be willing to talk to anyone about anything - to insurgent groups in whole or in part and even to Pakistan, which bankrolls some of those insurgents.

On the other hand, that's not true of some American hawks, who wish to have their cake and eat it too. Recognising intellectually that the only way out of the Afghan quagmire is through negotiation, they refuse to accept at a gut level that the Taliban won't buckle entirely if just given another year or five of military pressure. Thus we get think-tankers like Antonio Giustozzi pointing out that the Taliban are either a monolithic structure or they aren't, then arguing for the latter even though all his evidence points to the former. For Giustozzi, we need to fight longer to factionalize the Taliban and bring them to the table on our terms. CIA director Leon Panetta has the same counter-productive view, born of an inability to accept the reality on the ground.

Of course, Panetta and others argue that if we accede to the Taliban too early, Al Qaeda will return to Afghanistan en masse. This ignores reports that the Taliban has become generally disenchanted with its AQ allies and would happily agree to not offering them an Afghan safe haven right now. But Panetta also has to keep the White House happy-talk going, which is why he told ABC over the weekend that there are at most 100 Al Qaeda left in Afghanistan. Trouble is, Jim Jones said the same thing last year - which presents a problem for narratives of progress. By contrast, last year General Petraeus was sure there were no AQ in Afghanistan at all - which begs the question of whether the U.S. mandate for occupation is completed.

Bernard Finel writes today:

 The insurgents � as far as I can tell � are insisting on two things: (a) an end to foreign military forces in Afghanistan, and (b) a new constitution drafted with input from the insurgent forces.  As a practical matter, that IS where a settlement will end up, whether it occurs by force of arms or at the bargaining table.  The question for the United States ought to be less about trying to force others to pledge loyalty to the existing constitution and political order, and more about ensuring that what comes after continues to ensure minimal U.S. national security interests.

Which echoes something my colleague David Anderson wrote back in May:

There is only one red-line from the American perspective from talking with anyone in Afghanistan.  That red line is active, material support for "far enemy" terrorist groups.  Preventing long-distance support and planning cells for operations against US and allied civilians in their home territory is the only significant interest that we have in the region.  Everything else is a local concern that does not impact US security all that much. 

We can achieve minimal goals if we accept that we as a nation can not control everything nor is everything worth controlling.  Trying for anything else is a recipe for a long slow bleed and the continued militarization of society and a drain on the treasury for a national priapic dose. 

If there's minimal numbers of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, or none, and they won't be allowed to return, why are we still there?

For some, it's simply the inability to accept that America will fail to achieve its maximial goal set - as McChrystal's leaked report makes clear. For others, it's about the domestic political fallout of admitting that. For still others, it's about an inability to admit that thier beloved COIN ideology has failed. Robert Dreyfuss sets out the end-point in Guernica today:

Afghanistan is the place where theories of warfare go to die, and if the COIN theory isn�t dead yet, it�s utterly failed so far to prove itself. The vaunted February offensive into the dusty hamlet of Marja in Helmand province has unraveled. The offensive into Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban and a seething tangle of tribal and religious factions, once touted as the potential turning point of the entire war, has been postponed indefinitely. After nine years, the Pentagon has little to show for its efforts, except ever-rising casualties and money spent.

Perhaps Obama is still counting on U.S. soldiers to reverse the Taliban�s momentum and win the war, even though administration officials have repeatedly rejected the notion that Afghanistan can be won militarily. David Petraeus or no, the reality is that the war will end with a political settlement involving President Karzai�s government, various Afghan warlords and power brokers, the remnants of the old Northern Alliance, the Taliban, and the Taliban�s sponsors in Pakistan.

Making all that work and winning the support of Afghanistan�s neighbors�including India, Iran, and Russia�will be exceedingly hard. If Obama�s diplomats managed to pull it off, the Afghanistan that America left behind might be modestly stable. On the other hand, it won�t be pretty to look at it. It will be a decentralized mess, an uneasy balance between enlightened Afghans and benighted, Islamic fundamentalist ones, and no doubt many future political disagreements will be settled not in conference rooms but in gun battles. Three things it won�t be: It won�t be Switzerland. It won�t be a base for Al Qaeda. And it won�t be host to tens of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops.

About the only rational argument for staying in Afghanistan even five more years is the mess that it is likely to become. Indeed, that mess might yet decide matters for the West.

the very notion of Pakistani-sponsored talks has sparked consternation among Afghanistan's ethnically fractured opposition, who fear the rapprochement with Islamabad will see them excluded from any future political settlement.

"None of the players believe in the current strategy," opposition leader Abdullah Abdullah told the Guardian. "Karzai is going down the drain and taking the international community with him.

"If he thinks he can give [the Taliban] a few ministries and a few provinces, they will simply take those provinces and then force him out."

Abdullah said he was appalled that the Afghan president had recently referred to the Taliban with the affectionate "jan" suffix. "Talib-jan is how you would refer to your dearest young son � it would be considered too soft to use on a teenager."

Three weeks ago Karzai's intelligence chief, Amrullah Saleh, and his interior minister, Hanif Atmar, quit in protest at the new Pakistan policy. Both men are Tajiks; Saleh was previously a leading member of the Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taliban in 2001.

Michael Semple, a regional expert, said he was alarmed at the speed with which the political class was fissuring.

"Sane people, who've been part of this process all along, are now saying the country won't survive till the end of the year," he said.

The rationale, then, would be that the West should apply the "Pottery Barn" Rule - we broke it, so we should fix it. The trouble is that this ignores, even makes a mockery off, any pretense of Afghan sovereignty. As I've argued for a long time, the Real Pottery Barn Rule is not "we broke it, we own it", it's "you broke it, so pay up and get the f*** out of our store before you break more stuff you ham-handed clunk!" America has no more need or moral right to police any low-grade Afghan civil war than it does an Iraqi one.

Be that as it may, expect the two opposing viewpoints to further polarize, and for the administration to pursue a politically expedient cludge in an increasingly futile attempt to keep most of the voters happy most of the time. National security and the needs of Afghans don't really enter into it as much as the needs of politicians and careerists.

Update: Jonathan Rugman of the UK's Channel 4 News points up the differences in US and UK thinking.

The head of the British army, General Sir David Richards, and the head of the CIA, Leon Panetta, were asked in separate interviews over the weekend about the notion of talking to the Taliban as part of Britain and America�s exit strategy from Afghanistan. Their answers were so different that they point to potentially the biggest policy rift between London and Washington in a decade.
 
�There�s always been a point at which you start to negotiate, probably through proxies in the first instance,� Sir David told BBC radio yesterday. �I think there�s no reason why we shouldn�t be looking at that sort of thing pretty soon.�
 
On the very same day, Leon Panetta put the opposite view on the Taliban. �We have seen no evidence that they are truly interested in reconciliation,  where they would surrender their arms, where they would denounce Al Qaeda, where they would really try to become part of that society,� the CIA chief told the ABC network.

London and Washington do agree at least that the military campaign must continue so that, in the words of General Richards,  �they don�t think that we are giving up.� But unlike the British, the Americans appear to be clinging to the increasingly bizarre notion of inflicting a strategic defeat on the Taliban before talks can begin.

...It is tempting to dismiss such differences as healthy debate between friends, or �work in progress�. Except that British and American soldiers are dying at an alarming rate. So how high you set the bar on talking to the Taliban, who does it and how quickly you do it, could hardly be more important.

Europeans have mostly given up the idea of having Empires, even accidental ones. They are also far less wedded to the notion that embarassment is a foreign policy no-no. Thus they will want faster engagement than Beltway insiders. No surprise there.