Afghanistan, Europe and CIA Propaganda

Commentary By Ron Beasley

As Steve noted below 58% of Americans think Afghanistan is a lost cause and 60% think we should start withdrawing troops next August even if the country is unstable.  I'm sure those numbers will only rise.  I found this interesting confidential CIA document over at WikiLeaks. It appears the CIA is worried about public opinion in Europe.

Afghanistan: Sustaining West European Support for the NATO-led
Mission�Why Counting on Apathy Might Not Be Enough

The fall of the Dutch Government over its troop commitment to Afghanistan
demonstrates the fragility of European support for the NATO-led ISAF mission.
Some NATO states, notably France and Germany, have counted on public
apathy about Afghanistan to increase their contributions to the mission, but
indifference might turn into active hostility if spring and summer fighting
results in an upsurge in military or Afghan civilian casualties and if a Dutchstyle
debate spills over into other states contributing troops. The Red Cell
invited a CIA expert on strategic communication and analysts following public
opinion at the State Department�s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to
consider information approaches that might better link the Afghan mission to
the priorities of French, German, and other Western European publics.

The people of France and Germany are opposed to their counties participation in NATO misadventure they really don't care about it that much so leaders in those countries can simply ignore public opinion.

If some forecasts of a bloody summer in Afghanistan come to pass, passive French and
German dislike of their troop presence could turn into active and politically potent hostility. The tone of previous debate suggests that a spike in French or German casualties or in Afghan civilian casualties could become a tipping point in converting passive opposition into active calls for immediate withdrawal. (C//NF)

French and German commitments to NATO are a safeguard against a precipitous departure, but leaders fearing a backlash ahead of spring regional elections might become unwilling to pay a political price for increasing troop levels or extending deployments. If domestic politics forces the Dutch to depart, politicians elsewhere might cite a precedent for �listening to the voters.� French and German leaders have over the past two years taken steps to preempt an upsurge of opposition but their vulnerability may be higher now...

If the rest of NATO pulls out it will make it even more difficult for the US government to ignore the voters so can the war be re branded in Europe to minimize the backlash?

French Focused On Civilians and Refugees. Focusing on a message that ISAF benefits
Afghan civilians and citing examples of concrete gains could limit and perhaps even reverse
opposition to the mission. Such tailored messages could tap into acute French concern for
civilians and refugees. Those who support ISAF in INR surveys from fall 2009 most
frequently cited their perception that the mission helps Afghan civilians, while opponents
most commonly argued that the mission hurts civilians. Contradicting the �ISAF does more
harm than good� perception is clearly important, particularly for France�s Muslim minority:

• Highlighting Afghans� broad support for ISAF could underscore the mission�s
  positive impact on civilians. About two-thirds of Afghans support the presence of
  ISAF forces in Afghanistan, according to a reliable ABC/BBC/ADR poll conducted in
  December 2009. According to INR polling in fall 2009, those French and German
  respondents who believed that the Afghan people oppose ISAF�48 percent and 52
  percent, respectively�were more likely than others to oppose participation in the
  mission.


• Conversely, messaging that dramatizes the potential adverse consequences of an
  ISAF defeat for Afghan civilians could leverage French (and other European) guilt
  for abandoning them. The prospect of the Taliban rolling back hard-won progress
  on girls� education could provoke French indignation, become a rallying point for
  France�s largely secular public, and give voters a reason to support a good and
  necessary cause despite casualties.


• The media controversy generated by Paris�s decision to expel 12 Afghan refugees in
  late 2009 suggests that stories about the plight of Afghan refugees are likely to
  resonate with French audiences. The French government has already made
  combating Afghan human trafficking networks a priority and would probably
  support an information campaign that a NATO defeat in Afghanistan could
  precipitate a refugee crisis.

Germans Worried About Price And Principle Of ISAF Mission. German opponents of
ISAF worry that a war in Afghanistan is a waste of resources, not a German problem, and
objectionable in principle, judging from an INR poll in the fall of 2009. Some German
opposition to ISAF might be muted by proof of progress on the ground, warnings about the
potential consequences for Germany of a defeat, and reassurances that Germany is a
valued partner in a necessary NATO-led mission.

• Underscoring the contradiction between German pessimism about ISAF and Afghan
  optimism about the mission�s progress could challenge skeptics� assertions that the
  mission is a waste of resources. The same ABC/BBC/ADR poll revealed that 70
  percent of Afghans thought their country was heading in the right direction and
  would improve in 2010, while a 2009 GMF poll showed that about the same
  proportion of German respondents were pessimistic about ever stabilizing
  Afghanistan.


• Messages that dramatize the consequences of a NATO defeat for specific German
  interests could counter the widely held perception that Afghanistan is not
  Germany�s problem. For example, messages that illustrate how a defeat in
  Afghanistan could heighten Germany�s exposure to terrorism, opium, and refugees
  might help to make the war more salient to skeptics.


• Emphasis on the mission�s multilateral and humanitarian aspects could help ease
  Germans� concerns about waging any kind of war while appealing to their desire to
  support multilateral efforts. Despite their allergy to armed conflict, Germans were
  willing to break precedent and use force in the Balkans in the 1990s to show
  commitment to their NATO allies. German respondents cited helping their allies as
  one of the most compelling reasons for supporting ISAF, according to an INR poll in
  the fall of 2009.

It's not often we get a behind the scenes look at a propaganda campaign.