By Steve Hynd
General Ashfaq Kayani, the head of the Pakistani army, has been retained in that position for the next three years when he was supposed to retire later this year. The official narrative is that he has reluctantly agreed to continue serving although he had not sought to do so - and that this is an internal decision which the U.S. had no part in. If you believe either of those I've a bridge to sell you.
Some, like Shuja Nawaz, think this will allow Kayani to "continue the transformation of the Pakistan into army into a professional body ready to fight insurgencies and conventional enemies equally well" and will be a stabilizing move. Others, like Josh Mull, see the extension of Kayani's term as "bad news for us, due to his cozy relationship with militants and terrorist organizations, as well as his undermining of the democratically elected civilian government" and "could be considered another in Pakistan�s long history of military coups, albeit a completely silent one."
My own view, as anyone who has followed my posts about the increasingly Emperor Palpatine lookalike General, is far closer to Josh's. The Guardian's Saeed Shah puts the underlying dynamic succinctly:
The sudden move underscores the army's strength over the democratically elected government of President Asif Ali Zardari, which has been racked by political turmoil. Kayani will now outlast the prime minister and the president and is likely to oversee the next general election.
Just as importantly, Kayani's hand-picked man for running Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency, General Pasha, has already been given his own extension.
Guess who really runs Pakistan?
The US government loves Kayani - he's the kind of strongman Clinton, Holbrooke, Mullen and Petraeus are comfortable with while being sufficiently "behind the curtain" as to not raise too much talk of supporting dictators as was the case with Musharraf. The Western media, following their military sources as ever, love to trot out cliches about him while reporting on how important he is to US plans in the region. It's almost impossible to read a piece about Kayani in the mainstream which doesn't use at least two of "shadowy", "soft-spoken" and "chain-smoker". Some have gone as far as noting that he's respected because he's so machievellian, describing him as a "master manipulator" and quoting CIA sources as saying �We admire those traits�.
However, what you'll rarely find in Western coverage is that Kayani was ISI head during the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2006 and Pasha was ISI head during the Mumbai massacre of 2008 - planning for both of which led back to Pakistan's intelligence agency.
Steve, all this yak yak and it whittles down to two events in Mumubai, India?
ReplyDeleteHow does that inform your readers about future US interests? A bomb went off in Mumbai....and that has something to do with US strategic interests how?
When you are locked in a mortal combat in an arena as brutal as Afghnaistan/Central Asia you want the baddest ass on your side .....if you wish to come out aces!!!
Do read court documents/journals about 2006 Mumbai. No where is there a mention of Kiyani.
So buddy US interests in and around western china/iran are not synonymous with Indian quibbles with pakistan.
Hi Marc,
ReplyDeleteBack in Feb 2009 when you last commented on this blog, you didn't even know Mumbai 2006 existed! Glad you've remedied that.
As my knowledgeable friend "Empty" told you at the time: "there was a sourced article by Saleem Shahzad in Asia Times online which described the genesis of the plot within the ISI."
Maybe you might consider that it is not in the US strategic interest to put so many eggs in Kayani's snake basket. That's not a comment about Pakistanis - just about the military/feudal elite in charge there.
Just today, Admiral Mullen told reporters that the LeT and the Haqqani network are fast becoming the two biggest security threats to the US from the sub-continent. Both are backed by the ISI. LeT were their proxies for both Mumbai attacks, among others. On Thursday, Holbrooke and Mullen warned about the ISI's ties to the Let and taliban groups and said that the LeT were trying to ignite an Indo-Pak war. The Haqqani network was likely the group that tried to attack the Kabul conference the other day, has continually attacked US troops in Afghanistan, and has been described by Kayani as a "strategic asset".
So "buddy", do you get it yet?
Regards, Steve
Do any of you folks here at NewsHoggers follow the bloggers at the Indian National Interest? One of their more interesting fellows, Nitin Pai, said the following on Kayani's maneuvers:
ReplyDeleteYou would be foolish to think that you can rub off the entire top echelon of the Pakistani army�s general staff on the wrong side and get on with life as usual. Look at the last two power transitions in that country�Nawaz Sharif was ousted because he made the cardinal mistake of being less than respectful in his treatment of General Jehangir Karamat and then General Musharraf. In his turn, General Musharraf was ultimately pushed out because the army hierarchy had had enough of him. The rigidly hierarchical pyramid that is the Pakistani army is at once highly competitive at a peer level and unappreciative of anything that disrupts upward movement. Those who mess with the dynamic end up paying a dear price for it.
It doesn�t need you to be particularly astute to figure this out. But the trappings of power, headiness of perceived victories and public sycophancy by US officials militates against the exercise of good sense. Then fall, Caesar. It�s General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani�s turn now.
General Kayani might have secured a three-year extension but in doing so, he has ensured that as many as 24 lieutenant-generals�the entire lot of them�will not stand a chance to become army chief, unless something untoward happens to the overstaying incumbent. There are around 170 major-generals many of who will be affected too. That makes for quite a lot of disgruntled officers who would wish ill of their boss.
A general who gets an extension is like a blockage in a sewage pipe. If the blockage is not cleared, the pipe will burst. There�s always more sewage, pressure builds up relentlessly and no one wants the sewage pipe to burst. Not even US officials. So it is the blockage that is cleared.
General Kayani played a masterful hand so far. He would have done well to hang up his boots in November. Alas, power and hubris got the better of him. It�s downhill for him now. The dagger-sharpeners of Rawalpindi will see increased custom in the coming months.
What might the NewsHigger crew make of this analysis?
Hi T.,
ReplyDeleteI know Nitin Pai some, and I've written a piece for him for the Pragatti journal in the past. He's a smart guy but in this case I'll disagree with his prediction. Kayani has spent his tenure packing the upper echelons of the military with his own hand-picked people and they all owe their staus to him. The two most influential have just been given their own extensions too. I'd be more worried about that group deciding their best promotion path is to take minister's positions to Kayani's presidency than that they'd try a coup against the chain-smoking general.
Regards, Steve
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteWhile I don't think Kayani is faced with a coup attempt by disgruntled Lt. Generals this extension will cause him problems. The army functions as an institution because rules of competition are clearly laid out. By, in a sense, going around these rules Kayani has gone against tradition. He will have to spend significant political capital to soothe ruffled feathers and will end up being a weaker partner for the US because of that. I think the US would have been better off taking a risk on his successor. My 2 cents.