"America will lose in Afghanistan even if the current training mission succeeds"

By Steve Hynd

General Petraeus is expected to argue in an upcoming D.C. media blitz (hey, he can afford the time, it's not as if he has a war to run...) that NATO forces will have to stay longer in Afghanistan so that they can train the Afghan army and police further. The idea is that "they will stand up so we can stand down", just like Iraq.

Today, 11 year special forces veteran and Democrat candidate for Congress Tommy Sowers explains why this is just another pea-and-shell shuffle to perpetuate an occupation that is good for the generals, good for the Pentagon's budget, good for "hang tough" politicians, but bad for everyone else.

Who will pay for the Afghan military once America leaves? That the answer is not the Afghans, nor America, nor our allies, means that America will lose in Afghanistan even if the current training mission succeeds.

All roads to success in Afghanistan depend on building the Afghan security forces so our troops can finally come home. My experience in helping build a professional Iraqi military from scratch was no easy task, but my challenges in Iraq paled next to the challenges faced by our troops in Afghanistan: the second most corrupt nation in the world, without a strong or legitimate central government, poor education and infrastructure, and a tribal mentality.

Setting aside these significant challenges, logistics determine American blood and tax dollars will create a force too small to secure Afghanistan yet too large for Afghanistan to maintain. The U.S. Army's current counterinsurgency doctrine recommends a minimum force ratio of 1 to 50 (i.e. an Afghan policeman or soldier to keep the peace for every 50 civilians). Afghanistan's current population is 29,121,000. Therefore, securing Afghanistan will require, at minimum, 582,000 Afghan security personnel, a force larger than the active U.S. Army.

Yet America's current mission is not to expand the Afghan security force to 582,000, but 400,000. Even this reduced number will still cost Afghanistan at least 20 percent of its GDP, by far the greatest percentage on military spending by any nation.

Who will pay for the future Afghan army? The Afghans can't. Our allies won't. And America's soaring deficits indicate America can't pay forever. After a decade of U.S. military sacrifice and billions of taxpayer dollars, America will have created 400,000 trained, armed but unpaid Afghans...Their future employment is the seed of the next Afghan civil war...

...Tax dollars spent building an Afghan military are dollars not spent toward defeating al-Qaeda.

Very straightforward, no?