Renting Afghan Legitimacy

By Steve Hynd

Today at the HuffPo, Prof. Marc Gopin sets out a case for staying the course in Afghanistan which apparently relies on transitioning to a "kinder, gentler war" of the kind that has consistently eluded the US military and it's alles. Maybe that's because such a war is essentially mythical - no matter how many glad-news screeds are written about "population centric counterinsurgency" it always boils down to "force protection counterinsurgency" and whack-a-mole pacification operations when those theories are tried out in the real world.

As one of his primary "new ideas", for example, Prof. Gopin writes that:

CERP stands for Commanders' Emergency Response Program. These funds are being used by forward thinking commanders to reconstruct mosques and other basic construction needs. General Petreaus should significantly increase the quantity of these funds and the flexibility of their usage, particularly supporting commanders and chaplains in particular regions that have engaged the community, tribal and religious leaders as to their basic needs. This will have a significant impact on creating an American/Afghan alliance in the field.

The real game changer is far from the center, far from the problems of the Kabul leadership, but right up close to the choices being made by young people in the villages as to whether or not to join the insurgency.

Maybe Prof. Gopin could first suggest fixes for the DoD's attitude of "don't know, don't care" about taxpayers' money which has led to two thirds of CERP funds being unaccounted for to date - much of that money pissed away on projects that help the military rather than Afghans, or line the pockets of American contractors and the Afghan corrupt elite.

And then, he should read a report in Newsweek today by Micah Garen. Months after the US offensive in marjah was supposed to defeat the Taliban in their stronghold and usher in a new era when "government in a box" could be opened up there, Garen talks to US soldiers on the ground there (Emphaisis mine - SH).

Col. Christmas has been in Marja for 60 days now; he and his Marines are trying to win over the population by creating a sense of security, working on improvement projects, and convincing locals that the American-backed government in Kabul is their future. It�s a tough sell.

The security bubble provided by the Marine patrols extends only to a small section of Marja. Within that artificial bubble, shops are slowly reopening and tribal elders are engaging with Marines. But that�s along only a few of the main roads, where the U.S. military maintains a constant presence. In the surrounding countryside, which has barely passable roads or none at all, there�s little safety. And at night, all over Marja, anything goes.

The region is crumbling�buildings, roads, and the American-built canals are falling apart�and though the Marines rebuild mosques, schools, restaurants, and roads, and sometimes do win the locals over, it�s rarely to the side of the government. Afterward, the residents come straight to American soldiers with their needs or wants rather than relying on government officials...Christmas and other U.S. soldiers say they�re making progress incrementally, but also that they�re being played by the locals, who will make a deal with them one day and with the Taliban the next.

So, within the small and artificial "bubbles" of security that can be created, the locals are looking to the U.S. military, not their own government, as a legitimate authority - and one that's in a competition with the Taliban which it's by no means clear the military is winning. With the central government plagued by corruption and the populace showing a complete loss of faith as evidenced by meteorically falling election turnouts, the US military is left renting loyalties by day only to lose them at night - but no-where along the path is it creating legitimacy for non-Taliban Afghan governmental structures that might tie all those bubbles together.

Col Christmas and others admit it would take "a matter of four or five years" for all their reconstruction projects to see fruition. The question that must be asked is "why, if all that's going to happen is the locals become dependant on the U.S. military?" That's not an exit plan - it's a plan for perpetual occupation or one for an even more catastrophic collapse of public order when the U.S. finally does leave. 

We should forget the "face-saving" people like Prof. Gopin seem to advocate and accept that Afghanistan's coming troubles will get worse, not better, the longer we stay. Better to leave now.