Shaping an agreement

By Dave Anderson:

Bernard Finel at the Small War Journal continues to beat on a basic Clauswitzian drum --- military operations should be part of a broader political strategy to obtain goals instead of a substitute for a political strategy without regards for costs or constraints.  He argues that a military strategy that acknowledges the reality that the US will have 100,000 troops or more in Afghanistan for at least another eighteen months, peak deployment has already happened, and the US will eventually wind down its involvement in Afghanistan while the major Afghan players who have been major players for two generations now will still be involved in Afghanistan long after the US draws down means unconditional surrender/clean cut victory will not be achieved but a negoatiated settlement is plausible and desirable.

The United States ought to use its temporary increase in combat power in a concerted effort to bludgeon, coerce, and cajole insurgent forces to the negotiating table. In the end, a small-footprint, counter-terrorism approach may be the most cost-effective hedge against disorder in Afghanistan. But in the short-run, transitioning to that approach should not be main task of U.S. forces. Instead, the primary objective for the United States ought to be to promote the development of an inclusive political settlement � one that presumes a legitimate governance role for many current insurgent groups.

As I mentioned in March, there is one red-line global interest for the United States in Afghanistan and that is the only hard condition the US needs to insist upon:

There is only one red-line from the American perspective from talking with anyone in Afghanistan.  That red line is active, material support for "far enemy" terrorist groups.  Preventing long-distance support and planning cells for operations against US and allied civilians in their home territory is the only significant interest that we have in the region.  Everything else is a local concern that does not impact US security all that much.

Conservative Pashtuns, tribal militias, drug-runners, warlords and their private armies are all long-standing interest groups in Afghanistan who have either full or limited veto power over American maximal goals that would dictate numerous local concerns.  Minimalist goal sets disregard local concerns and create the opportunity for out-groups to become in-groups.