Libya Notes

By John Ballard

Too many tabs stacking up on the toolbar. This is my way of "clearing the cache" in case I want to refer to any of them in future.

?Two items at The Arabist. If the tide turns: some pros and cons of military intervention in Libya and A different take on foreign intervention in Libya.
Both are short and intelligent.  Couple of salieth points...

• ...intervention in Libya would not necessarily be a repeat of Iraq, or rather, it would not be Iraq 2003. Rather, it would be Iraqi Kurdistan in the summer of 1991, or Bosnia in 2005. �Any foreign incursion into Libyan land or airspace risks tainting the rebellion as foreign-backed.


• ...a regime which falls completely due to the efforts of its own people, rather than to the work of foreigners, would be more likely to lead to its moral collapse -- ie, you would be less likely to have Qaddafi revanchists threatening other Libyan factions in the future.


• I am specifically againt US intervention: the US is overstretched as it is, and it does not need the inherit the mess in Libya. The no-fly zone concept being bandied about, as Steve noted, is both a lot more difficult to pull off than people think and not particularly helpful.


• ...a ground invasion by Egypt to restore order. While I kind of like this concept, the Egyptian military has a country to run at the moment and no appetite for adventurism. Let's be satisfied at least that the Arab League two days ago actually issued a condemnation of what was happening in Libya, a historic first.


• Another possibility is a decapitation mission against the Libyan leadership, particularly Muammar Qadhafi. I think that this mission with clearly defined and limited aims is the best choice if intervention of any kind is chosen. The only problem is that it might deprive Libyans of the pleasure of doing it themselves (although perhaps those defector pilots could be put to good use). It would obviously rely either an aerial bombing mission (hard to verify success) or a special forces operation (difficult to pull off without good intelligence)


• Finally, we should consider the possibility of a prolonged civil war in Libya, with or without the Qadhafis, and no foreign intervention. Someone will be selling weapons to one side or the other. Perhaps some are even considering arming one side, at least so they can defend themselves. I doubt many people want more weapons in Libya, but this is the way things are likely to head if there is no decisive victory by one side or the other.

?'Peace Process' - What Peace Process?
Tony Karon notes the evaporation of anything resembling a "peace process" in the I/P conflict.

....last Friday's [United Nations] vote was not simply a repudiation of Israeli policy; it was a symbolic rebuke of U.S. handling of the conflict -- not only by the Palestinians, but also by all of Washington's allies, none of which supported the Obama Administration's position.

No one says so out loud, but  something tells me this is playing out in accordance with what the Obama administration wants. Disinterested observers have seen for years the specter of a king without clothes, but it has been politically self-destructive to say so openly. Ask Jimmy Carter. Terms like "terrorist state" and "terrorist organization" have become meaningless. The Muslim Brotherhood distanced itself from terrorism years ago and even Hamas, its protege, is light years away from Al Qaeda. And the exposure of Qaddafi needs no further comment. Claims that Libya ever "renounced terrorism" ring hollow now.

?16 miles away, Saudi Arabia's watchful eye looms over Bahrain unrest
Washington Post short column.Tick, tick, tick...

?Gaddafi loses more Libyan cities
Al Jazeera quickie with three-minute video.

?On the Line With Libya
Latest from Nickolas Kristof. He ticks off a few assertive actions but stops short of advocating direct intervention.

And these are uncertain levers, creating some risk that he would respond by going after citizens of the United States. But there are two reasons why I think it�s very important to pull these levers.

The first is that so many Libyans have defected or seem to be wavering. That military family in Tripoli estimates that only 10 percent of those in the Libyan armed forces are behind Colonel Qaddafi � and the rest are wondering what to do next.

The second is that as this democracy uprising spreads, other despots may be encouraged to follow Colonel Qaddafi�s example. We need to make very sure that the international reaction is so strong � and the scorched-earth strategy so unsuccessful � that no other despot is tempted to declare war on his own people.