Maximal goals = maximum veto points

By Dave Anderson:

The US wants a maximal victory in Afghanistan as defined by "defeating" the Taliban, and destroying Al-Quaeda and any other terrorist organization. The second part of this goal set is achievable, or at least is achievable if it is redefined as reducing the threat to nuisance level as AQ's ideas have disseminated and anyone with a grievance against the US and the West in the Islamic world and is willing to use violence co-opts the AQ brand. However the first goal is ridiculous as "defeating" the Taliban in the language of US officials means removing conservative Pashtun influence from the political-economic sphere of a nation where Pashtuns make up a plurality, and conservative Pashtuns make up a sizable majority of the Pashtun elite. This goal set also has the issue of conflicting with the goal sets of every local stakeholder.

The Small Wars Journal is pointing this problem out to the Very Serious People:

Karzai is systematically build-ing a coalition of regional powerbrokers in preparation for a post-American Afghanistan. By strategically reshuffling provincial, district, and ministerial positions, Karzai is gradually reproducing the powerbrokers� political and economic patronage structures he tried for seven years to displace with his own. He is doing so to create the political space required to maintain his family�s influence beyond the 2014 elections or to exit the presidency intact.

Implementing this strategy allows President Karzai to achieve his objectives due to three effects. First, and most importantly, he begins to break his dependence on the international community for his administration�s survival. Second, he is able to leverage remaining international assistance to secure continued powerbroker interest in the short-term viability of GIRoA. Finally, Karzai can choose to reconcile with the Taliban to reinforce his bargaining position. This new Karzai governing strategy mitigates the conse-quences of the impending decline in international support, though at the expense of the Afghan population and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency (COIN) implementation.

Yes, Karzai is an authoritarian, corrupt bastard, but he is the American backed bastard. His interests (to either keep his head on his shoulders, or to pad the Swiss/Grand Cayman bank account) significantly diverge from American interests. And he is one of the more pliable stakeholders in Afghanistan because the US is funding his regime and his retirement account.

Other stakeholders are also willing to define victory in a massively different manner than the United States --- they are seeking long term working relationships with slightly different power imbalances rather than absolute and crushing victory. And since they will be in Afghanistan far longer than the US, those opinions matter more than the poll-tested desire for "complete victory."

The only red-line the US should have to any settlement is that any major stakeholder in Afghanistan does not actively engage in backing AQ or pushing the AQ brand.