Arab Democrats - 1, Al Qaeda - 0

By John Ballard

This is a quickie and not very erudite. It's been said before and will be said again (often, I hope).
But it's like eating junk food or hearing "I love you."
You can't get too much of it.

Al Qa'eda's modus operandi has always been predicated on the idea that only violent struggle can overthrow the corrupt regimes of the Arab world. Now, without firing a shot, the Egyptian people proved otherwise.

In Tahrir Square, Arabs dealt a more significant blow to al Qa'eda than 10 years of US bombardment around the world. That represents a significant victory for the young people of the Arab world.

Will somebody please tell that guy from Connecticut and the constituents drinking his koolade.

This link leads to an excellent article with more nuanced analysis than I have snipped. Do read it entirely and forgive me for picking the cherry off the sundae.

For jihadis, there may be worse to come. If Egypt or Tunisia can build a pluralistic political system that succeeds in beginning to solve some of the chief challenges those countries face, the jihadist narrative will be further undermined and a model will be established.

Of course, if, as I wrote last week, chaos prevails in North Africa, there is a good chance jihadis may try to use it as a base for operations, as in post-invasion Iraq. And if another strongman emerges or Egypt slips back into autocracy, al Qa'eda will be able to claim that the whole basis of a pluralistic system doesn't work and that an Islamic theocracy is the only workable solution.

[...]    Interestingly, the cultural affinity that underpins Arab nationalism has been on show in every demonstration since Tunisia's revolution. The protesters in Egypt and elsewhere were explicitly following Tunisia, saying, in banners, in person and in deed, that if the Arabs over there could do it, we can do it, too.

That has led some theorists to suggest that Arab nationalism might be making a comeback. But it's important to understand that Arab nationalism was a political interpretation of a much broader social attitude. The Arabs feel themselves to be related, in some unspecified, amorphous way. This is broadly a cultural affinity rather than a political position.

In reality, this feeling is much closer to the Anglosphere, the undefined cultural affinity, bound by language, that links Britain, a significant chunk of North America, Australia and New Zealand, as well as other places, such as South Africa. This Arabsphere is deeper, however, because it is popularly thought to contain an ethnic component.

It has, however, not been translated into a political union, partly because the Arab world is too large and too diverse. Any cultural affinity between the Arabs on show in North Africa is different to the nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, of nationalism as a political project, under one charismatic leader. As Arabs of a particular age have lamented for some time, there is no new Nasser on the landscape.

His comparison of the Arab world with the Anglosphere is a good point.

I might add that tribal social structures predate nationalism and have deeper roots, not only among Arab society but all over the world. Wherever humans have lived in groups they have organized themselves into tribes. Nationalism is a modern geo-political construct which once had political meaning. Even that has been exploited by transnational business enterprises rendering the term virtually meaningless. 

Wouldn't it be great if the Arab Democrats could devise a political system honoring tribal roots with as much egalitarian idealism as religious, ethnic and gender considerations?  That could be as important a contribution to the progress of mankind as Aarbic numerals and the concept of zero.