What Next?

By Dave Anderson:



So now what in Libya as there appears to be a highly predictable stalemate as the pro-Quaddafi forces cannot move en masse due to the threat of NATO airpower hitting mobile columns strung out on exposed road marches. The anti-Quaddafi forces are unable to effectively maneuver because they have no armor, minimal discipline, minimal logistics and minimal artillery that is only partially compensated by NATO close air support and interdiction strikes. The rebels can make long road marches in the nothingness of Libya but as soon as they get near any valuable real estate held by the pro-Quaddafi units, they get whacked by modern artillery and armor units.





The New York Times has some details on this dynamic:

Having abandoned Bin Jawwad on Tuesday and the oil town of Ras Lanuf on Wednesday, the rebels continued their eastward retreat, fleeing before the loyalists' shelling and missile attacks from another oil town, Brega, and falling back on the strategic city of Ajdabiya. On Wednesday afternoon, residents of Ajdabiya were seen fleeing along the road north to Benghazi, the rebel capital and stronghold that Colonel Qaddafi's forces reached before the allied air campaign got underway nearly two weeks ago.



There were few signs of the punishing airstrikes that reversed the loyalists' first push. But military experts said they expected the counterattack to expose Colonel Qaddafi's forces to renewed attacks, and an American military spokesman said that coalition warplanes resumed bombing the pro-Qaddafi units on Wednesday, without specifying the timing or locations.

So now what? Economic seige of Tripoli and the rest of Western Libya with the hope that the oppressed residents or more likely a self-motivated general to launch a coup? The Quaddafi regime has plenty of near cash fungible resources to insure the loyalty of their inner core of supporters. Oil and gasoline can continue to be smuggled to the outside world to generate cash and to bring in ammunition and other neccessary supplies. The other option is for someone's Marines to land on the shores of Tripoli, but the US is ruling that out, the British are already overextended, and I am not sure what the French and Italian marine infantry availability is right now.





Maybe an option tree that includes an effective stalemate should have been thought out before the bombing began as quick wars tend to produce lower overall casualty levels than prolonged wars and stalemates.