Pakistan and Osama Bin Laden (Updated)

By Steve Hynd

So, the most important thing about Osama Bin Laden's death to my mind isn't that he's dead. That's nice, sure - but as conservative-leaning national security pundit David Gartenstein-Ross writes today, just because Osama is dead doesn't mean Al Qaeda is. In fact:

bin Laden's death does not close this chapter in history. Two points are worth bearing in mind. First, bin Laden's strategic ideas for beating a superpower (which U.S. planners never fully understood) have permeated his organization, and are widely shared by al Qaeda's affiliates. Second, one critical lesson of 2001 is that we should not allow bin Laden's death to cause us to lose sight of the continued threat that al Qaeda poses.

And Australian counter-terrorism expert Leah Farrall, one of the best in the business, writes:

It�s leadership will go to ground and close ranks while they try to protect themselves and ascertain the degree of damage to their comms channels and other elements of operational security.

External operations (AQ�s attacks against the west) are not likely to be impacted. OBL really only got involved in ops planning to approve spectaculars, particularly those using a new means of attack or against a new target. Second tier leaders deal with external operations for the most part. Aside from communications disruptions (which do little to disrupt those already deployed) this section will continue on business as usual.

Leadership will automatically pass to the second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri. If he goes too, then the position goes to the head of the command council, or potentially the head of AQ�s shariah council, although this is a more informal body. It�s unlikely to go to a vote in the short term due to operational requirements.

AQ�s branch and franchises will stay on board.

As for retributive attacks, AQ is unlikely to waste operatives on hasty retaliation. It will incite others to do so, but it�s own efforts will come later. AQAP may not be so pragmatic and it already has permission to carry out attacks against the west.

No, what's most important is what Pakistan knew about Bin Laden's massive, $1 million dollar compound which had stood for half a decade a stone's throw away from their military academy and the homes of retired military officers. Over the years, Pakistani officials have repeatedly claimed they had no idea where Bin Laden was hiding, or stated that he was definitely not in Pakistan. But he was right under their noses, a half hour's drive from ISI headquarters, the whole time.

Despite early rumors that pakistani authorities had co-operated with the US operation to kill Bin Laden, fresh reports seem to suggest that was not the case at all. The ISI says that the US operation was mounted from Afghanistan and was undetected by Pakistani air defense. The BBC's Jon Williams reports that this was becaiuse the US helicopters flew low to avoid Pakistani radar. Why do that if the two nations were co-operating?

Moreover, no less than Admiral mullen, the chair of the Joint Chiefs, has recently verbally lashed out at Pakistan's ISI for aiding the Haqqani network of militants, who pass with impunity across the border into Afghanistan. And over the years American Afghan, Indian, Spanish, UK and NATO intelligence reports have suggested that the Taliban's head, Mullah Omar, is living in an ISI compound in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

There are some tough questions coming about the nature of the West's alliance with pakistan, and the worth of the billions in aid sent there.

Update: more from emptywheel at FDL.

Update 2: From Foreign Policy Magazine: great moments in Pakistani leaders pretending they didn't know where Bin Laden was over the last decade.