Parley Parlay

by Eric Martin

There have been multiple media reports of late about a still-forming policy of outreach to certain Taliban factions in an effort to seek a negotiated end to the myriad conflicts in Afghanistan.  Robert Dreyfuss provides his take here.  See also, here (reports that Mullah Omar would sever ties with al-Qaeda), here (pdf from Brookings), here and here (a pessimistic take).

Along these lines, Pakistani Army Major Ali Iqbal has a thought-provoking piece at the Small Wars Journal which posits that entering negotiated settlements represents a win-win opportunity regardless of how the accords ultimately turn out.  His thesis is based on the premise that the Taliban currently enjoy an artificially high level of support among certain local populations because: (1) the Taliban is currently out of power and can capitalize on anti-government sentiments without providing an alternate model of governance subject to scrutiny; (2) it can capitalize on vague Pashtun anxieties and feelings of disempowerment that have set in post-2001, again, without providing opportunities and attainable aspirations; and (3) many locals extend the Taliban the benefit of the doubt about their ostensibly "limited" military goals and supposed lack of totalitarian agenda.

So after having looked into the root cause of the issue, where does the solution lie? The solution is simple, talks, parleys, overtures and concessions to the Taliban (Kudos to the Karzai establishment and international community for considering this option). I know that it sounds defeatist in its very nature and that all the efforts of almost a decade may be considered going down the drain, however, it is essential. It is essential, firstly, only for the reason that if the Taliban are actually serious in bringing peace, then what else do we wish for (Best form of Victory is winning without fighting � Sun Tzu).

Secondly and most probably, if the Taliban are not serious in bringing peace and have greater designs for their totalitarian rule and hegemony, then their maliciousness will be unveiled to the people. The sincerity of ISAF in giving peace a chance, at the cost of undue concessions and compromising on a few core beliefs would bring a change of heart by the locals. The insurgents after being offered a chance to give people their long awaited shot at tranquility and then losing it through self serving interests would stand alone with little to no popular support.

There is one additional element that seems crucial to Major Iqbal's proposal:

Involve the locals in parleys with the militants. Let them have a say and then they will feel responsible if the militants do not measure up to their commitments. Their active participation would either make the militants buckle under pressure or turn them against each other.

Major Iqbal points to the experience in the Swat Valley in Pakistan as an example of using a negotiated truce to turn the locals against the erstwhile popular insurgents.  Although not completely analogous, the model has some prospects for success and given the Taliban's proclivities for overreach, there is no reason to think that a similar ploy couldn't work in areas of Afghanistan as well.

What's even more encouraging than the recent recourse to negotiation with Taliban elements, though, are some early signals that the Obama administration may actually be looking for ways to address Pakistani concerns, and account for what Pakistan perceives as its vital interests, in some manner that could lessen its dependence on the Taliban as proxy.  Such an accounting for Pakistan's position is a prerequisite to a successful winding down of the conflict because without Paksitani buy-in, it will be difficult if not possible to establish any type of lasting accord.  Pakistan has more than enough opportunity to play spoiler if the arrangement in Afghanistan ignores its perceived needs.  Roberty Dreyfuss on some of those encouraging developments:

According to Arnaud de Borchgrave, the ultraconservative commentator and columnist, Obama is sending General James Jones, the national security adviser, to Pakistan to find out what kind of role Pakistan could play in ending the war. More importantly, he says that during his recent tour of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Gates came to the reluctant conclusion that ending the war means rebalancing the Afghan government in a way that takes both Indian and Pakistani interests into account, which happens to be exactly right. Says de Borchgrave:

"All the talk is how to end the Afghan war, not how to win it. ... For U.S. Defense Secretary Bob Gates, just back from India and Pakistan, a power-sharing compromise in Kabul is the only way to cut short a war that no longer has the support of the American people."

The attitude of Pakistan is, and will be, crucial. Yesterday, General Kiyani, the Pakistani chief of staff -- whose command and its intelligence service, the ISI, have long supported the Taliban -- suggested that Pakistan might be willing to train Afghan security forces in order to help stabilize the country. Reading the intentions of the Pakistani army and ISI are difficult, since they are notorious liars, but it just might be that Kiyani is making a serious offer here. If Pakistan does engage in training Afghan forces, it might create a dynamic in which Pakistan needs to rely less on the Taliban for influence in Afghanistan, and thus Pakistan might be willing to coax the Taliban, or parts of it, to the bargaining table.

Kiyani, speaking to reporters, said:

"We want to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, but that does not imply controlling it. If we have a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, automatically we will have our strategic depth because our western border will be secure, and we will not be looking at two fronts."

His offer to train Afghan forces is "being considered by US and Afghan officials," according to the Times, which added that "Kiyani's offer appeared to be in part driven by a desire to limit the influence in Afghanistan of India." Well, duh.

Ideally, Pakistani influence in Afghanistan would be limited and based upon mutual respect, mutual enrichment and non-interference in each others' affairs.  The same could probably be said for US-Afghan relations it should be noted.  However, given the reality that Pakistan is simply not going to go along with any arrangement that lessens its historical influence while India's presence grows, it would be wiser to accept this intractable reality and begin searching for alternative vehicles for Pakistani influence that are more constructive, and less pernicious to us, than the Taliban in its pro-al-Qaeda incarnations.  With the onus on Pakistan to accept such a compromise.  A needle I've advocated threading for some time now.