On Anniversary of Marjah Push, Escalation Strategy Still Failing

By Derrick Crowe

Exactly one year ago, on February 13, 2010, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan launched the first major military operations enabled by President Obama's 30,000 troop increase. President Obama and the high priests of counterinsurgency warfare, Generals David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, made two major assertions about the escalation, that it would a) enable coalition forces to reverse the insurgents' momentum and b) increase security for the Afghan people. After a year of fighting, neither of those things happened. The escalation is a failure, and it's time to bring our troops home.

February 13, 2010: The Push into Marjah

Three hundred and sixty-five days ago, U.S. and other international forces began Operation Moshtarak, the invasion of Marja District in Helmand Province. Looking back, the hubris and hype surrounding this military operation boggle the mind. General McChrystal promised, "We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in," meaning that good governance and the extension of Kabul's writ would be implemented very rapidly. The operation was supposed to be a prototype for future campaigns in Afghanistan and a "confidence builder" for both U.S. forces and a restive political class in Washington, D.C., not all of whom were happy about the escalation or McChrystal's brashness in pushing it.

To put it mildly, Moshtarak failed to live up to the hype:

"[I]n the weeks leading up to the imminent offensive to take the Helmand River Valley town of Marjah in southern Afghanistan, the Marines' commander, Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, sat with dozens of Afghan tribal elders...offering reassurances that his top priority will be the safety of Afghan civilians." -- Chicago Tribune, February 10, 2010.

Almost immediately, this hype about an operation purported to be proof-of-concept for the population-protecting counterinsurgency strategy fell apart in the face of U.S.-caused civilian deaths. Just prior to the operation, coalition forces dropped leaflets on the largely illiterate district warning people to stay in their homes. An Italian NGO, Emergeny, warned that military blockades were preventing civilians from fleeing the area. At the same time commanders bragged that the "evacuation" of the residents would allow the use of air strikes without the danger of civilian casualties. These contradictions soon bore deadly fruit: On the second day of the offensive, U.S. troops fired a HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) weapon on a house full of civilians, killing roughly a dozen people. By February 23, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission reported that ISAF forces were responsible for most civilian deaths so far in the incursion.

As insurgents melted away (as all guerrillas do in the face of superior firepower -- to bide time and return once counter-insurgents are dug in) the "government in a box" hype fell apart as well. The coalition's hand-picked governor, Abdul Zahir, turned out to be an ex-convict who served part of a prison sentence for stabbing his own son. By July, he would be replaced as part of a "reform procedure."

Sending Afghan National Police forces to establish rule of law proved to be a cruel joke on the local residents:

"In the weeks since they were sent to Helmand province as part of the U.S.-led offensive in Marjah, ANCOP members have set up checkpoints to shake down residents, been kicked out for using drugs and shunned in some areas as outsiders, according to U.S. officials briefed on a recent analysis by the RAND Corp. ...More than a quarter of the officers in one ANCOP battalion in Helmand were dismissed for drug use, and the rest were sent off for urgent retraining. One Western official who attended the briefing termed ANCOP's role in Marjah a disaster."

As late as October 2010, residents of the town said the area was "more insecure than ever," and Reuters classified the Taliban re-infiltration as a "full-blown insurgency." And, although U.S. commanders want us to believe that the fighting in Marjah is "essentially over" as of December, the numbers tell a different story. According to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office, in Helmand Province, in which Marjah is located, the number of attacks by insurgents in spiked from 620 in 2009 to 1387 in 2010, a 124-percent increase [pdf].

A Wider Pattern of Failure

This pattern of hype ("Protecting civilians! Reversing insurgents momentum!") followed by a failure to deliver extended from Marjah to the whole of the escalation strategy across Afghanistan. Even after a month of fighting in Marjah in which U.S. and coalition forces were responsible for the majority of civilian deaths, Defense Secretary Robert Gates characterized the offensive in this way on March 8, 2010:

"Of course the operation in Marjah is only one of many battles to come in a much longer campaign focused on protecting the people of Afghanistan."

As was the case in Marjah, that broader campaign has utterly failed to protect the people of Afghanistan in terms of the reach of the insurgency, the levels of war-related violence and the number of civilians killed or injured in the conflict.

Although President Obama, General Petraeus and others have repeatedly asserted in public remarks that the U.S. has reversed the insurgents' momentum, reports from the Pentagon and from NGOs agree that the insurgency continued to grow in size and sophistication throughout 2010. By one measure, insurgent-initiated attacks this January are up almost 80 percent from last January. Worse, a new report from Alex Strick von Linschoten and Felix Kuehn at the Center on International Cooperation warns that the U.S. targeted killings of senior Taliban leadership is not only failing to retard the growth of the insurgency, but it's providing opportunities for much more radical junior leaders to take control of the operation, making the Taliban more susceptible to al-Qaeda influence and making the insurgents less willing to negotiate. In short, over the year in which the U.S. was pursuing its escalated military strategy, the insurgency got larger, smarter and more radical.

When testifying to Congress immediately following President Obama's 2009 West Point speech, Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen asserted the escalation would "improve security for the Afghan people." The past year proved him wrong. According to the Afghan NGO Safety Office's (ANSO) Q4 2010 report [pdf],

"Consistent with the five year trend...attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were 64% higher than 2009, the highest inter-annual growth rate we have recorded... If averaged, the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per day, every single day of the year. ...[T]aking the national data as a whole we consider this indisputable evidence that conditions are deteriorating."

General Petraeus has taken to speaking of "security bubbles" in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, but violence is up in those provinces by 20 percent and 124 percent, respectively, according to ANSO. Security in Afghanistan for Afghan civilians sharply declined in the period following the launch of the escalated military campaign.

This heightened level of insurgent-initiated violence, combined with attacks initiated by U.S. and coalition forces, led to a predictable result: 2010 was the worst year of the war so far for war-related civilian deaths.

President Obama and numerous Pentagon officials asserted that the escalation strategy, which began one year ago with the invasion of Majah, would enable U.S. forces to reverse insurgent momentum and protect the population. They were wrong. Measured by the standards of its backers, the escalation strategy in Afghanistan is a miserable failure.

Because It's Time

Let's have some accountability here. In the leaked strategic assessment that's largely responsible for getting us into this mess, General Stanley McChrystal used dire language to describe the "need" for escalation [pdf]:

"The long-term fight will require patience and commitment, but I believe the short-term fight will be decisive. Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

McChrystal wrote those words in late August 2009, under Petraeus' supervision. The insurgency's momentum has not been reversed and security continues to deteriorate across Afghanistan. So let's take the generals at their word when they say we had to reverse insurgent momentum by late August 2010 to have a chance at defeating the insurgency. Let's also take the Pentagon at its word that insurgent "operation capability and geographic reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding." That means that today, on the one-year anniversary of the launch of the escalated military campaign, we're several months past the point of no return. And that's if you bought the analysis of those who thought the escalation was a good idea in the first place.

The American people have been more than patient with Washington, D.C. when it comes to the Afghanistan War. In fact, we've been downright indulgent, having forked over more than $375 billion in tax dollars and debt and having given the Pentagon almost a decade now to play Risk with other people's lives in other people's country. Every deadline that's been laid down has been fudged. Every justification that's been given for just one more big push has fallen apart. Every guarantee of a positive outcome has been junked. We've had enough.

Rethink Afghanistan and our supporters are tired of politicians making excuses for their failure to rein in this debacle, so we're doing a little escalating of our own. Starting on Sunday, February 13, Rethink Afghanistan will have a new ad on CNN in Washington, D.C., featuring the winners of our Because It's Time contest, calling for an end to the Afghanistan War. They represent the voices of the 72 percent of Americans who support congressional action to speed up the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. The ad buy also coincides with the upcoming reintroduction of U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee's Responsible End to the War in Afghanistan Act in the House of Representatives. These actions send a strong message that we want decisive action from our elected officials to bring our troops home -- because it's time.

Today is the one-year anniversary of the launch of the escalated military strategy in Afghanistan. It's clear from the last 12 months that the escalation strategy is a failure. It's time to come home.

If you're tired of this war that's not making us safer and that's not worth the cost, join Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and Twitter.

General Petraeus, Proconsul of Fantasyland

By Derrick Crowe

The gap between General Petraeus' rhetoric and the reality on the ground in Afghanistan grows every day.

On October 14, 2010, the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) released its quarterly report (.pdf) on the security situation in Afghanistan, which described the continued growth of the Afghan armed resistance and a deterioration of security in areas where ISAF made major military pushes. Yet on October 15, 2010, General Petraeus crowed in London about "progress" made in Afghanistan. Americans are wise to the game and don't buy this sort of clap-trap anymore: most Americans believe the war in Afghanistan is a "situation like Vietnam (.pdf)." Yet Petraeus spins on, damaging his own credibility and fooling no one.

The ANSO report paints a grim picture of the reality on the ground in Afghanistan:

The [Taliban] counter-offensive is increasingly mature, complex & effective. Country wide attacks have grown by 59% (p.10) while sophisticated recruitment techniques have helped activate networks of fighters in the North where European NATO contributors have failed to provide an adequate deterrent (p.11). Some provinces here are experiencing double the country average growth rate (p.12) and their districts are in danger of slipping beyond any control. Clumsy attempts to stem the developments, through the formation of local militia's and intelligence-poor operations, have served to polarize communities with the IEA capitalizing on the local grievances that result. In the South, despite more robust efforts from the US NATO contingents, counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar and Marjah have similarly failed to degrade the IEA's ability to fight, reduce the number of civilian combat fatalities (p.13) or deliver boxed Government.

By contrast the [Taliban] are showing signs of transition to their own 'hold & build' phase. Already operating advanced administrations in the rural South & East, local 'shadow governance' structures in the North are being buttressed by cadres of loyalists to reinforce the ideological and political cohesion of the movement. Field reports suggest that these efforts are drawing in more conservative recruits from the Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik communities affording highly valuable opportunities for expansion. Internal factionalism is being addressed with junior opposition partners (domestic and foreign) being slowly subordinated to their command structure, sometimes violently. At the strategic level, leaders are outlining tentative foreign policy, reassuring neighbors of cooperation on narcotics, the environ- ment and commerce, while alluding to 'the upcoming system of the country'. The sum of their activity presents the image of a movement anticipating authority and one which has already obtained a complex momentum that NATO will be incapable of reversing.

...This year has seen nine consecutive months of deterioration, with each month since May breaking a new record, and high levels of attacks extending well in to the traditional downturn season (Aug-Dec).

In other words, the counterinsurgency campaign is failing all over the dang place. ANSO very helpfully updated their chart showing the number of armed-opposition-group-initiated attacks over time, and the picture is worth a thousand words:

...The data rises above day-to-day tactical assessments and presents a remarkably consistent five year pattern of intra-annual cycles, summer peaks and winter troughs driven by climatic conditions on the ground, paired with a very steady 45-55% growth in total attacks between years.

Each new year retains approximately 80% of the previous years growth suggesting that once ground, or capability to attack through manpower, technology or technique, is gained it is seldom relinquished. The pattern suggests careful and deliberate building on last years gains, expanding, consolidating and expanding again.

Lest you think the ANSO data is an outlier, remember that military assessments in both December 2009 and late March 2010 both said that the insurgency's organizational capabilities are qualitatively and geographically expanding.

Now, in this context, with a clear and easily available body of data that includes U.S. military reports, no U.S. media outlet should be uncritically passing along any quote from any military official claiming "progress" in Afghanistan. The American adventure in Afghanistan is a 9-year-plus unequivocal failure with the indicating statistics showing a remarkable consistency.

Yet on Friday, October 15, General Petraeus laughably attempted to paint "a picture of Afghanistan in which the Taliban's ability to mount attacks is being reduced..." The ABC News coverage of Petraeus' remarks came under the headline, "General Petraeus Upbeat, Cites Signs of Progress in Afghanistan." The subsequent story is little more than stenography, reporting Petraeus' narrative without including information that would challenge the general's false depiction of the situation on the ground. The story even claims--without substantiation--that the insurgency has been "knocked back." That's laughable, and easily disproved. See above.

Petraeus went on to describe plans to "link the growing Kandahar security bubble with the one in central Helmand." That begs the question: what planet is Petraeus living on?

Marjah is a basketcase--an example of the failure of the McChrystal/Petraeus strategy. Here's a brief description, courtesy of the Associated Press:

Eight months on, the Taliban are still here in force, waging a full-blown guerrilla insurgency that rages daily across a bomb-riddled landscape of agricultural fields and irrigation trenches.

As U.S. involvement in the war enters its 10th year, the failure to pacify this town raises questions about the effectiveness of America's overall strategy. Similarly crucial operations are now under way in neighboring Kandahar province, the Taliban's birthplace.

There are signs the situation in Marjah is beginning to improve, but "it's still a very tough fight," said Capt. Chuck Anklam, whose Marine company has lost three men since arriving in July. "We're in firefights all over, every day."

Also from the ANSO report:

"Data from Marjah, Helmand (below) paints a similar picture with high rates of attacks persisting 30 weeks after OP MOSHTARAK and an average of two residents per week being killed by AOG in acts of intimidation or collaterally in IED strikes. The closed nature of Marjah makes reliable reporting difficult but anecdotal reports suggest the fighting is much more intense than ANSO records show with possibly as many as 70-100 kinetic events per week. Both operational areas shows signs of the 'dynamic occupation' process typical of the region with AOG melting away ahead of IMF operations only to reappear intact in their wake."

Kandahar is similarly a wreck. Security for the civilian population has rapidly deteriorated since the launch of the ISAF military push there, resulting in a doubling of the war-related injury rate for civilians, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. ANSO's data confirms the dire security situation:

"The daily attack rate [in Kandahar] has grown from 0.1 in Week one to 2.8 per day by Week 35 suggesting that the ele- ments of OP HAMKARI un- dertaken so far are not de- grading the AOG ability to conduct attacks. Field reports suggest that the Taliban retain up to 4,000 fighters inside the city and continue a wide- spread campaign of intimidation, targeted assassination and the widespread deployment of IEDs against Police and Military targets."

If those are security bubbles, the only thing Petraeus is going to succeed in linking is a discreet arc of deteriorating safety for civilians and rising insurgent attacks. Petraeus's slippery aspirational language can't hide the fact that he and his strategy are failing to produce promised results.

There are no "security bubbles" to link.

These aren't signs of progress.

These are signs of failure.

With roughly 60 percent of the American people opposed to the war in Afghanistan, it's clear that Petraeus is no longer fooling anyone. We know failure when we see it, and we see it in the counterinsurgency strategy pushed by Petraeus, McChrystal, and their think-tank allies.

Where Petraeus is succeeding, however, is in demonstrating conclusively just how disconnected the generals are from reality. But as long as President Obama suspends his disbelief and allows their warped version of reality to drive U.S. policy in Afghanistan, we'll continue to waste lives and resources on a failed policy that corrodes the national interests of the United States. The president once declared he was against, "dumb war." It's past time he acted like it and acted aggressively to rein in the Proconsul of Fantasyland.

The Afghanistan War isn't making us safer, and it's not worth the cost. If you're tired of this brutal, futile conflict, join us at http://facebook.com/RethinkAfghanistan.

Petraeus' Oily Spin about Progress in Afghanistan

By Derick Crowe

With General Petraeus' stop on CBS Evening News with Katie Couric now halfway over, it's worth taking a moment to unpack the unchallenged, false assertions and implications he's piled up thus far on his media tour. We decided to look into the claims he made about "oil spots" of "progress" during his interview with NBC's David Gregory. Both claims were absolute fantasies, and the remaining journalists on Petraeus' tour owe their viewers more rigorous skepticism than what we saw on Meet the Press.

Despite Petraeus' use of the term more than a dozen times in his MTP interview, virtually no data that shows strategically significant security "progress" in Afghanistan since the start of the latest escalation. According to the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), emphasis mine:

...[T]he number of provinces having more than three attacks per day has grown from 1 to 4 while the number of provinces seeing the lowest rate (<1 per 2 days) has dropped from 22 to 19. Overall ANSO assess that, in terms of daily attack rates, 23 provinces have remained stable, 1 has improved and nine provinces have deteriorated being Nangahar, Paktya, Kandahar, Paktika, Uruzgan, Helmand, Ghazni, Farah, Kunduz.

AOG are presenting a formidable geographic presence and are escalating attacks, in areas well outside of IMF main focus, at their own direction and tempo.

Needless to say, if insurgents are initiating many more attacks "at their own direction and tempo," International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not "regained the initiative."

But let's talk specifically about General Petraeus' "oil spots."

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, the oil, the oil spot, if you will, is a, is a term in counterinsurgency literature that connotes a peaceful area, secure area. So what you're trying to do is to always extend that, to push that out. ...[D]own in Helmand Province what we sought to do was to build an oil spot that would encompass the six central districts of Helmand Province, including Marjah and then others, and then to just keep pushing that out, ultimately to connect it over with the oil spot that is being developed around Kandahar City...

The general's visit to Wardak Province today was in part to underline the ...importance of that security bubble being extended from outside Kabul to the southwest here to Wardak Province.

The general, quite frankly, is out of his mind if he wants us to apply a term that means "a peaceful area, secure area" to Helmand (which includes Marjah), Kandahar, or Wardak. None of those provinces are secure. None. In fact, compared to this time last year, they are less peaceful and less secure.

Helmand/Kandahar Region

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), southern Afghanistan is in the grip of an ever-escalating insurgent assassination campaign. UNAMA's latest report conveys the local Afghans' perception that the insurgents can strike anywhere, anytime, and that U.S. and allied forces can't protect them. From the report:

The Taliban's use of assassinations increased from an average 3.6 per week and 15.6 per month in the first part of 2009 to on average 7.0 per week and 30.5 per month in the first four months 2010. In May and June, the number of assassinations skyrocketed to on average 18.0 per week according to the UN Department of Safety and Security- Afghanistan.

Helmand (including Marjah)

According to ANSO, the number of insurgent attacks in Helmand province during the second quarter of 2010 spiked to 820, compared to 257 attacks during the same period last year. According to UNAMA, the has effectively prevented provincial authorities from delivering the promised "government in a box" in Marjah, while Operation Moshtarak "has not resulted in increased protection for the civilian population."

UNAMA also slapped ISAF for decreasing civilian security by locating their bases in or near residential areas. ISAF justifies this placement by appealing to counterinsurgency admonitions to "live in and among the population," but UNAMA's report retorts that, because of the locations of the bases,

Afghan civilians face not only the risk of often disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks by AGEs, but also death and injury from mortar and rocket attacks fired by IM Forces that mistakenly fall short of their target and hit residential compounds.

The failure of ISAF to establish security for the residents of Helmand and the ever-growing insurgent assasination campaign combine to make Helmand "the most violent province in the country," according to ANSO.

Kandahar

When Karzai, McChrystal and other representatives of ISAF and the Afghan government held their shuras in Kandahar to win local support, they were told in no uncertain terms that the locals didn't want a military operation brought to their home because they feared it would just drag violence into their neighborhoods. They complained bitterly about ISAF's dismissal of their concerns to UNAMA:

Elders also reported that...these meetings were "photo opportunities" at which the elders' concerns and suggestions were not taken seriously. As one elder from Panjwayi district told UNAMA HR, ".. there are far too many 'meetings in name.' ISAF and the Government ignore what we say, because we are from the districts..[T]his is not true, and it is insulting...[t]here are too often photographers and television cameras at these meetings. In Pakistan, of course, the Taliban can watch television, see me sitting with the governor and decide to kill me. So, when there is a 'meeting in name,' first I risk my life, and then I am insulted."

As ISAF's so-called "rising tide of security" began to materialize, the elders' contended to UNAMA that "ISAF's publication of its plans to launch the military operation caused the Taliban to plant more IEDs and intensify their campaign of intimidation against pro- Government figures." ANSO and UNAMA figures bear out their assertion: Armed opposition groups initiated 559 attacks in the second quarter of 2010, up from 399 during the same period last year, with "more civilians were killed in the region in the first six months of 2010 than in any other region."

Wardak

As for Wardak, ANSO's figures show that, again, attacks were up in the second quarter of 2010 (183 attacks) compared to the same period in 2009 (139). The province is a hotbed for abductions, particularly along Highway 1. In fact, according to UNAMA, "On 15 June, the acting District Governor of Sayadabad district in Wardak province was abducted reportedly by AGEs and later beheaded." Also according to UNAMA:

"[E]lders in Logar and Wardak provinces...said their priority was to end the culture of impunity for civilian deaths and injury from military operations and for those who committed abuses to be held accountable."

And, for the bonus round, rocket fire interrupted Petraeus' shura while Gregory accompanied him for his puff-piece interview. Sounds like a place safe enough for a middle-school field trip, doesn't it?

You've Got to Be Kidding Me

All this brings us back to Petreaus' definition of an "oil spot."

"Well, the oil, the oil spot, if you will, is a, is a term in counterinsurgency literature that connotes a peaceful area, secure area."

Nobody in their right mind or wearing pants that aren't on fire can honestly look at the information above and derive from that anything remotely approaching an "oil spot," as Petraeus defines it. Helmand, Kandahar, and Wardak aren't examples of peace or security. I honestly have no idea why Petraeus would hold any of these places up as his "progress" examples. Wardak is certainly not stabilized, and Helmand and Kandahar are glaring examples of the failure of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

So here's a takeaway for all you reporters out there rounding out Petraeus' media tour: General Petraeus' job is not to tell you the truth. Petraeus' job is to win the war handed him by President Obama. He sees public opposition crystallizing, while at the same time coming to the realization that his mission will not be accomplished by the deadline to start withdrawals. Rather than questioning the basic assumption that COIN was the right strategy to pursue in Afghanistan (it wasn't), he wants what generals always want: more troops, more time. Thus, he sees it as his job to sell the messages that need to be sold to get the things he think will help him accomplish his mission.

His job isn't to tell you the truth. It's to sell you his war. Buyer beware.

Secretary Gates, Backpedaling

By Derrick Crowe

Defense Secretary Gates wants to extricate himself and the president from the impending P.R. disaster shaping up around the flailing Kandahar operation set for this Summer Fall.

"I think it's important to remember that Kandahar is not Afghanistan," Gates said in comments that appeared to play down a U.S.-led operation for control of the area, known as the birthplace of the Taliban.

...

"Kandahar and Helmand are important but they are not the only provinces in Afghanistan that matter in terms of the outcome of this struggle," he said.

From the Pentagon's most recent Afghanistan report to Congress, here's a chart showing how optional Kandahar and Helmand are for the success of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy being pursued by U.S. and allied forces.

From p. 126 of the Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan (April 2010), emphasis mine:

8.1: ISAF Strategy

Under the ISAF concept of operations, the main effort is to conduct decisive clearing operations concentrated on the most threatened population in the southern part of the country to establish population security and implement measures that diminish insurgent influence over the people. As described in Figure 23 - ISAF Concept of Operations, the main effort in RC-South, by province, is in Helmand and Kandahar, where efforts are focused on clearing districts most threatened by insurgents.

No reporter should let Secretary Gates, General McChrystal, or President Obama off the hook in the coming months regarding the make-or-break nature of the Kandahar operation for their (poorly) chosen COIN strategy in Afghanistan. As described in the report to Congress, Kandahar/Helmand is the main effort, and everything else is either a "shaping," "supporting," or "economy of force (read: leftovers)" operation. Kandahar/Helmand is the COIN strategy. If ISAF fails there, it fails, period.

Members of Congress considering funding the ongoing Kandahar/Helmand/escalation strategy should read these comments from Secretary Gates with alarm. He's hedging and trying to set expectations because he knows the COIN effort is in serious, "bleeding ulcer" trouble. Congress should save us all a whole lot of trouble and vote against the $33 billion war spending supplemental under consideration. As Daniel Ellsberg says in the most recent Rethink Afghanistan video, this war can be infinitely prolonged, but "winning" through military force is a pipe dream that's killing people.

UPDATE: ISAF and the Pentagon are now comically denying that they ever planned an "offensive" in Kandahar, emphasis mine:

The commander of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Nick Carter, insisted that there never was a planned offensive. �The media have chosen to use the term offensive,� he said. Instead, he said, �we have certainly talked about a military uplift, but there has been no military use of the term offensive.�

Sure, the media chose the word "offensive." Specifically, the American Forces Press Service (in a story cross posted on the Pentagon website and the ISAF website!), quoting one Maj. Gen. Nick Carter:

The general stressed that the planning and execution of an offensive in Kandahar are Afghan-led initiatives directed by President Hamid Karzai. The provincial governor is reaching out to his city and district mayors to engage the population and build relationships with the population, he said.

Carter said he expects the offensive to begin in the "next month or two," and that by Ramadan, which begins in August, security improvements will begin to be apparent. It will take some three months before a strong, credible government is formed in Marja, he said, leading him to believe that it could take just as long, if not longer, to sway public support and perception in Kandahar.

For more use of the word "offensive" in posts on ISAF's website, see here and here.

U.S., Allies Responsible for Most Marjah Civilian Casualties

By Derrick Crowe

According to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, U.S. and Allied forces have killed and injured more civilians than have the insurgents during Operation Moshtarak. Incredibly, the Pentagon continues to insist that this operation "protects the people." AIHRC's Feb. 23 press release reports [h/t Josh Mull, our new Afghanistan blog fellow]:

"AIHRC is concerned at the loss of life and civilian harm already caused by this operation. AIHRC found that in the first 12 days of Operation Mushtarak 28 civilians, including 13 children, were killed and approximately 70 civilians, including 30 children, were injured.

"Witnesses suggested the majority of the casualties were caused by PGF artillery and rocket-fire."

Late last year, just after the President announced his escalation, I wrote:

The president's decision to add more troops is a mistake that will result in deep costs which we cannot afford; increased U.S. casualties; and increased civilian casualties as our troop increase further raises the temperature in the conflict.

A separate update from Brookings shows that President Obama's escalation and subsequent military operations have indeed raised the temperature of the conflict, increasing the level of violence across Afghanistan:

"In terms of raw violence, the situation is at a historic worst level, with early 2010 levels of various types of attacks much higher than even last year at this time. Much of that is due to the recent Marja campaign and, more generally, the deployment of additional U.S. (and Afghan) troops to parts of the country where they have not been present before."

War does not protect civilians. War doesn't make us safer. The Afghanistan war needs to end, now.

Had enough? Join us: become a fan of Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook.

Civilian Casualties in Marjah "Inevitable" as Largest Military Operation of Afghanistan War Begins

By Derrick Crowe

Military officials say that civilian casualties in Marjah, Afghanistan are "inevitable" as U.S. and allied forces launch Operation Moshtarak, the largest military action since the U.S-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Thanks in part to conflicting messages from ISAF and in part due to some residents' inability to flee, many civilians remain in Marjah, in the crossfire.

Statements from Brig. Gen. Nicholson, commander of the operation, indicate that he feels he has leeway to use airstrikes in the civilian area, and that he intends to use fast, furious attacks to try to overwhelm the Taliban. The problem: airstrikes in support of troops in contact are the leading cause of U.S.-caused civilian deaths.

In the L.A. Times article on the upcoming operation in Marja, the U.S. commander says all the right words when it comes to the issue of insulating the non-combatants from the carnage:

�[I]n the weeks leading up to the imminent offensive to take the Helmand River Valley town of Marja in southern Afghanistan, the Marines� commander, Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, sat with dozens of Afghan tribal elders, drinking endless cups of sweet tea and offering reassurances that his top priority will be the safety of Afghan civilians.

�In counterinsurgency, the people are the prize,� Nicholson said�

...except Nicholson is talking out of both sides of his mouth:

US Second Marine Expeditionary Force commander Larry Nicholson said that the evacuation of most civilians would give commanders leeway to use air-to-ground missiles, declaring that he was �not looking for a fair fight.�

ABC News quotes Nicholson explaining some truly worrisome logic:

Nicholson underscored the point saying a heavy handed approach will reduce the chance for civilian casualties.

�Our feeling is if you go big, strong and fast, you lessen the possibility of civilian casualties as opposed to a slow methodical rolling assault. You go in and you dominate. You overwhelm the enemy,� he said.

Okay, let�s put these two things together. Nicholson is telegraphing he�s letting the air strikes off the chain and that he intends to use rapid, furious attacks in Marja, and somehow that is supposed to lead to reduced civilian casualties. Well, that would be great if we didn�t already know that the single greatest cause of U.S.-caused civilian casualties was airstrikes in support of troops involved in intense firefights.

All of this is very, very bad news for civilians in Marjah. And it's bad news for the troops in the fight as well.

Cross-posted at Rethink Afghanistan.