Memorial Day: Remembering Those Who Didn't Have To Die in Afghanistan

By Robert Greenwald and Derrick Crowe

Memorial Day is a national holiday dedicated to remembering Americans killed in wartime. This year, unfortunately, we remember war dead who didn't have to die, and unless Congress and the president act, we'll remember more needless deaths next year. As of today, 1,516 Americans have died in the Afghanistan War, a conflict that the American people oppose and the continuation of which makes no sense.

Hidden from the front pages of newspapers and other media who can't be bothered to devote significant coverage to the longest war in U.S. history, these dead troops had names and lives before our national policies forced them to give them up.

For example, 23-year-old Army Pvt. Thomas C. Allers from Plainwell, Michigan, was remembered as a "great kid, very sweet," who enjoyed fishing with his parents. He died this week alongside Staff Sgt. Kristofferson B. Lorenzo, 33, of Chula Vista, California; Pfc. William S. Blevins, 21, of Sardinia, Ohio; and Pvt. Andrew M. Krippner, 20, of Garland, Texas.

These men didn't have to die. They died because our politicians sent them to Afghanistan over the continued objections of their countrymen. Their comrades will continue to die until those politicians bring them home.

In a bitter moment of irony this week, the U.S. House of Representatives narrowly failed to agree to amendments that would have reined in the brutal, futile war on the same day U.S. troops were suffering their worst losses in Afghanistan since Bin Laden's death. But, as Robert Naiman points out, even though McGovern/Jones amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act failed, the vote margin was so narrow (204-215) that it sent a strong signal to the president that Congress' patience with the constantly deteriorating and resource-hungry war was running out. As U.S. Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.) put it, "[W]hen somebody comes up with the right amendment, it's going to pass."

The American people's patience ran out long ago, however. For months, poll after poll has shown rock-solid opposition to the Afghanistan War. Since last December, for example, Pew Research Center's polling has consistently shown that at least a plurality (hovering around 50 percent) want to "remove troops ASAP." With Osama Bin Laden dead and al-Qaeda driven from the country, it's time Congress and the president listened.

Today, we remember Americans killed during the Afghanistan War. Below are the names of the troops who died in that conflict just since last Memorial Day. Congress and the president need to act to end this war immediately so that next year's list is drastically shorter. Please take a moment to sign our petition to bring the troops home.

• Abbate, Matthew


• Aceves, Omar


• Acosta, Rudy A.


• Adams, Christian M.


• Adamski III, Frank E.


• Adkins, Charles L.


• Adkinson III, Vinson B.


• Aguilar, Amaru


• Ahmed, Shane H.


• Ainsworth, Jesse W.


• Alcaraz, Raymond C.


• Aleman, Nicholas J.


• Allen, Justin B.


• Allers, Thomas C.


• Ambard, Philip D.


• Amores, Jason G.


• Anderson, Brian M.


• Andrade, John E.


• Andrews, Scott A.


• Antonik, Christopher J.


• Arizmendez, Marc A.


• Arrechaga, Ofren


• Ashlock, Vincent W.


• Atim, Paul J.


• Ausborn, Jeffrey O.


• Ayube II, James A.


• Bailey, Michael C.


• Balduf, Kevin B.


• Baldwin, Robert F.


• Balthaser, Jesse M.


• Bartelt, Justus S.


• Barton, Robert N.


• Bauer, Joseph A.


• Beckerman, Michael J.


• Benitez, Carlos A.


• Bennedsen, Robert N.


• Billingsley, Tramaine J.


• Bishop, John C.


• Bitner, Benjamin F.


• Blevins, William S.


• Board, Cody A.


• Bock, Michael A.


• Boelk, James D.


• Bohall, Thomas A.


• Bolen, Edward H.


• Bovia, Joseph A.


• Boyd, Christopher J.


• Braggs, Randy R.


• Brodeur, David L.


• Broehm, Matthew J.


• Brown, Tara R.


• Brummund, Gavin R.


• Bryant Jr., Frank D.


• Bubacz, Andrew S.


• Buenagua, Ardenjoseph A.


• Buffalo, Loren M.


• Buras, Michael J.


• Burgess, Bryan A.


• Burgess, Scott H.


• Bury, Brandon C.


• Buzinski, Keith T.


• Byrd, Jordan


• Cabacoy, Christopher F.


• Cain, Justin J.


• Calhoun Jr., Marvin R.


• Callahan, Sean T.


• Calo, Jason D.


• Campbell, Joshua R.


• Campbell, Karl A.


• Carazo, Mario D.


• Carpenter, Andrew P.


• Carroll, Jacob C.


• Carroll, Patrick R.


• Carron, Paul D.


• Carse, Nathan B.


• Carver, Jacob R.


• Carver, Ross S.


• Caskey, Joseph D.


• Castro, Andrew J.


• Castro, John P.


• Catherwood, Alec E.


• Catlett, Matthew R.


• Cemper, Joseph B.


• Ceniceros, Irvin M.


• Chapleau, Kristopher D.


• Charte, Philip G. E.


• Chihuahua, Shannon


• Childers, Cody S.


• Chisholm, Benjamen G.


• Ciaramitaro, Dominic J.


• Clark, Ryane G.


• Clements, Chad D.


• Coleman, Chad D.


• Collins, Sean M.


• Cooper, Keenan A.


• Cornelius, Kevin M.


• Corzine, Kenneth A.


• Cox, Nathan W.


• Craig, Adam D.


• Creamer, Zainah C.


• Creighton, Andrew J.


• Crouse IV, William H.


• Crow, Robert W.


• Cruttenden, Aaron B.


• Cueto, Kevin A.


• Culbreth, Justin E.


• Cullins, Joshua J.


• Curtis, Jonathan M.


• Cutsforth, Sean R.


• Cuzzupe, Paul O.


• Dawson, William Brandon


• Day, David P.


• Deans, Patrick D.


• DeBoer, Daane Adam


• Deluzio, Steven J.


• Dennis, Jacob A.


• Dennis, Preston J.


• Dew, Victor A.


• Deyoung, Matthew J.


• Dickmyer, Adam L.


• Dimock II, Joseph W.


• Donahue, Max W.


• Donnelly IV, William J.


• Dumaw, Joshua R.


• Dupont, Steven L.


• Durham, Patrick K.


• Eastman, Christopher L.


• Edgerton, Donald R.


• Emrick, Jordan B.


• Estelle II, Raymond G.


• Fabbri, Ralph J.


• Fahey Jr., David R.


• Fannin, Shawn D.


• Farley, Derek J.


• Fastuca, Louis R.


• Faulkner, Jeremy P.


• Fedder, Daniel L.


• Feldhaus, Dustin J.


• Fike, Robert J.


• Filpi III, Vincent A.


• Fisher, Zachary M.


• Flannery, Sean M.


• Fleming, Scott J.


• Flores, Michael P.


• Forester, Mark Andrew


• Freeman, Ronald D.


• Frison, Demetrius M.


• Gammone III, Vincent E.


• Gartner, Ryan A.


• Garvin, Nathaniel D.


• Gassen, Jacob A.


• Geary, Michael E.


• Gentz, Joel C.


• George, Matthew Eric


• Giese, Joseph R.


• Gire, Joshua S.


• Goeke, Christopher S.


• Goetz, Dale A.


• Goncalo, Ethan L.


• Gonzalez, Edwin


• Gould, Kristopher J.


• Grady, Ryan J.


• Green, Stacy A.


• Greer, Kristopher D.


• Grider, Ronald A.


• Grochowiak, Casey J.


• Hamilton, Adam S.


• Hamski, Joseph J.


• Hand, Andrew


• Hardin, Ethan C.


• Harley Jr., Willie J.


• Harper, Andrew M.


• Harris Jr., Larry D.


• Harris, Devon J.


• Harris, Todd M.


• Harrison, Calvin B.


• Harton, Joshua A.


• Hennigan, Matthew R.


• Hermanson, Matthew D.


• Hermogino, Ken K.


• Hernandez, Derek


• Hernandez, Jose A.


• Hess, David A


• Hidalgo, Daren M.


• High, IV, Charles M.


• Hizon Rudolph R.


• Holbrook, Jason E.


• Holder, Kyle M.


• Holley, Floyd E. C.


• Holmes, David A.


• Honeycutt Jr., Terry E.


• Hoover, Bryan A.


• Hotchkin, Gunnar R.


• Howard, Abram L.


• Htaik, Maung P.


• Hughes, Bradley S.


• Hunter, James P.


• Huse, Dakota R.


• Hutchins, Andrew


• Ide, James R.


• Infante, Jesse


• Jackson, Francisco R.


• Jackson, Joe M.


• Jackson, Timothy M.


• Jarrell, John H.


• Jarvis, Barry E.


• Javier Jr., Conrado D.


• Jefferson, David


• Jenkins, Gerald R.


• Jirtle, Charles S.


• Johnson, Daniel J.


• Johnson, John C.


• Johnson, Joseph D.


• Johnson, Kalin C.


• Johnson, Matthew J.


• Johnson, Raymon L. A.


• Johnson, Timothy L.


• Jones, Adam D.


• Justesen, Anthony T.


• Justice, James, A.


• Karch, Christopher N.


• Kelly, Robert M.


• Kennedy, Joseph A.


• Kessler, Kevin J.


• Kihm, John F.


• King, Brandon M.


• King, Jarrid L.


• Kirspel Jr., Michael D.


• Kirton, Brandon M.


• Klusacek, Erick J.


• Kramer, Aaron K.


• Kridlo, Dale J.


• Krippner, Andrew M.


• Lammerts, Michael S.


• Lancaster, Joshua T.


• Land, Brett W.


• Laningham, Ira B.


• Lee, Roger


• Lew, Harry


• Lillard, Nathan E.


• Lim, Daniel


• Lindskog, Jameson


• Locht, Gwendolyn A.


• Looney, Andrew R.


• Looney, Brendan J.


• Lopez, Joseph C.


• Loredo, Edwardo


• Lorenzo, Kristofferson B.


• Lugo, Martin A.


• Lukeala, Joshua A.


• Lutes, David C.


• Lynch, Scott A.


• Madden, Russell E.


• Maher, Brent M.


• Mahr, Michael C.


• Malachowski, James M.


• Maldonado, Alexis V.


• Maldonado, Jose L.


• Maldonado, Pedro A.


• Marler, Donald M.


• Martin, Shane R.


• Martinez Jr., Rafael


• Matteoni, Anthony D.


• Mays, Chauncy R.


• McAninch, Kenneth K.


• McClellan, Jonah D.


• McClimans, Joshua M.


• McCluskey, Jason J.


• McDaniel, Mecolus C.


• McGahan, Michael E.


• McGarrah, Clayton D.


• McLain, Buddy W.


• McLawhorn Jr., Willie A.


• McLendon, David B.


• McMahon, Jason T.


• McNeley, Justin


• Meari, Andrew N.


• Meis, Christopher S.


• Meletiche, Pedro A. Millet


• Melton, Bradley L.


• Mickler Jr., Donald R.


• Mills Jr., Edward D.


• Middleton, William K.


• Miller, David T.


• Miller, Paul J.


• Milley, Scott F.


• Miranda, Denis C.


• Misener, Garrett A.


• Mittler, Shaun M.


• Mixon, Kelly J.


• Moffitt, Thomas A.


• Montoya, Diego M.


• Mooldyk, Evan J.


• Moon, Christopher J.


• Moore, Benjamin G.


• Mora, Conrad A.


• Morrison, Donald Scott


• Moses, Sonny Jade


• Muhr, Shawn A.


• Muller, Ian M.


• Nagorski, Scott T.


• Near, Robert J.


• Necochea Jr., Kenneth E.


• Neenan, Brendan P.


• Negron, Carlos J.


• Nettleton, Eric M.


• Newlove, Jarod


• Newman, Eric C.


• Newman, Jaime C.


• Newton, Robert J.


• Nguyen, Tevan L.


• Nichols, Donald L.


• Nicol, Andrew C.


• Novak, Adam J.


• Noziska, Mark


• Nylander, Nathan J.


• O'Malley, Aracely Gonzalez


• Oakes, Curtis A.


• Officer, Justin A.


• Oquin, James J.


• Oratowski, Kevin E.


• Ortega, William


• Ortiz Rivera, Javier O.


• Osborn, Benjamin D.


• Osborne, Jerod H.


• Ose, Joshua S.


• Osman, Ergin V.


• Osterman, Sean A.


• Page, James A.


• Pallares, Ronnie J.


• Palmer, Benjamin J.


• Pape, Kevin M.


• Paranzino, Michael F.


• Park, Benjamin J.


• Park, Daehan


• Patino IV, Claudio


• Patton, Adam J.


• Pearson, Brandon W.


• Pedro, Brian J.


• Peney, Jonathan K.


• Peto, Jason D.


• Petree, Jaysine P. S.


• Pharris, Robert W.


• Pickering, Brandon T.


• Piercy, Brian F.


• Pierre, Linda L.


• Pietri, Jose M. Caraballo


• Pilgeram, Jonathan A.


• Plank, Michael G.


• Plunk, Jared C.


• Poulin, Dennis C.


• Powell, Joshua D.


• Powell, Matthew C.


• Prentler, Joseph T.


• Pressley, Cheziray


• Pridham, Michael S.


• Pyeatt, Lucas T.


• Rabon Jr.,Luther W.


• Ramirez, Joel A.


• Ramsey, Matthew W.


• Raney, Daniel G.


• Rankel, John K.


• Ransom, Charles A.


• Rappuhn, Bradley D.


• Rast, Benjamin D.


• Raver, Bryn T.


• Redding, Blaine E.


• Reed, Jesse D.


• Reeves, Jason A.


• Reifert, Shane M.


• Repkie, Robert K. L.


• Richards, William T.


• Ridgley Jr., Charles E.


• Riley Jr., Brian D.


• Rivadeneira, Juan L.


• Roads, Tyler A.


• Roberts, Cody A.


• Roberts, Edgar N.


• Robinson, David S.


• Robinson, James C.


• Rodewald, Joseph E.


• Rodgers, Christopher B.


• Rodriguez, Arturo E.


• Rodriguez, Mario


• Rodriguez, Ronald A.


• Rogers, Jason A.


• Rogers, John M.


• Romig, Christian J.


• Rosa, Anthony J.


• Ross, Justin D.


• Runkle, John M.


• Rusk, Colton W.


• Sadell, Charles M.


• Saenz III, Jose L.


• Salmon, Zachary S.


• Sanchez, Daniel R.


• Santiago, Anibal


• Santos, Dave M.


• Schlote, Robert C.


• Schmalstieg, Justin E.


• Schultz, Nathaniel J. A.


• Scott, Lucas C.


• Self, David D.


• Senft, David P.


• Serwinowski, Timothy G.


• Shanfield, Derek L.


• Shaw, Eric B.


• Shoecraft, Justin B.


• Silk, Brandon M.


• Simmons, Anthony W.


• Simonetta, Derek T.


• Simpson, Mark A.


• Sinkler, Amy R.


• Sisson Jr., Robert C.


• Smith, Adam O.


• Smith, David C.


• Smith, Jason T.


• Smith, Jeremy D.


• Snow, Deangelo B.


• Snow, Jesse Adam


• Sockalosky, Stephen C.


• Solorzanovaldovinos, Diego A.


• Solesbee, Kristoffer M.


• Soltero, Omar


• Southworth, Tristan H.


• Sparks, John T.


• Spaulding, Riley S.


• Springer II, Clinton E.


• Stack, James B.


• Staggs, Austin G.


• Standfest, Jeffrey R.


• Stanley, Chase


• Stansbery, Michael L.


• Stanton, Jordan R.


• Stark, Christopher G.


• Stout, Christopher T.


• Stout, Kyle B.


• Swanson, Aaron M.


• Swink, James Michael


• Tabada, Brian


• Tanner, Phillip C.


• Tate, Jacob A.


• Tate, Sheldon L.


• Tawney, Ian M.


• Taylor, Cynthia R.


• Taylor, Johnathan W.


• Theinert, Joseph J.


• Thode, James E.


• Thomas, Collin


• Thomas, David W.


• Thompson, Blair D.


• Thibodeau, Christopher R.


• Tilton, Jesse R.


• Tompkins, Travis M.


• Torbert Jr., Eric M.


• Trueblood, Eric S.


• Tucker, Lamarol J.


• Turner, Eddie


• Twigg, Joshua T.


• Van Aalst, Jared N.


• Vargas, Anthony


• Vargas, Julio


• Varnadore II, Terry L.


• Vazquez, Frederik E.


• Velazquez, Louie A. Ramos


• Venetz Jr., Anthony


• Vieyra, Barbara


• Villacis, Jorge E.


• Villanueva, Jonathan M.


• Villarreal Jr., Jorge


• Vinnedge, Phillip D.


• Vogeler, Lance H.


• Wade, Andrew P.


• Wade, Chad S.


• Wagstaff, Matthew G.


• Wallace, Ellery R.


• Walters, Zachary J.


• Warren, Kyle R.


• Warriner, Christian M.


• Weaver, Jason M.


• Weaver, Todd W.


• Weigle, Dave J.


• Weikert, Matthew W.


• Weis, James M.


• Welch III, Robert F.


• Wells, Mark C.


• West, Matthew J.


• Whipple, Blake D.


• White, Benjamin D.


• White, Kevin W.


• Whitehead, Joseph C.


• Wilfahrt, Andrew C.


• Williams, Leslie D.


• Winters, Leston M.


• Wisniewski, David A.


• Wood, Edwin C.


• Wren, Charles J.


• Wright, Christopher S.


• Wrightsman, Joe L.


• Wyatt, Derek A.


• Yates, Eric


• Young, James C.


• Zaehringer III, Frank R.


• Zimmerman, James R.

Turning in Circles in Afghanistan

By Robert Greenwald and Derrick Crowe

Defense Secretary Robert Gates told reporters late last week that he thinks we may turn the corner at the end of this year in Afghanistan. Again. Turning the corner, or the tide, or the momentum, or what have you, has become a semi-annual ritual in the failing U.S. war in Afghanistan. While all these turned corners make for great soundbites, the reality is that we're just turning in circles in Afghanistan.

Here's what Gates said:

"We have driven the Taliban out of areas they have controlled for years, including their heartland. They clearly intend to try and take that back. If we can prevent them this year from retaking the areas that we have taken away from them and we can continue to expand the security bubble, I think it's possible that by the end of this year we will have turned a corner, just because of the Taliban being driven out and, more importantly, kept out."

First of all, let's not fail to notice that this is the latest a continual string of promises about "turning a corner." Joshua Foust and Win Without War over the past months have compiled fairly extensive lists of the embarrassment of "turned corners" claimed by U.S. officials. Here's Foust's list, just to give you an idea:

• February 20, 2010: "Western officials believe that a turning point has been reached in the war against the Taliban, with a series of breakthroughs suggesting that the insurgents are on the back foot for the first time since their resurgence four years ago."



• August 31, 2009: "Monday marks the end of August, a month with both good and bad news out of Afghanistan -- and the approach of a key turning point."



• February 6, 2008: "But the ties that bind NATO are fraying badly - and publicly - over just how much each member state wants to commit to turning Afghanistan around. 'It's starting to get to a turning point about what is this alliance about,' says Michael Williams, director of the transatlan- tic program at the Royal United Services Institute in London."



• July 23, 2007: "Taken together these may reflect a turning point in how the war in Afghanistan is to be waged."



• September 12, 2006: "The Afghan front is at a critical turning point that imperils many of the hard-fought successes of the early phase of the conflict and the prospects for snaring bin Laden."



• September 22, 2005: "Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan's foreign minister, called the recent parliamentary elections 'a major turning point' on his country's path to democracy."



• January 27, 2004: "A statement from U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad called the enactment of the constitution a 'turning point for the Afghan nation.'"



• February 26, 2003: "The growing aggressiveness by guerrillas is a relief for US forces, who greet the possibility of a real engagement with the Taliban as a possible turning point in the war. 'We want them to attack us, so we can engage them and destroy them,' says one Special Forces soldier from the US firebase at Spin Boldak, who took part in the initial firefight that led to Operation Mongoose.



• December 2, 2002: "But in 'Bush at War' there's a glaring omission. Woodward misses the turning point in the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda forces. It's as though the most important scene had been left out of a movie, say, where Clark Kent turns into Superman."

It's almost a yearly tradition for some ebullient U.S. official to come to some microphone and claim we're ready to hang a left or a right onto the road to glorious victory. It's silly, and it insults our intelligence.

Gates' comments imply a growing level of security in Afghanistan. That is a patent falsehood.

• Insurgent attacks are at an all-time high in Afghanistan. March 2011 saw 68 percent more insurgent-initiated attacks than March 2010.



• In fact, every March since at least 2006 has been more violent than the last. The same is true for every February, and it looks like attacks are on track to make that true for every April as well, according to the Afghanistan NGO Safety Office's (ANSO) figures.



• Looking at the entire first quarter of the year, insurgent attacks have skyrocketed by a horrendous 51 percent compared to the prior year. ANSO reports that in the first quarter of this year, insurgent attacks averaged "35 per day, surpassing even the August 2009 summer peak during Presidenial elections."



• The number of insurgent-initiated attacks in the first quarter of 2011 was more than twice the level of insurgent-initiated attacks in the first quarter of 2009, when President Obama took office and started launching his repeated escalations of the military campaign. That strategy has obviously failed.

Rolling into places like Marjah with lots of troops and TV cameras hasn't done a thing to increase security nation-wide for Afghans or blunt the growth in insurgent-initiated attacks. We're not "turning a corner." We're turning in circles. It's time to make a U-turn and get those troops home.

If you're fed up with a war that's making us less safe and that's not worth the cost, join Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and Twitter, and share our latest video with your friends.

2010: Worst Year for Civilian Deaths of the Afghanistan War

By Derrick Crowe

Last year was the worst year for civilian deaths in the war so far, and irregular armed groups backed by the U.S. and by the Afghan government are preying on the population while recruiting and abusing children. Go team.

I'm almost numb from continually relaying reports like this, but every time I get an email update or a news alert from ISAF or the U.S. government, it contains claims of "progress," so I'm compelled to keep highlighting alternative reporting when it comes in. Frankly, I'm so disgusted by the "progress" talk that I'm having trouble holding anyone who spouts it in any regard other than the most utter contempt.

Here's the latest assessment from the Afghanistan Rights Monitor (.PDF):

Almost everything related to the war surged in 2010: the combined numbers of Afghan and foreign forces surpassed 350,000; security incidents mounted to over 100 per week; more fighters from all warring side were killed; and the number of civilian people killed, wounded and displaced hit record levels.?

...From 1 January to 31 December 2010, at least 2,421 civilian Afghans were killed and over 3,270 were injured in conflict-related security incidents across Afghanistan. This means everyday 6-7 noncombatants were killed and 8-9 were wounded in the war.

...In addition to civilian casualties, hundreds of thousands of people were affected in various ways by the intensified armed violence in Afghanistan in 2010. Tens of thousands of people were forced out of their homes or deprived of healthcare and education services and livelihood opportunities due to the continuation of war in their home areas.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are widely considered as the most lethal tools which killed over 690 civilians in 2010. However, as you will read in this report, there is virtually no information about the use of cluster munitions by US/NATO forces. Despite Afghanistan's accession to the international Anti-Cluster Bomb Treaty in 2008, the US military has allegedly maintained stockpiles of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.

A second key issue highlighted in this report is the emergence of the irregular armed groups in parts of Afghanistan which are backed by the Afghan Government and its foreign allies. These groups have been deplored as criminal and predatory by many Afghans and have already been accused of severe human rights violations such as child recruitment and sexual abuse.

Compare this with the weasel words in President Obama's State of the Union address:

In Afghanistan, our troops have taken Taliban strongholds and trained Afghan security forces. Our purpose is clear: By preventing the Taliban from reestablishing a stranglehold over the Afghan people, we will deny al Qaeda the safe haven that served as a launching pad for 9/11.

Thanks to our heroic troops and civilians, fewer Afghans are under the control of the insurgency. There will be tough fighting ahead, and the Afghan government will need to deliver better governance. But we are strengthening the capacity of the Afghan people and building an enduring partnership with them. This year, we will work with nearly 50 countries to begin a transition to an Afghan lead. And this July, we will begin to bring our troops home. (Applause.)

This is just another version of General Petraeus' empty "taking the fight to the enemy" rhetoric that tells you nothing about the outcomes of the strategy and tactics used by U.S. forces. The ARM data above makes it clear that the president would be more accurate if he said, "fewer Afghans were living outside the crossfire." The fact is, one year after the new escalated military campaign began in Marjah, things are much worse for the people of Afghanistan. Blame the escalation for the continued increase, or be more generous and say that the escalation simply failed to prevent further deterioration. But please, spare us the lie that "progress" is being made.

If you're tired of this war that's not making us safer and that's not worth the cost, join us at Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and Twitter.

Failure, Not Progress, in Afghanistan

By Derrick Crowe and Robert Greenwald

On Thursday, December 16, 2010, the White House will use its December review to try to spin the disastrous Afghanistan War plan by citing "progress" in the military campaign, but the available facts paint a picture of a war that's not making us safer and that's not worth the cost.

Let's take a look at just the very broad strokes of the information. After more than nine years and a full year of a massive escalation policy:

• the insurgency continues to gain in size and strength,
• more U.S. troops are dying than ever,
• more civilians are dying than ever,
• violence in the country continues to spike,
• Pakistan is playing a double game with the U.S. and


• the military strategy lacks credible prospects for a turnaround.

And yet, we are told we can expect a report touting security gains and "progress," and that there's virtually zero chance of any significant policy change from this review. It sort of begs the question: just what level of catastrophe in Afghanistan would signal that we need a change in direction?

Insurgency Growing and Getting Stronger

This cat is already out of the bag, no matter how hard the Pentagon tries to reel it back in. In the ironically named "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," published several weeks ago, the Pentagon told Congress that the insurgency's organizational and geographic reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding. This growth is reflected in other statistics. According to USA TODAY, U.S. troops were hit with 7,000 more attacks this year compared to last year. About 3,800 troops were killed and injured by IEDs, about 1,000 more than last year. These statistics depict an insurgency with unbroken momentum, despite administration and military claims to the contrary.

As the signers of the Afghanistan Call to Reason put it last week,

"Despite these huge costs, the situation on the ground is much worse than a year ago because the Taliban insurgency has made progress across the country. It is now very difficult to work outside the cities or even move around Afghanistan by road. The insurgents have built momentum, exploiting the shortcomings of the Afghan government and the mistakes of the coalition. The Taliban today are now a national movement with a serious presence in the north and the west of the country. Foreign bases are completely isolated from their local environment and unable to protect the population."

The insurgents' momentum is clearly shown by the number of attacks they've initiated across the country so far this year. According to the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO),

"The [Taliban] counter-offensive is increasingly mature, complex & effective. Country wide attacks have grown by 59% (p.10) while sophisticated recruitment techniques have helped activate networks of fighters in the North where European NATO contributors have failed to provide an adequate deterrent (p.11). Some provinces here are experiencing double the country average growth rate (p.12) and their districts are in danger of slipping beyond any control. Clumsy attempts to stem the developments, through the formation of local militia's and intelligence-poor operations, have served to polarize communities with the IEA capitalizing on the local grievances that result. In the South, despite more robust efforts from the US NATO contingents, counterinsurgency operations in Kandahar and Marjah have similarly failed to degrade the IEA's ability to fight, reduce the number of civilian combat fatalities (p.13) or deliver boxed Government."

Here's a helpful chart from ANSO's report that shows the level of ever-escalating insurgent attacks across Afghanistan.

The White House wants to weasel out of the implications of the data above by saying that the reason the statistics are going south is because, as Petraeus so often says, "when you take away areas important to the enemy, the enemy fights back." So, we're "on offense," as President told troops few weeks ago during his trip to Afghanistan. Well, so what? The 1976 Buccaneers went on offense, too, but that didn't mean they won games.

When the administration claims that they're seeing "progress" in pockets of southern Helmand and Kandahar (a claim open to serious dispute, by the way, and strangely contradicted by some of Petraeus' own spin), they're displaying a familiar kind of confusion between the tactical and the strategic, one that seems to always pop up when we're confronting a failed war.

"One of the iconic exchanges of Vietnam came, some years after the war, between Col. Harry Summers, a military historian, and a counterpart in the North Vietnamese Army. As Summers recalled it, he said, 'You never defeated us in the field.' To which the NVA officer replied: 'That may be true. It is also irrelevant.'"

Pakistan's Double Game

That brings us to Pakistan. According to the New York Times, two new National Intelligence Estimates "offer a more negative assessment [than the administration's upcoming review] and say there is a limited chance of success unless Pakistan hunts down insurgents operating from havens on its Afghan border." But that's some serious wishful thinking, since Pakistan has long used the Taliban as a cat's paw to combat growing Indian influence in Afghanistan. Pakistan wants the militants who threaten it internally suppressed, but it finds the militants who threaten the Karzai regime useful. Fixing that problem would requite U.S. policy follow the roots of their support of the Taliban all the way up to the India/Pakistan animosity, and nothing--nothing--in the U.S.'s military-first strategy comes close to doing so.

Troops Pay the Price

While U.S. politicians nibble at the edges of this real crisis, U.S. troops pay the bloody price, a price that's gotten much worse with the arrival of the new escalation policy over the course of this year. At least 874 American troops have been killed in the war so far this year, compared to 317 for all of 2009. In the NATO hospital near Kandahar, doctors performed a major amputation once very other day in September.

These statistics go hand-in-hand with the huge rise in civilian casualties, which number some 2,400 this year so far, according to the Campaign for Innocent Civilians in Conflict.

Time for the White House to Get Real

The Obama administration is kidding itself if it thinks the American people will buy this attempted whitewash of the failure of the escalation strategy in Afghanistan. We are in the grips of a desperate unemployment crisis, wrapped in a larger economic meltdown. We are not ignorant of the $2 billion dollars sent per week on the war, and we want that money, and those young people, back here at home so we put people back to work.

Following the death of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the president should take a step back and realize that we all have to travel down that road some day. He should think about what legacy he wants to leave behind him. Postponing a final end to U.S. military action in Afghanistan until 2014 puts U.S. taxpayers and American troops on the hook for an enormous investment of blood and treasure in a failing enterprise with no prospects for a turnaround.

A real, honest review would objectively conclude that the enterprise is failing and that the best alternative is to start removing U.S. troops immediately to stave off continued economic and social damage caused by this war that's not making us safer nor worth the cost.

Please watch our latest video and share it with your friends. Then, join Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and Twitter.

Petraeus' Oily Spin about Progress in Afghanistan

By Derick Crowe

With General Petraeus' stop on CBS Evening News with Katie Couric now halfway over, it's worth taking a moment to unpack the unchallenged, false assertions and implications he's piled up thus far on his media tour. We decided to look into the claims he made about "oil spots" of "progress" during his interview with NBC's David Gregory. Both claims were absolute fantasies, and the remaining journalists on Petraeus' tour owe their viewers more rigorous skepticism than what we saw on Meet the Press.

Despite Petraeus' use of the term more than a dozen times in his MTP interview, virtually no data that shows strategically significant security "progress" in Afghanistan since the start of the latest escalation. According to the Afghan NGO Safety Office (ANSO), emphasis mine:

...[T]he number of provinces having more than three attacks per day has grown from 1 to 4 while the number of provinces seeing the lowest rate (<1 per 2 days) has dropped from 22 to 19. Overall ANSO assess that, in terms of daily attack rates, 23 provinces have remained stable, 1 has improved and nine provinces have deteriorated being Nangahar, Paktya, Kandahar, Paktika, Uruzgan, Helmand, Ghazni, Farah, Kunduz.

AOG are presenting a formidable geographic presence and are escalating attacks, in areas well outside of IMF main focus, at their own direction and tempo.

Needless to say, if insurgents are initiating many more attacks "at their own direction and tempo," International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has not "regained the initiative."

But let's talk specifically about General Petraeus' "oil spots."

GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, the oil, the oil spot, if you will, is a, is a term in counterinsurgency literature that connotes a peaceful area, secure area. So what you're trying to do is to always extend that, to push that out. ...[D]own in Helmand Province what we sought to do was to build an oil spot that would encompass the six central districts of Helmand Province, including Marjah and then others, and then to just keep pushing that out, ultimately to connect it over with the oil spot that is being developed around Kandahar City...

The general's visit to Wardak Province today was in part to underline the ...importance of that security bubble being extended from outside Kabul to the southwest here to Wardak Province.

The general, quite frankly, is out of his mind if he wants us to apply a term that means "a peaceful area, secure area" to Helmand (which includes Marjah), Kandahar, or Wardak. None of those provinces are secure. None. In fact, compared to this time last year, they are less peaceful and less secure.

Helmand/Kandahar Region

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), southern Afghanistan is in the grip of an ever-escalating insurgent assassination campaign. UNAMA's latest report conveys the local Afghans' perception that the insurgents can strike anywhere, anytime, and that U.S. and allied forces can't protect them. From the report:

The Taliban's use of assassinations increased from an average 3.6 per week and 15.6 per month in the first part of 2009 to on average 7.0 per week and 30.5 per month in the first four months 2010. In May and June, the number of assassinations skyrocketed to on average 18.0 per week according to the UN Department of Safety and Security- Afghanistan.

Helmand (including Marjah)

According to ANSO, the number of insurgent attacks in Helmand province during the second quarter of 2010 spiked to 820, compared to 257 attacks during the same period last year. According to UNAMA, the has effectively prevented provincial authorities from delivering the promised "government in a box" in Marjah, while Operation Moshtarak "has not resulted in increased protection for the civilian population."

UNAMA also slapped ISAF for decreasing civilian security by locating their bases in or near residential areas. ISAF justifies this placement by appealing to counterinsurgency admonitions to "live in and among the population," but UNAMA's report retorts that, because of the locations of the bases,

Afghan civilians face not only the risk of often disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks by AGEs, but also death and injury from mortar and rocket attacks fired by IM Forces that mistakenly fall short of their target and hit residential compounds.

The failure of ISAF to establish security for the residents of Helmand and the ever-growing insurgent assasination campaign combine to make Helmand "the most violent province in the country," according to ANSO.

Kandahar

When Karzai, McChrystal and other representatives of ISAF and the Afghan government held their shuras in Kandahar to win local support, they were told in no uncertain terms that the locals didn't want a military operation brought to their home because they feared it would just drag violence into their neighborhoods. They complained bitterly about ISAF's dismissal of their concerns to UNAMA:

Elders also reported that...these meetings were "photo opportunities" at which the elders' concerns and suggestions were not taken seriously. As one elder from Panjwayi district told UNAMA HR, ".. there are far too many 'meetings in name.' ISAF and the Government ignore what we say, because we are from the districts..[T]his is not true, and it is insulting...[t]here are too often photographers and television cameras at these meetings. In Pakistan, of course, the Taliban can watch television, see me sitting with the governor and decide to kill me. So, when there is a 'meeting in name,' first I risk my life, and then I am insulted."

As ISAF's so-called "rising tide of security" began to materialize, the elders' contended to UNAMA that "ISAF's publication of its plans to launch the military operation caused the Taliban to plant more IEDs and intensify their campaign of intimidation against pro- Government figures." ANSO and UNAMA figures bear out their assertion: Armed opposition groups initiated 559 attacks in the second quarter of 2010, up from 399 during the same period last year, with "more civilians were killed in the region in the first six months of 2010 than in any other region."

Wardak

As for Wardak, ANSO's figures show that, again, attacks were up in the second quarter of 2010 (183 attacks) compared to the same period in 2009 (139). The province is a hotbed for abductions, particularly along Highway 1. In fact, according to UNAMA, "On 15 June, the acting District Governor of Sayadabad district in Wardak province was abducted reportedly by AGEs and later beheaded." Also according to UNAMA:

"[E]lders in Logar and Wardak provinces...said their priority was to end the culture of impunity for civilian deaths and injury from military operations and for those who committed abuses to be held accountable."

And, for the bonus round, rocket fire interrupted Petraeus' shura while Gregory accompanied him for his puff-piece interview. Sounds like a place safe enough for a middle-school field trip, doesn't it?

You've Got to Be Kidding Me

All this brings us back to Petreaus' definition of an "oil spot."

"Well, the oil, the oil spot, if you will, is a, is a term in counterinsurgency literature that connotes a peaceful area, secure area."

Nobody in their right mind or wearing pants that aren't on fire can honestly look at the information above and derive from that anything remotely approaching an "oil spot," as Petraeus defines it. Helmand, Kandahar, and Wardak aren't examples of peace or security. I honestly have no idea why Petraeus would hold any of these places up as his "progress" examples. Wardak is certainly not stabilized, and Helmand and Kandahar are glaring examples of the failure of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

So here's a takeaway for all you reporters out there rounding out Petraeus' media tour: General Petraeus' job is not to tell you the truth. Petraeus' job is to win the war handed him by President Obama. He sees public opposition crystallizing, while at the same time coming to the realization that his mission will not be accomplished by the deadline to start withdrawals. Rather than questioning the basic assumption that COIN was the right strategy to pursue in Afghanistan (it wasn't), he wants what generals always want: more troops, more time. Thus, he sees it as his job to sell the messages that need to be sold to get the things he think will help him accomplish his mission.

His job isn't to tell you the truth. It's to sell you his war. Buyer beware.

General Petraeus, Concern Troll

By Derrick Crowe

Watch "Don't Let General Petraeus Move the Goalposts on Afghanistan" in HD on Facebook.

Concern troll.

In an argument (usually a political debate), a concern troll is someone who is on one side of the discussion, but pretends to be a supporter of the other side with "concerns". The idea behind this is that your opponents will take your arguments more seriously if they think you're an ally.

--Urban Dictionary.

When asked about the July 2011 deadline to begin troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, General Petraeus says "I support the policy of the president." This past week, though, in testimony before Congress in hastily arranged hearings, he made his position more clear. He supports the policy of the president," but thinks "we have to be very careful with time-lines," and he might even try to convince the president to renege on his promise to the American people as July 2011 comes closer.

He's a concern troll. He's kowtowing to the principle of civilian control of the military, but his function in the debate is to constantly hem and haw, sapping support for strong action in favor of a position with which he does not (and maybe never did) agree.

Now, Petraeus is a cool customer and an experienced hand at testifying before Congress. When faced with an adversarial questioner, he rarely shows his cards and tends to filibuster them out of time, sticking closely to the "I support the president" talking point. That's what makes his performance this week slightly shocking. The masked slipped.

When asked by Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) whether his support for the July 2011 reflected his best, personal, professional judgment, he responded with a very interesting stare at the senator, an "um," and a five-second-or-so pause before saying, "We have to be very careful with time-lines." Asked whether that was a qualified yes, or qualified no, or a non-answer, he said, "qualified yes."

In other words, "yes, but..."

Wednesday's House Armed Services Committee (HASC) hearing shed even more light on what exactly those qualifications are, and the troll tusks were showing. Responding to a question from HASC Ranking Member Buck McKeon (R-Calif.), Petraeussaid that yes, he supports the July 2011 date as the beginning of a process. But, he complained, that date was based on a projection from last Fall. He said we'll do everything humanly possible (well, everything humanly possible within the constraints of a brutal, costly strategic frame that's not working) to achieve those conditions. When asked by McKeon whether July 2011 was based on conditions and not just a date on the calendar, he said, "That's correct." And, when asked whether he'd recommend delaying the withdrawal if those conditions didn't materialize, he confirmed it.

America, get ready for this excuse:

"Well, we tried, but it's just not possible for us to keep President Obama's promise to start a withdrawal this month." --General David Petraeus, July 2011.

Compare that General Petraeus, who only gives the July 2011 date his qualified support and who wants us all to know he might change his mind when crunch time arrives, with this General Petraeus, described by Jonathan Alter:

Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus, "David, tell me now. I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in 18 months?"

"Sir, I'm confident we can train and hand over to the ANA [Afghan National Army] in that time frame," Petraeus replied.

"Good. No problem," the president said. "If you can't do the things you say you can in 18 months, then no one is going to suggest we stay, right?"

"Yes, sir, in agreement," Petraeus said.

"Yes, sir," Mullen said.

The president was crisp but informal. "Bob, you have any problems?" he asked Gates, who said he was fine with it.

The president then encapsulated the new policy: in quickly, out quickly, focus on Al Qaeda, and build the Afghan Army. "I'm not asking you to change what you believe, but if you don't agree with me that we can execute this, say so now," he said. No one said anything.

"Tell me now," Obama repeated.

"Fully support, sir," Mullen said.

"Ditto," Petraeus said.

Expect the Alter quotation above to become cliche in a hurry. Petraeus revealed this week that he has no intention of standing by his word to the president. This week, he said explicitly that if we can't do the things he says in 18 months, he will, in fact, suggest we stay.

Petraeus says he supports the president's policy. His comments this week, though, serve only to validate the critics of the withdrawal portion of the president's policy. He's not a supporter of this policy. He's a concern troll.

Don't let him get away with moving the goalposts. Join Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook as we work to end this brutal war that's not worth the costs.

Civilian Casualties in Marjah "Inevitable" as Largest Military Operation of Afghanistan War Begins

By Derrick Crowe

Military officials say that civilian casualties in Marjah, Afghanistan are "inevitable" as U.S. and allied forces launch Operation Moshtarak, the largest military action since the U.S-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Thanks in part to conflicting messages from ISAF and in part due to some residents' inability to flee, many civilians remain in Marjah, in the crossfire.

Statements from Brig. Gen. Nicholson, commander of the operation, indicate that he feels he has leeway to use airstrikes in the civilian area, and that he intends to use fast, furious attacks to try to overwhelm the Taliban. The problem: airstrikes in support of troops in contact are the leading cause of U.S.-caused civilian deaths.

In the L.A. Times article on the upcoming operation in Marja, the U.S. commander says all the right words when it comes to the issue of insulating the non-combatants from the carnage:

�[I]n the weeks leading up to the imminent offensive to take the Helmand River Valley town of Marja in southern Afghanistan, the Marines� commander, Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson, sat with dozens of Afghan tribal elders, drinking endless cups of sweet tea and offering reassurances that his top priority will be the safety of Afghan civilians.

�In counterinsurgency, the people are the prize,� Nicholson said�

...except Nicholson is talking out of both sides of his mouth:

US Second Marine Expeditionary Force commander Larry Nicholson said that the evacuation of most civilians would give commanders leeway to use air-to-ground missiles, declaring that he was �not looking for a fair fight.�

ABC News quotes Nicholson explaining some truly worrisome logic:

Nicholson underscored the point saying a heavy handed approach will reduce the chance for civilian casualties.

�Our feeling is if you go big, strong and fast, you lessen the possibility of civilian casualties as opposed to a slow methodical rolling assault. You go in and you dominate. You overwhelm the enemy,� he said.

Okay, let�s put these two things together. Nicholson is telegraphing he�s letting the air strikes off the chain and that he intends to use rapid, furious attacks in Marja, and somehow that is supposed to lead to reduced civilian casualties. Well, that would be great if we didn�t already know that the single greatest cause of U.S.-caused civilian casualties was airstrikes in support of troops involved in intense firefights.

All of this is very, very bad news for civilians in Marjah. And it's bad news for the troops in the fight as well.

Cross-posted at Rethink Afghanistan.

Tell the House Armed Services Committee to read Eikenberry's warning.

By Derrick Crowe

The New York Times recently published the full text of U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's memo to President Obama detailing his deep reservations about sending more troops to Afghanistan. The White House ignored his warnings and sent troops anyway.

With the House Armed Services Committee set to begin the 2011 Defense Department budget process on Wednesday, it's essential that its members read Eikenberry's warnings about the dangers of deepening U.S. military involvement in the Afghanistan war.

Sign our act.ly petition to the House Armed Services Committee:

petition @HASCDemocrats @HASCRepublicans to read the Eikenberry cables. http://act.ly/1oe RT to sign #actly

After President Obama announced a troop surge despite Eikenberry's warnings, The New York Times reported that:

Without offering details, Mr. Eikenberry has said in public hearings since then that his concerns have been dealt with, and that he supported the White House's troop increase plan. But it is not clear what might have changed about his assessment...

The Eikenberry documents spell out in detail why a military strategy in Afghanistan is the wrong approach. HASC members should write strong language into the 2011 Defense budget that requires the Pentagon to begin withdrawing our troops by July 2011. Sign the petition today.

Next steps: Join our Twitter vigil against the Afghanistan war!

Cross-posted at Rethink Afghanistan.

Afghanistan War Shapes Engorged Defense Budget While Domestic Programs Freeze

By Derrick Crowe

The Obama Administration just unveiled a huge Defense Department budget for next year shaped by the Afghanistan war. War spending is exempt from the president's proposed spending freeze, despite President Obama's statement at West Point that, "we can't simply afford to ignore the price of these wars."

According to AFP:

The Obama administration plans to unveil a defense budget on Monday that pours billions into drones, helicopters and special forces, reflecting a focus on fighting Islamist extremists rather than conventional armies.

The Pentagon's spending priorities as well as its strategic vision -- which is also due to be unveiled this week -- are a product of the counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan that have severely stretched the military.

The proposed 2011 defense budget comes to more than 700 billion dollars, a modest two percent increase, and unlike last year avoids sweeping cuts to major weapons programs, according to Pentagon officials and draft documents.

Politico also reports that the administration's war funding estimates for the next 2 years far exceed last year's estimates:

President Barack Obama's new budget, to be released Monday, forecasts two consecutive years of near $160 billion in war funding, far more than he hoped when elected and only modestly less than the last years of the Bush Administration.

In 2011 alone, the revised numbers are triple what the president included in his spending plan a year ago. And the strain shows itself in new deficit projections, already hobbled by lagging revenues due to the weak economy.

We can't afford to keep spending huge amounts of blood and treasure on a war that's causing massive human suffering and that's not making us any safer.

In other news, Bloomberg reports that, "Defense Stocks May Rise With Government Budget Increase." Note especially the giggling about the profitability of drones. Mass murder from above is good for business!

Rethink the State of the Union

By Derrick Crowe

President Obama will give his first State of the Union address on Wednesday night at 9 p.m. Eastern. Brave New Foundation's Rethink Afghanistan campaign wants to make sure this isn't just a time to sit and watch, but a time to get together with our friends and push back against the expanding Afghanistan war.

20,000 and Counting

On Friday, we asked our supporters to sign a simple petition to President Obama:

In your State of the Union address on January 27, 2010, I want you to provide a concrete exit strategy for our troops in Afghanistan that begins no later than July 2011 and which completes a withdrawal of combat troops no later than July 1, 2012.

More than 20,000 people signed it. Instead of just handing it to someone at the White House, petition signers are getting their message and the list of signers to the White House by posting it on the White House Facebook fan page. If you haven't signed the petition, please do so.

No Applause, Please

Our friends over at TrueMajority are pushing their Members of Congress to refrain from applauding when the president talks about Afghanistan. The media and people at home notice when an applause line falls flat during the State of the Union, and we want our representatives to represent us by refusing to cheer for more wasted spending on a deadly war that doesn't make us safer.

Rethink the State of the Union

Why watch the speech alone on TV when you can hang out with more than 11,000 people like you who want the Afghanistan war to end? Join the other fans of Rethink Afghanistan and watch the speech on our Facebook fan page.

• Rethink Afghanistan's fan page will have a live stream of a part of Rethink Afghanistan (The Cost of War) prior to the speech at 8:30 p.m. Eastern / 5:30 p.m. Pacific.


• Then, we'll carry a live stream of the State of the Union address.


• Brave New Foundation's Robert Greenwald will be there for the conversation, and I'll provide commentary and links to Afghanistan-related information.


• After the speech, our whole mob will head over to the White House's Facebook page to share our thoughts on his Afghanistan comments.

We hope you'll join us tomorrow night starting at 8:30 p.m. Eastern / 5:30 p.m. Pacific as our community gathers to rethink the State of the Union.

Derrick Crowe is a political associate at Brave New Foundation, working on their Rethink Afghanistan campaign

Mr. President, Lead Us Out of the Afghanistan War

By Derrick Crowe

Next Wednesday, President Obama will give his first State of the Union address. It's a safe bet he'll discuss the Afghanistan war. You probably recall that the President recently committed to start drawing down troops in Afghanistan in July 2011.

Setting a target date for the start of a withdrawal is a good step, but if we are going to make the president's commitment into a reality, we need a concrete exit strategy.

Please take a moment to sign Rethink Afghanistan's petition to tell the President that you want him to describe a real exit strategy for Afghanistan during his State of the Union speech. Here's the text:

In your State of the Union address on January 27, 2010, I want you to provide a concrete exit strategy for our troops in Afghanistan that begins no later than July 2011 and which completes a withdrawal of combat troops no later than July 1, 2012.

A concrete exit plan will lay the groundwork that will help make President Obama's commitment to a draw-down a reality. Our country cannot afford to keep spending billions of dollars on a war that's not making us safer. Staunching the flow of American blood and treasure into the Afghanistan war will be essential to the success of the Obama presidency and to getting our economy back on track. We need more than a date. We need a plan.

Please sign the petition today. If we get 10,000 signatures, we'll deliver them to the White House on Monday. Your signature will help put us on a defined path to the end of the war in Afghanistan.

Cross-posted at Rethink Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan War's Shadow, Government Corruption Thrives While the People Sell Children for Food

By Derrick Crowe

Corruption is flowering in the shadow of the Afghanistan war. A new report published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reveals that bribery consumes an amount equal to 23 percent of the GDP of Afghanistan. Afghans are forced by corrupt government culture to pay more than a third of their income in bribes. Earlier this month, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported that 3/4 of all their active corruption investigations involved at least one Westerner.

Originally posted at Rethink Afghanistan.

President Obama to Request Another $33 Billion for Unpopular Wars

By Derrick Crowe

The Associated Press reports that President Obama "plans to ask Congress for an additional $33 billion" to fight the unpopular Iraq and Afghanistan wars, "on top of a record request for $708 billion for the Defense Department next year."

This request comes in the middle of the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, at a time when our country can least afford it. Economist Dean Baker recently pointed out that "in standard economic models, defense spending is a direct drain on the economy, reducing efficiency, slowing growth" and costing huge numbers jobs. These costs are so significant that President Obama felt the need to include mention of them when he announced his most recent decision to add more troops in Afghanistan. We can't afford more open-ended, economically damaging spending on these unpopular wars.

Congress should require the president cough up an exit plan that puts us on track for that yes/no/maybe-so 2011 drawdown date.

Cross-posted at Rethink Afghanistan.

[Note: Yes, I realize I'm horribly late getting this post up on Newshoggers. I've started a new gig this week, so bear with me. The above is a video I've done as part of my new job for Brave New Foundation's Rethink Afghanistan campaign. You can see other videos I've done so far this week about the Afghanistan war on the Rethink Afghanistan blog.]