By Steve Hynd
American Security Project Senior Fellow, Dr. Bernard Finel, has been blogging up a storm on the inconsistencies and illogicalities unadmitted by the COINdinista echo-chamber that is monopolizing U.S. policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in his latest post he pinpoints the underlying CYA of COIN advocacy: it contains within it a ready made excuse if it happens to fail. �Don�t blame me. Blame the Afghans!�
The COIN theorists would like the Afghan government to field a force of somewhere in the neighborhood of 400,000-600,000 disciplined troops, capable of using discriminant force and avoiding civilian casualties. They�d like the Aghan government to eliminate corruption. They�d like the central government to find a way to build loyalty from provincial governors and other local elites, to ensure an Afghan �whole of government� response.
Actually, it isn�t that the COIN theorists would �like� this. They require it as a precondition for the viability of their strategy. This is like writing a business plan for a new start-up that assumes you have the killer app to sell and then focuses all its details on the design for the corporate suite.
But unfortunately, the prerequisites are actually virtually impossible to achieve. The Afghan government does not have the tax base, infrastructure, expertise, or � significantly � the inclination to build the kind of military and institutional capacity that our strategy requires from the local partner. Furthermore, the desire to curtail corruption runs counter to the desire to secure the cooperation of provincial leaders. We are setting the Afghans up to fail. And unfortunately, setting the Afghans up to fail is a win-win scenario for the COIN theorists. If, by some miracle, the Afghan government is able to meet our needs, we will claim credit for having given the Afghans a model to achieve. If the Afghans fail, then any negative consequences will be the fault of the Afghans.
That is not the way to develop a sound military strategy. In the standard model, military strategy is conceived as a cycle where the theorist explores ends, ways, means, and RISKS. What we have in Afghanistan is a super-risky approach because some of the key assumptions are profoundly unlikely. The proper response to this situation is to develop a branches and sequels framework. What if the Afghans can�t deliver? Exum � et al � essentially say, �well, in that case, that is their fault.� But the problem is that if you genuinely believe that Afghanistan is so significant that it warrants the expenditure of American blood and treasure for a decade or more, you need to provide a solution, not just a response that sustains your position in the American punditocracy.
We�ve gone down this road before. In South Vietnam...
Bingo!
We've been down this road already in Iraq too, where it was Iraqis who got the blame from both neocons and neolibs alike for not welcoming US invaders as liberators, for not accepting the US plan for their nation with open arms and eventually for not taking advantage of The Surge (tm) to effect political reconstruction.
That narrative played well in domestic politics and elections - which is doubtless why it's being used again on Afghanistan. That doesn't make it any less dishonest.
This brings us back to a familiar dichotomy: are our military tacticians stupid, or are they lying about their goal?
ReplyDeleteWe don't have to go back to Vietnam for this history (although that may apply as well) -- they also found it convenient to tell the American people the Iraqis were to blame for all those six-month-long extentions of the US occupation of Iraq.
Greg Djerejian isn't blogging much these days but when he does it's delicious. Today's post echoes your observations. He picked up a wonderful snip by Rory Stewart, director of the Carr Centre for Human Rights at Harvard�s Kennedy School. He is among a cadre of experts consulted by big shots in the administration.
ReplyDelete�I do a lot of work with policymakers, but how much effect am I having?� he asks, pronging a mussel out of its shell.
�It�s like they�re coming in and saying to you, �I�m going to drive my car off a cliff. Should I or should I not wear a seatbelt?� And you say, �I don�t think you should drive your car off the cliff.� And they say, �No, no, that bit�s already been decided � the question is whether to wear a seatbelt.� And you say, �Well, you might as well wear a seatbelt.� And then they say, �We�ve consulted with policy expert Rory Stewart and he says ...��
Djerejian link:
http://www.belgraviadispatch.com/2009/08/lunch_w_the_ft.html
FT link:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/c7414148-7d60-11de-b8ee-00144feabdc0.html