by Eric Martin
Matt Duss, Peter Juul and Brian Katulis have authored a detailed and informative report on the many costs associated with, and resulting from, the invasion of Iraq. Here is just a sample - there is, quite tragically, much more in the actual report:
Human costs
- Total deaths: Between 110,663 and 119,380
- Coalition deaths: 4,712
- U.S. deaths: 4,394
- U.S. wounded: 31,768
- U.S. deaths as a percentage of coalition deaths: 93.25 percent
- Iraqi Security Force deaths: At least 9,451
- Total coalition and ISF deaths: At least 14,163
- Iraqi civilian deaths: Between 96,037 and 104,7542
- Non-Iraqi contractor deaths: At least 463
- Internally displaced persons: 2.6 million
- Refugees: 1.9 million
Financial costs
- Cost of Operation Iraqi Freedom: $748.2 billion
- Projected total cost of veterans� health care and disability: $422 billion to $717 billion
Strategic costs
The foregoing costs could conceivably be justified if the Iraq intervention had improved the United States� strategic position in the Middle East. But this is clearly not the case. The Iraq war has strengthened anti-U.S. elements and made the position of the United States and its allies more precarious.
Empowered Iran in Iraq and region. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the primary strategic beneficiary of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. The end of Saddam Hussein�s regime removed Iran�s most-hated enemy (with whom it fought a hugely destructive war in the 1980s) and removed the most significant check on Iran�s regional hegemonic aspirations. Many of Iraq�s key Iraqi Shia Islamist and Kurdish leaders enjoy close ties to Iran, facilitating considerable influence for Iran in the new Iraq. The Islamic Republic of Iran is the primary strategic beneficiary of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq. The end of Saddam Hussein�s regime removed Iran�s most-hated enemy (with whom it fought a hugely destructive war in the 1980s) and removed the most significant check on Iran�s regional hegemonic aspirations. Many of Iraq�s key Iraqi Shia Islamist and Kurdish leaders enjoy close ties to Iran, facilitating considerable influence for Iran in the new Iraq.
Created terrorist training ground. According to the U.K. Maplecroft research group, Iraq is the most vulnerable country in the world to terrorism.The years of U.S. occupation in Iraq created not only a rallying call for violent Islamic extremists but also an environment for them to develop, test, and perfect various tactics and techniques. These tactics and techniques are now shared, both in person and via the Internet, with extremists all over the region and the world, including those fighting U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Regarding that last paragraph, it is incontrovertibly true that military action in this region generates opposition, and that opposition (fueled in part by reinforcement "the narrative") can and will come in the form of terrorism. Of course, some terrorist activity would have persisted absent an invasion of Iraq and/or Afghanistan, but that point is as tautological as it is largely beside the point.
On the contrary, the analysis should focus on the scope and degree of the problem of terrorism, and how certain policies can ameliorate or exacerbate the risks - especially with respect to the levels of support the would-be terrorists receive in the underlying population. In other words, counterterrorism policies are not, individually, magic bullets that will (or won't) eradicate all threats of terrorism in perpetuity. But just because some risk would remain even if we adopt the optimal course of action does not mean thatan effort to perfect our policies is useless. Quite the opposite. Mitigating risk, at an acceptable cost, is the essential goal.
On this topic, Stephen Walt does a good job of putting the recent attempted attack in Times Square in context, with appropriate caveats that I would second:
Whether [Faisal Shahzad] was acting alone or in cahoots with Pakistani extremists, his abortive attack was probably a response to our efforts to eradicate terrorist groups in Pakistan via drone strikes and other special operations. In short, he decided to enlist in the "war on terror," but not on America's side.
If this is correct (and I'm prepared to revise my views as we learn more about his alleged motives), it would remind us that illegitimate violence directed at innocent Americans is mostly about what we do and less about "who we are." (This was also true of the suicide bomber who killed a cadre of CIA agents in Afghanistan earlier this year). To say this is not to argue that what the US is doing is necessarily wrong, however, or to sign up for the "blame America first" crowd. Whether the current drone war in Pakistan is a good idea is a separate question that involves both cost-benefit analysis (i.e., on balance, is it weakening al Qaeda or not?) and moral judgment. And yes, even realists can worry about morality.
Instead, recognizing "why they hate us" is critical to understanding the overall price tag associated with America's global military presence and interventionist foreign policy. When the United States is waging war in some far corner of the world, some people aren�t going to like it and will try to make us pay. It's a very good thing that this guy failed, but it would be na� to believe that we can maintain our present global posture and be wholly immune from attacks here at home.
It also means that we should continue to analyze and debate whether our current counter-terror strategy is the right one. On the one hand, one could argue (as this BBC report does), that drone strikes are disrupting militant leadership and organization in places like Waziristan, and thus making these organizations less lethal or effective. The fact that Shahzad seems to have been poorly trained and forced to act more-or-less on his own could be seen as a sign that this aspect of our strategy is working.
But on the other hand, our continuing military engagement there also reinforces the accusation that the United States is engaged in illegitimate interference in foreign (i.e., Muslim) lands, an argument that Osama bin Laden has repeatedly emphasized and that appears to resonate with people like Shahzad. Our ultimate goal, therefore, ought to be to lower our footprint (including the shadow cast by Predator and Reaper strikes) as soon as we possibly can.
Right. We need to reassess the prevailing panglossian attitude about the utility and adaptability of military force generally speaking. War is, literally, only very rarely the answer.
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